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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
FACULTY OF BUSINESS and LAW 
School of Management 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Chunjia Han 
Maintaining or increasing R&D efficiency and productivity is a constant 
challenge for R&D-driven businesses, and companies in these sectors 
often explore strategies seen be effective in related sectors, for example 
the adoption of ‘open’ innovation by the pharmaceutical sector, based on 
its observed success in the information technology sector as reported by 
Chesbrough. The papers in this thesis address two gaps in the research 
literature: (1) the relative lack of established quantitative measures of the 
performance of open or other innovation strategies, and (2) the continuing 
challenge of assessing the effectiveness or otherwise of the OI paradigm 
outside its original high-tech industry focus. The pharmaceutical industry 
has been claimed as one of the pioneering industries where the principle 
of OI has been applied. In view of the limitations of prior research on R&D 
efficiency and OI in this industry, the question of whether OI is the best or 
only prescription for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry remains a 
strategic one.  The first paper in the sequence identifies and explores 
systematic  measures of innovation by investigating  the  adaptation and 
application of DEA as a candidate technique for analysing the  R&D 
efficiency performance, using data on China’s high-tech industry sectors. 
The second paper explores how such ‘indices of innovation’ could be used 
to measure performance in terms of changes in R&D efficiency over time, 
in a case study of Procter and Gamble, a company widely recognised as an 
early adopter of OI. The third paper builds on the first two, using DEA and 
MI as ‘indices of innovation’ to measure whether adopting OI is leading to 
increased  R&D efficiency in the pharmaceutical sector.  Taken together, 
these papers explore (a) the feasibility if DEA and MI as new quantitative 
econometric ‘indices of innovation’, (b) their correlation with a known case 
of open innovation, and (c) to test the hypothesis that open innovation is 
increasing R&D efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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  xi       Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.  Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1  Literature Review 
1.1.1  Critical Trends in Innovation 
Innovation has been long viewed as a path to success, not only for 
corporations but also at the institutional, national and industry levels. For 
the corporates, innovation allows them to establish competitively 
dominant positions, and afford new entrants an opportunity to gain a 
foothold in the market (Danneels and Kleinschmidt, 2001). However, with 
the high failure rate of  innovation varying from 40% to 90% (Gourville, 
2005), innovation is also associated with the high risk. Therefore, study of 
innovation plays an important way for the future success.  
Innovation has been studied in a variety of contexts, including economics, 
management and sociology. The relevance of innovation was first brought 
to public perception by Schumpeter (1934), who identified the importance 
of innovation as the main driving power of economic development. The 
following works by other economists continued to contribute our 
understanding of innovation. Through the empirical study, Solow (1957) 
demonstrated that innovation and technical progress play a key role for 
economic growth. Arrow (1962) studied the seller’s dilemma about 
revealing and hiding technology information to the potential customers.  
With the development of innovation studies, it became well known and 
accepted that innovation is also crucial for the company’s growth and 
success. Therefore, establishing an efficient innovation strategy could 
affect the future destiny of the company (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; 
Adner, 2006). Subsequently, a number of innovation strategies have been 
developed. These often reflected opposing demands, such as incremental 
versus radical innovation (Dewar and Dutton, 1986), continuous versus 
discontinuous innovation (Veryzer, 1998), sustaining versus disruptive 
innovation (Christensen, 1997) or closed innovation versus open 
innovation (OI). Incremental innovation is progress in small steps to 
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maintain and improve the competitive position for the existing products 
(Schwery et al., 2004; Song and Montoya-Weiss, 1998), while radical 
innovation is a breakthrough through providing completely  new or 
revolutionary products (Ettlie et al., 1984; Henderson, 1993). Continuous 
innovation upgrades or enhances the existing technologies or products 
without fundamentally changing the dynamics of the industry (Soosay et 
al., 2008), while discontinuous innovation brings either a factor of 5-10 
times in product performance or a significant (>30%) reduction in cost 
(Leifer, 1997; Leifer and Rice, 2000). Sustaining innovation, like 
incremental and continuous, obtains the competitive position through 
evolving existing technologies or products with better value (Audretsch, 
2004), while disruptive innovation create a new value or market through 
disrupting an existing market or seemingly superior technologies 
(Danneels, 2004; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006; Henderson, 2006). 
Closed innovation is “a view that says successful innovation requires 
control. Companies must generate their own ideas, and then develop them, 
build them, market them, distribute them, service them, finance them, and 
support them on their own” (Chesbrough, 2003b). Since large firms have 
greater resources for conducting R&D and using it to create barriers to 
new and small firms (Schumpeter, 1942), controlling in-house R&D by 
closed innovation has helped the companies keep successful in the past. 
This kind of closed innovation has played an important role of technical 
know-how for firms (Mowery, 1983), especially in sectors like 
pharmaceuticals where in-house, proprietary knowledge has driven 
companies for almost a century.  
However, it is not the only possible source of innovation. In particular, in 
the networked world of innovation (e.g. Prahalad and Krsihnan, 2008) 
there are major opportunities for sourcing knowledge externally (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) emphasized the ability of 
recognizing and commercializing the external information is critical to the 
firm’s innovative capability. von Hippel (1986) proposed how the 
integration of customers such as lead users can stimulate emerging needs 
for new products, processes and services. Pisano (1990, 1991) states that 
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established firms need to balance between in-house R&D and external 
sources from new entrants since the moving of R&D expertise. Powell 
(1990) identified that both formal relationships such as licensing 
agreements, alliances and joint-ventures and the informal relationships 
have been adopted by firms to source expertise outside their boundaries. 
With some ‘erosion factors’ have developed (i.e. the growing mobility of 
highly experienced and skilled people, the increasing presence of private 
venture capital, the existence of a market for technology), the closed 
innovation is no longer sustainable in many competitive situations 
(Chiaroni et al., 2009). In these cases, a new strategy which assumes that 
firms “can and should use external ideas as well as internal ones, and 
internal and external paths to market” (Chesbrough, 2003a) is emerging.  
1.1.2  Open Innovation 
One of the most influential recent theories in innovation study has been 
open innovation. Open innovation was originally defined by its originator 
as “…the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to 
accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of 
innovation respectively” (Chesbrough, 2003b; 2006b). Chesbrough’s work 
plays an instrumental role in providing an umbrella for various 
subsequent research streams (Ili et al., 2010).  
Gassmann and Enkel (2004) identified three core OI processes: outside-in, 
inside-out and coupled, based on their empirical analysis of a database of 
124 companies. Chesbrough and Crowther (2006) studied OI beyond ‘high 
technology’ industries and observed the existence of OI initiatives in lower 
technological and more mature industries. West and Gallagher (2006) 
summarized the fundamental challenges for firms in applying OI through 
examining the activity of firms in open source software. Dodgson et al. 
(2006) identified the importance of technological changes for facilitating 
OI strategies based on the case study of Procter and  Gamble. van de 
Vrande et al. (2009) investigated OI practices which applied by small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with the analysis of 605 innovative SMEs 
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in the Netherlands. Spithoven et al. (2011) studied the absorptive capacity 
building in firms from traditional industries to embrace OI.  
Although a significant body of knowledge  has now been developed on OI 
(for example see Dahlander and Gann, 2010), the field of open innovation 
is still  at an early stage, offering  a wide field in which academics, 
practitioners and policy makers can be active (Gassmann et al., 2010). Two 
relevant gaps can be identified that are relevant in light of the purpose of 
this thesis: 
(1)  The scarcity of attention dedicated to measure the performance of OI, 
as recently highlighted by several authors (e.g. Huizingh, 2011). 
(2) The lack of contributions that systematically and longitudinally assess 
the extent and the determinants of diffusion of the OI paradigm in a 
specific industry (Chiaroni et al., 2009). 
The first gap - the lack of attention to measures - has been highlighted 
from a number of perspectives in the recent literature. Although former 
studies seem to indicate that companies could be benefit from OI adoption 
(Dodgson et al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006), innovation measurement 
still lacks an appropriate metrics system that monitors the investments 
and impact of open versus closed innovation approaches in order to help 
companies to find their optimal strategic balance (Enkel and Lenz, 2009). 
Some research investigates the performance of the pioneering OI adopters 
such as Procter and Gamble (Chesbrough, 2006a; Chesbrough, 2006b; 
Gassmann, 2006; Huizingh, 2011; Lichtenthaler, 2011). However, only 
simple approaches to  measurement systems and key performance 
indicators are in use, which makes it hard to evaluate open versus closed 
innovation approaches (Enkel et al., 2009). Initial studies in OI tend to be 
descriptive, which helps in understanding the concept. Next stage studies 
should include performance measures  (Huizingh, 2011). Since ‘you can’t 
manage right what you can’t measure well’ (Cruz-Cázares et al., 2013), 
measuring the performance of OI should be one of the most important 
research targets in OI research. 
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With respect to the second gap – applicable OI across and within sectors - 
the initial studies of OI were concentrated on high-tech industries (for 
example see Chesbrough, 2003b). Actually, OI was developed by 
Chesbrough (2003b) based on the analysis of a series of high-tech 
companies.  The  subsequent  work  about OI has switched their attention 
from the high-tech sector to the more traditional and mature sectors, 
aiming to understand OI in other industries (Chesbrough and Crowther, 
2006). More and more industry-specific OI studies have been conducted: 
Sarkar and Costa (2008) reviewed extant literature on open innovation 
practices in the food industry and analysed their effects on the sector’s 
innovation capabilities, and found that OI does take place within the food 
sector. Sieg et al. (2010) investigated  managerial challenges faced by 
companies working with an innovation intermediary to solve R&D 
problems, based on the case study with seven chemical companies 
working with the same innovation intermediary. Ili et al. (2010) provided a 
comprehensive overview from the theoretical and practical perspective to 
highlight interesting preliminary findings about OI perceptions in the 
automobile industry through the analysis of 42 companies. Even OI 
practices in the service sector have been studied recently (Mention, 2011). 
Although these studies have contributed our understanding about OI in 
the special industries, more research focusing on the industry is still 
needed to broaden our knowledge on the applicability of OI. Furthermore, 
it remains an open question whether the OI proves to be more adequate in 
the attempt to achieve a better R&D productivity than a closed model for 
some industries (Ili et al., 2010).  Industries such as the  pharmaceutical 
sector, which have claimed to have adopted OI strategies, should provide 
relevant test cases for broadening  our knowledge about OI beyond 
traditional OI research samples. 
1.1.3  Open Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
The pharmaceutical industry has been recognised as one of the major 
industries outside of high-tech which appears to have pioneered the 
principle of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003b). More strategic modes 
of OI have already become a standard in the pharmaceutical industry, and 
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the trend toward OI is still growing (Gassmann, 2010). It makes the 
pharmaceutical industry become a potential interesting testing ground for 
OI research. The initial studies, such as the textbook case of Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals  (Chesbrough, 2003b), have contributed our knowledge 
about OI in the pharmaceutical industry. However, in relation to the 
increasing demands of business conditions and management practice in 
this industry, the prior studies about OI in pharmaceutical industry are 
still limited.  
A systematic review of the literature (using ISI, ScienceDirect, and Google 
Scholar) revealed that a relatively small number of papers have specifically 
focused on open innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. These studies 
have generally explored strategic, structural or operational aspects of OI. 
Fetterhoff and Voelkel (2006) advanced a model of the external innovation 
value chain to help biotechnology firms capture the full value of 
partnerships with external technology providers through the case study of 
Roche Diagnostics. Melese et al. (2009) studied the OI networks between 
academia and industry and summarised the principal models for industry-
academic partnerships based on interviews with both companies and 
academic researchers. Talaga (2009, 2010) discussed the innovative 
partnership stages model which is adapted from the study in food 
industry and analysed the possibility of open and reverse innovation for 
the future of pharmaceutical R&D. Chiaroni et al. (2009) developed a 
framework of analysis establishing the relations between OI modes and 
the phases of the drug discovery and development process through a two-
step research focusing the first 20 pharmaceutical biotech firms. Bianchi 
et al. (2011) did a similar study about the OI organisational modes in the 
bio-pharmaceutical industry and how these modes are interwoven with the 
phases of drug discovery and development process based on the similar 
research strategy and sample. Hunter and Stephens (2010) introduced the 
OI activities and possibilities in the pharmaceutical industry, and pointed 
out that OI is a valuable model for large pharmaceutical firms. Hughes and 
Wareham (2010) identified two OI concepts are not present in the 
innovation portfolio while three concepts get a focus, and discussed these 
capabilities in relation to absorptive capacity through the case study. Judd 
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(2013) discussed the suitability of adopting OI in the pharmaceutical 
industry, especially in the UK. Nigro et al. (2013) developed the use of Real 
Options Analysis (ROA) in the OI field for the R&D project evaluation and 
R&D portfolio selection in the biopharmaceutical firms. Most recently, 
Schuhmacher et al. (2013) found the evidence that pharmaceutical 
companies with more than 50% of their R&D project portfolio from 
external sources have better financial performance, and characterized four 
new types of open innovator which describe current open R&D models in 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
These previous studies have contributed to the understanding of OI in the 
pharmaceuticals on the project evaluation (Nigro et al., 2013), 
organizational mode (Bianchi et al., 2011; Chiaroni et al., 2009), absorptive 
capability (Talaga, 2009; Hughes and Wareham, 2010), partnership 
management (Fetterhoff and Voelke, 2006; Melese et al., 2009).  All the 
studies provide quite positive support and evaluation for the OI adoption 
in the pharmaceutical industry by qualitative analysis. To the best 
knowledge of the author, only one study (Schuhmacher  et al., 2013) 
mentioned evaluating the performance of OI adopters in the 
pharmaceuticals based on data analysis, while this descriptive analysis 
only focus on firms’ financial performance which makes it still far away 
from the final answer. Therefore, the most important question and the top 
level question for this research–  whether OI is the best  strategic 
prescription for the pharmaceutical industry –  is still waiting to be 
answered.  
1.2  Research Design 
Open innovation seems to provide a broad range of benefits, while the 
most important one is the chance to increase the productivity of own R&D 
(Ili et al, 2010). Therefore, the R&D efficiency should improve after 
adoption of OI if it works. Based on this idea, the research is designed to 
develop the indices of innovation and measure the performance of OI 
through comparing the performance of the R&D efficiency before and after 
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OI adoption. This research has been divided into three steps 
corresponding to three important questions: 
(1)  Can quantitative methods be identified, adapted, or developed to 
systematically measure the R&D efficiency of companies or sectors? 
(2)  Could such measures be used to assess changes in OI performance 
through analysing the performance of R&D efficiency before and after OI 
adoption? 
(3)  Could such methods be used to test or predict the effectiveness of 
strategies proposed or assumed to produce more efficient R&D for the 
pharmaceutical industry than the previous or current strategies? 
This chapter addressed the preceding literature and historical innovation 
context of the research. The three main research questions defined above 
are then addressed respectively in the following chapters  (papers). 
Chapter 2 discusses and explores the techniques as adopted and adapted 
in this research for the R&D efficiency measurement through analysing the 
R&D efficiency performance in China’s high-tech industry. Chapter 3 
explores the way for measuring the OI performance through analysing the 
R&D efficiency, the case study of Procter and Gamble which is widely 
recognised as the early OI adopter has been developed, and also the 
‘indices of innovation’. Chapter 4  describes ‘indices of innovation’ as 
developed based on the first two papers, to measure whether adopting OI 
has led to better R&D efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry. The final 
conclusion, along with policy implications and future research questions 
are summarised in Chapter 5. The overall research logic is summarized 
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2.   Chapter 2: Evaluating R&D Investment 
Efficiency in China's High-tech Industry 
Abstract 
Research and development (R&D) investment activity plays a crucial role in 
developing high-tech industries, especially in large developing countries. 
In recent decades, China has made sustained investments in its domestic 
high-tech industries, with the goal of increasing their productivity. This 
paper investigates the effect of this investment on relative R&D efficiency 
across China’s high-tech sectors. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was 
used to generate quantitative indices for sector comparisons; this 
technique which has been applied widely to evaluate the efficiency and 
productivity of industries and sectors. It generates TE, PTE and SE, which 
respectively measure the overall R&D investment efficiency, the pure R&D 
investment efficiency excluding scale effects, and various classes of the 
returns to scale of R&D investment. The analysis of this study indicates 
that overall R&D investment efficiency did not increase from 1998 to 2009, 
despite R&D expenditure increasing by 2188%. Over the same period, most 
sectors suffered from decreasing returns to scale (DRS), presumably also 
reflecting the inefficient R&D investment. Most of the sectors showed 
significant fluctuation on R&D investment efficiency over the period. This 
research result indicates that the problem of China’s high-tech industry 
may be from the inefficiency of its technology commercialization 
processes, and therefore represents a critical parameter for policy makers 
and managers seeking to improve the performance of China’s high-tech 
industry. 
Keywords 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA); R&D investment efficiency; China’s high-
tech industry; Technical efficiency (TE); Pure technical efficiency (PTE); 
Scale efficiency (SE). 
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2.1  Introduction 
The importance of innovation has been widely acknowledged and the 
growth of high-tech industry has frequently been regarded as the one of 
most important indices for economic development (Rosegger, 1996; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Cainelli et al., 2006). This phenomenon is 
no longer confined to the developed countries; countries from emerging 
markets have been investing increasingly into the high-tech industry to 
enhance their capacity for innovation. Although the increasing level of 
investments would seem likely to promote innovation, it is not clear that 
this is occurring (see Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al., 2007). In addition, 
because of the limitation of resources, investment should be prioritized 
strategically across the various high-tech industries in order to realize 
optimal levels of innovation and productivity.  
Research and development (R&D) activities provide the basis for many 
corporate science and technology activities, and play a crucial role in 
enhancing the competitiveness of companies in achieving sustained and 
rapid growth (Zhong et al., 2011). In order to improve R&D efficiency, it is 
first necessary to measure it, and so quantitative methods have been 
adapted to analyze the efficiency of R&D investment as an index of 
innovation. R&D investment efficiency is improved when for the same 
amount of R&D input more innovation output is generated, or when less 
R&D input is needed for generating the same amount of innovation output. 
Simply, innovation efficiency can be defined as the ratio of outputs over 
inputs (Hollanders and Celikel-Esser, 2007). Inputs include R&D 
expenditure, R&D personnel and knowledge capital stock, and outputs 
indicate the technical improvement and economic benefit from the R&D 
activities. 
Measuring the R&D investment efficiency from the quantitative 
perspective is needed to provide practical indices for measuring and 
managing it, especially in the developing countries. Most of the relevant 
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research is based on advanced markets in which the innovation 
production systems are more mature  (for example, Mansfield, 1998; 
Timmer, 2003). Although the experiences from these countries are very 
useful, the particular characteristics of emerging markets decide  the 
necessity and importance of measuring and understanding the R&D 
investment efficiency in developing countries.  
As one of the main developing countries in the world, China has been 
making great efforts to develop its R&D capacity for high-tech industry. 
Firstly, China’s government figures indicate that spending on R&D has 
increased dramatically in recent years. R&D spending has increased by 
2794.044% from 1991 to 2008. Its R&D intensity, namely the R&D spending 
as a percentage of GDP, climbed from 0.76% in 1999 to 1.54% in 2008. On 
the global landscape, although China’s global share in terms of gross R&D 
expenditure remains lower, it is currently the second to third highest 
investor in R&D, following the US and Japan. Secondly, from 1995 to 2004, 
the number of researchers in China increased by 77%. In 2006, China 
ranked second worldwide with 926,000 researchers, just behind the U.S. 
and ahead of Japan. Thirdly, China’s patent applications and 
authorizations showed a double-digit increase, with an average increase of 
16.7% and 25%, respectively, from 1986 to 2007. China’s world-ranking in 
terms of patent application rose from the 22nd place in 1997 to the 7th 
place in 2007 (China Science and Technology Indicators, 2009; The Royal 
Society, 2011). 
With these growing investments aimed at increasing innovation and 
productivity, China has emerged as the largest high-tech exporting 
country with 16.9% of global market share in high-tech products in 2006 
(Eurostat’s high-tech statistics, 2009). However, China is still far away from 
the developed countries in independent innovation capability and 
commercialization capability. For example, In terms of trade forms, 82% of 
high-tech exports belong to processing trade in 2009, i.e., “processed high-
tech” exports. Under the category of high-tech products, what China 
actually exported is low skilled labour rather than technology (Xing, 2011). 
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A  significant  literature  about the study of China’s R&D capability has 
developed over the last decade. Zhang et al. (2003) made a contribution 
about the relationship between ownership and R&D efficiency based on a 
sample of 8341 Chinese firms. Guan et al. (2006) studied the relationship 
between competiveness and technological innovation capability based on 
the analysis of 182 industrial innovative firms in China. Liu and Buck 
(2007) investigated the impact of different channels for international 
technology spillover on the innovation performance of Chinese high-tech 
industries.  Guan and Chen (2010) developed the measurement of the 
innovation production process and applied it to a cross-region study of 
China’s high-tech innovation. Zhong et al. (2011) evaluated the relative 
efficiencies of 30 regional R&D investments in 2004.  
Research on the R&D productivity in China began with the studies of 
elements affecting the performance of China’s innovation capability. Later 
on, researchers switched their attention  to the measurement of 
performance on China’s R&D productivity. However, the relative studies in 
the literature only focused on the cross-region comparison on R&D 
investment  efficiency.  So the research to systematically measure the 
performance of R&D efficiency performance in China’s high-tech industry 
based on industry level and the comparison  across  sectors and sub-
sectors  is still needed to help understand the innovation capability of 
China’s high-tech industry. 
The main econometric methodologies for efficiency and productivity 
analysis are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA). SFA has been adapted to develop the studies about the R&D 
productivity. For example, Zhang et al. (2003) applied SFA approach to 
examine the effects of various types of ownership on R&D efficiency of 
Chinese firms. Wang (2007) applied SFA approach to evaluate the relative 
efficiency of aggregate R&D activities cross 30 countries and observed a 
positive correlation between R&D performance and income level. However, 
there are two disadvantages for SFA technique which make it unsuitable 
for this research: it only can be used when the production function model 
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is known, and more importantly it cannot accommodate many inputs and 
many outputs (Avkiran and Rowlands, 2008; Iglesias et al., 2010; Reinhard 
et al., 2000). DEA, in contrast, has several advantages in terms of 
evaluating the relative efficiency of R&D activities: firstly, DEA is especially 
valuable where the  relative importance of the various inputs employed 
and outputs produced by a DMU (decision making units) cannot be deﬁned; 
secondly, DEA allows for efficiency evaluation without necessitating the 
specification of a functional representation of the R&D/knowledge 
production technology; thirdly, R&D activities typically involves multiple 
inputs and multiple outputs (Wang and Huang, 2007). 
Therefore, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was employed to evaluate the 
R&D investment efficiency in this research. DEA has been widely used to 
evaluate the efficiency and productivity of many different kinds of entities 
ranging from manufacturing industry to service industry, and activities 
including cost efficiency measurement and operating efficiency 
measurement, as well as in contexts from emerging market to advanced 
market (Cooper et al., 2004). 
Specifically, in this study the following three questions were addressed: 
Firstly, What change did the entire R&D investment efficiency of China’s 
high-tech industry undergo during 1998 to 2009? Secondly, what was the 
relative performance of China’s five major high-tech sectors in terms of 
R&D investment efficiency? Finally, what factors triggered this 
performance and what are their implications for the future performance 
landscape? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains 
the research design including DEA model, research procedure, variable 
measurement and sample selection. Section 2.3 provides the empirical 
results of DEA and individual output/input ratio analysis applied to the 
whole industry, the five high-tech sectors and sixteen sub-sectors. Finally, 
section 2.4 discusses the results and makes the conclusion. 
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2.2  Research Design 
2.2.1   The DEA Model 
DEA is a mathematical programming methodology, which is  applied to 
assess production efficiency by  using multiple inputs  and outputs (see, 
e.g., Kozmetsky and Yue,  1998; Yeh, 1996). The ground breaking work 
done by Rousseau and Rousseau (1997, 1998) proved the potential of DEA-
analysis to assess R&D activities. Subsequent studies (see, e.g., Guan and 
Chen, 2010; Chen et al., 2006; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al., 2007; Zhong et 
al., 2011) have provided supporting evidence for its use in evaluating the 
innovation efficiency, especially for the high-tech industries. Two DEA 
models are used in this thesis: CCR model (Charnes et al., 1978) and the 
BCC model (Banker  et al., 1984). The CCR model is designed under the 
assumption that production exhibits constant returns to scale. The BCC 
model, on the other hand, assumes that there are variable returns to scale 
(Wang and Huang, 2007). Therefore, in the CCR model there is a linear 
relation between inputs and outputs; while in the BCC model, outputs can 
increase by a variable percentage, depending on its position on the 
efficiency frontier (Hollanders and Celikel-Esser, 2007). The following 
section describes the two models in more detail.  
Assume that there are n DMUs (decision making units) (DMU𝑗,𝑗 = 1,2,…,𝑛). 
Each DMU𝑗 contains  m  inputs 𝑥𝑖𝑗 (𝑖 = 1,2,…𝑚) and  s  outputs𝑦𝑟𝑗 (𝑟 = 1,2,…𝑠). 
So the m*n input matrix, X, and s*n output matrix, Y, represent the data of 
all n DMUs. The efficiency rate of a unit DMU𝑗 can be generally expressed 
as: 
weighted sum of outputs
weighted sum of inputs =
∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1 ,
     
where 𝑢𝑟( 𝑟 = 1,2,…𝑠) and 𝑣𝑖 ( 𝑖 = 1,2,…𝑚) are separately output weights and 
input weights. The essence of DEA models in measuring the efficiency of 
productive unit DMU𝑗 lies in maximising its efficiency rate but subject to 
two conditions as follows. 
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•  The efficiency rate of any other units must not be greater than one. 
•  The model must include all characteristics considered, that is the 
weights of all inputs and outputs must not be smaller than zero.  
Let DMU𝑜 be the one to be evaluated. Define u as an s*1 vector of output 
weights (i.e., u=(u1,⋯,us)), and v as an m*1 vector of input weights (i.e., 
v=(v1,⋯,vm)). The input-output vector of DMU𝑜 is (𝑥𝑜,𝑦𝑜). To satisfy the two 
conditions, the general DEA  model is defined as a linear divisive 
programming model: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢,𝑣            (𝑢𝑦𝑜/𝑣𝑥𝑜)  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜     𝑢𝑌/𝑣𝑋 ≤ 1   
         
                𝑢,𝑣 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                 (1)                                                                                  
To make sure the above model has an infinite number of solutions (𝑢,𝑣), 
we impose 𝑣𝑥𝑜 = 1. Then we have 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢,𝑣            (𝑢′𝑦𝑜)  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜       𝑣′𝑥𝑜 = 1   
                           𝑢′𝑌 − 𝑣′𝑋 ≤ 0   
         
                𝑢′,𝑣′ ≥ 0                                                                                                                                 (2)                                                                                  
 where  𝑢′, 𝑣′  are the notions changed from  u, 𝑣    reflecting the 
transformation.  
By using the duality in linear programming, the model (2) can be converted 
into a linear programming model which is called CCR model or BCC model 
by adding a constraint. In particular, let 𝜃 be the efficiency score and 𝜆 be 
a n*1 vector of constants. The CCR model is defined as: 
min𝜃,𝜆  𝜃 
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𝑠.𝑡.    𝜃𝑥𝑜 ≥ 𝑋𝜆 
        𝑌𝜆 ≥ 𝑦𝑜 
         𝜆 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                              (3) 
Here 𝜃   is a scalar and its value is not greater than one. With a value 
equals to one, it indicates such DMU is technically efficient.  
The BCC model adds the convexity constraint. It is shown as follows: 
min𝜃,𝜆  𝜃 
𝑠.𝑡.    𝜃𝑥𝑜 ≥ 𝑋𝜆 
        𝑌𝜆 ≥ 𝑦𝑜 
           𝖺𝜆 = 1 
        𝜆 ≥ 0                                                                                                       
(4) 
Again, DMU𝑜 is technically efficient if 𝜃 is equal to one. 
2.2.2  Research Procedure 
The study looks at three levels. Firstly, at the industry level it examines 
the R&D investment efficiency of the whole China’s high-tech industry 
between 1998 and 2009. Secondly, at the sector level, the performance of 
five China’s high-tech sectors on the R&D investment efficiency from 1998 
to 2008 is evaluated. The evaluation is based on the DEA test and 
individual output/input ratio analysis. Finally, in order to explore more 
deeply any  efficiency changes associated with  the R&D investment, the 
performance of 16 sub-sectors over time is examined by comparison of 
the years 2001 and 2008. 
Both the CCR and BCC variants of the DEA model are employed in this 
research. This permits the calculation of the technical efficiency (TE) score, 
pure technical efficiency (PTE) score and scale efficiency (SE) score. The TE 
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score is calculated as the ratio of the actual productivity to the maximum 
attainable productivity (Sharma and Thomas, 2008). It is calculated in the 
CCR DEA model under the assumption of constant returns to scale: in this 
case, the maximum attainable productivity is  presented as the distance 
from the constant returns to scale frontier.  The PTE score is calculated in 
the BCC DEA model as the ratio of the actual productivity to the maximum 
attainable productivity: in this case, the maximum attainable productivity 
represents the distance from the variable returns to scale frontier, which 
means, in contrast to the TE score, the PTE score excludes scale effects 
(Gulati, 2011). The SE score can be derived from the BCC model if the 
technology exhibits variable returns to scale. If there is a difference 
between the TE score and PTE score for a particular sector DMU, then this 
unit is characterized by scale inefficiency (Wang and Huang, 2007). The SE 
score is then defined as the ratio of constant returns to scale Technical 
Efficiency to the Variable Returns to Scale Technical Efficiency (Sharma 
and Thomas, 2008). Once the BCC is established, the analysis can be used 
to determine whether a particular DMU is experiencing increasing, 
constant, or decreasing returns to scale (Chen et al., 2006). Thus the DEA 
analysis process generated three key indices: the SE scores, PTE scores 
and TE scores. These scores can then be used to evaluate the R&D 
investment efficiency by industry, sector, or company over time.  
2.2.3  Variable Measurement and Sample Selection 
2.2.3.1  Input Parameters 
Industrial R&D investment is often a complex process, with multiple inputs 
and outputs. One of the advantages of adopting the DEA analysis is that 
multiple inputs and outputs can be measured  more than can be 
accommodated using conventional econometric techniques (Cooper et al., 
2004).  This multiple DEA analysis study  was begun  by selecting the 
appropriate inputs and outputs  based on the previous literature. The 
inputs to innovation production activities are physical resources and 
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mainly manpower, which are usually measured in annual total R&D 
expenditures and R&D personnel (Wang and Huang, 2007).  
The R&D expenditure refers to the total internal expense, covering all 
projects involving fundamental research, applied research or experimental 
development, as well as the ‘overhead’ expenses related to the 
management and services for these projects (Zhong et al., 2011). In this 
case, the internal expenditure of R&D funding is employed to represent 
the R&D expenditure index. Since the study focuses on industrial R&D 
investment efficiency, only internal expense  is  included (exclusive of 
external). This R&D expense input index has been widely used, and found 
to be suitable in previous studies (Guan and Chen, 2010; Zhong et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2006). 
The R&D personnel input figure includes all staff are engaged in either 
fundamental research, application research or experimental development 
(Zhong et al., 2011). The number of research staff on R&D activities can be 
taken as the R&D personnel input index. However, based on the previous 
studies, the full-time equivalence (FTE) cost of scientists and technologists 
on R&D activities was adopted as the R&D personnel input index, since the 
R&D personnel input index is considered to be more  accurate than the 
research staff number. 
However,  for the macro-level  analysis  such as the industry study on 
country level, the effect of knowledge capital stock should also be 
considered, especially for the developing country due to their knowledge 
capital stock is changing dramatically and has strong potential impact to 
the country’s future innovation performance. The support evidence comes 
from the basic hypothesis behind Romer’s knowledge production function 
(Romer, 1990), which is the idea generation does not ‘‘fall from heaven’’, 
but derives from prior knowledge stock available and human capital (Guan 
and Chen, 2010). Therefore, knowledge capital stock is employed as the 
third input in this research. The accumulated patents stock is used as a 
proxy measure of knowledge capital stock, which is consistent with prior 
studies (see Furman et al., 2002; Hu and Mathews, 2008).  
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2.2.3.2  Output Parameters 
The process of innovation production is complex. If we consider all the 
details in this process, it will be impossible to measure its performance. 
Therefore, the former studies tried to simplify the whole process to make 
it possible to be measured, without affecting the final result (see Guan and 
Chen, 2010). The acceptable process could be a system that first obtains 
technology, then transforms the technology into specific product 
development achievements, and finally to output by extending R&D 
activities to productive development and commercial activities (Zhong et 
al.,  2011).  So the main outputs of industrial R&D activities are not only 
technical improvement, but also include economic benefit.  
The initial, direct outcome of R&D investment is technical improvement. 
The  patents may be the most appropriate proxy of this technical 
improvement (see Guan and Chen, 2010; Wang and Huang, 2007). Although 
not all inventions are patentable or patented and the inventions which are 
patented have different quality (Griliches, 1990), former studies including 
empirical evidence indicate that patents provide a fairly reliable measure 
of innovation production activities (see Acs et al., 2002; Pakes and 
Griliches, 1984).  Therefore, this study employed the number of patent 
applications to measure the technical improvement. Here the number of 
patent applications refers to the quantity of accepted patent applications 
given to the sector/sub-sector by the patent office in the given year. 
Economic benefit is the key purpose of company’s R&D  investment 
behaviour.  The success or failure of innovation activities on economic 
benefit could be observed from the performance of sales and revenues, 
particularly on new products. As Freeman and Soete (1997) discussed, an 
innovation in the  economic sense is accomplished only with the ﬁrst 
commercial  transaction.  Therefore, two indices –  value-added from new 
products and the sale revenue for new products  -  which record the 
economic performance of new products, are adapted in this research. Here 
value-added from new products refers to the value-added achieved from 
the development of new products in the given year. The sale revenue for 
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new products refers to the sale revenue achieved from sales of new 
products in the given year. 
2.2.3.3  Time Lag Effects 
Previous studies indicated that time lags between the inputs and the 
outputs could be important factors. However, there is no generally 
accepted  time lag for R&D inputs and outputs. Goto and Suzuki (1989) 
studied the average time before the sale of a product resulting from R&D 
technology based on survey data for Japanese firms and found that the 
time lag varied among major industries. Adams and Griliches (2000) 
studied the relationship between research output and R&D in eight fields 
of university research, and considered the time lag to be 5 years. Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) considered the lag effects of 
business and public R&D capital stocks on multi-factor productivity 
growth of 16 countries to be 1 and 2 years, respectively. Wang and Hua 
(2007)  conducted a preliminary test, which showed that a 3-year lag is 
most appropriate in the study of relative efficiency  of R&D activities 
across countries when using aggregate data.  Guan and Chen (2010) 
conducted a preliminary test of time lags, using a series of correlation and 
regression analyses, and concluded that the most appropriate time lags 
for the efficiency study of China’s R&D activity would be 2-year lag for the 
R&D process and 1-year lag for the commercialization process. Following 
these studies, the preliminary test was given in this study aimed to find 
the suitable time lag between inputs and outputs, which shows that 2-year 
lag for the applied patent number and 1-year lag for the value-added from 
new products and the sale revenue for new products are appropriate (For 
example, if the dataset of the inputs is from the statistical data in 2003, 
the output data of the applied patent number should come from the 
statistical data in 2005 with 2-year lag, and the outputs data of the value-
added from new products and the sale revenue for new products should 
come from the statistical data in 2006 with 1-year lag). 
The robustness of this selection was  tested in two ways.  There are 
normally two ways to test the robustness of DEA analysis results: firstly, 
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by  choosing  two consecutive cross-sectional datasets to provide an 
approach for a robustness test by longitudinal comparisons (see Guan and 
Chen, 2010; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al., 2007); secondly,  by  varying the 
length of time lags to provide a robustness test (e.g.,  Hollanders and 
Celikel-Esser, 2007).  Due to this study utilising  panel data, the  cross-
sectional dataset already included into the data analysis. For the other 
robustness test, two different time lags were selected and adapted, in 
order to see whether current introduction of time lag has an effect of the 
final results. These two time lags are 2 years’ lag which shows that 1-year 
lag for the applied patent number and 1-year lag for the commercial 
revenue, and 4 years’ lag which shows 3-year lag for the applied patent 
number and 1-year lag for the commercial revenue. The analysis results 
show that, although the exact score per sector per year has changed, the 
general  performance of each sector looks similar which indicates  that 
current introduction of time lag has limited effect on the general analysis 
results. And because this 3 years’  time lag was selected based on 
preliminary test, it is more suitable to be adapted in this study. The 
analysis of results from the other two time lags (2 years’ lag and 4 years’ 
lag) can been seen in the appendix (Table A.1-6). 
Another potential issue is  the time lag difference among sectors. The 
product  development lead time in different sectors is different (see 
Arundel et al., 1995). To avoid this difference affecting the research result, 
a test of time lag was needed. Based on the above tests which adapted two 
other time lag choices (2-year time lag and 4-year time lag), we can see 
that for most of sectors the performance and ranking are stable in the test 
results. This indicates that the time lag adopted in this study is broadly 
suitable. However, from the experience in mature market, the  Medicine 
sector - as defined in this database - normally has much longer product 
lead time since its characteristics and regulation  (see Munos, 2009). 
Therefore, one test was developed through adoption of longer time lag for 
the  Medicine sector to observe whether the time lag difference  has an 
effect for the result. 8-year time lag was employed in this test, in line with 
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previous studies (Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008; Odagiri and Murakami; 
1992).  
The test result is documented in the Appendix (Table A.7-9). Due to the 
limitations  of  the  time lag  effect,  only a short period performance of 
Medicine sector (2003-2008) could be observed. Comparing the research 
results from four tests of time lag, the general performance of Medicine 
sector with 8-year time lag is consistent with the ones from other tests 
which showed the trend of improvement on R&D efficiency. However, with 
an 8-year time lag, the R&D efficiency of Medicine sector ranked at second 
among all sectors, even higher than the Electronics sector (EEACE) and the 
Instrument sector (MEAMI), which was  not observed at other time lags. 
With the comparison of expenditure for new product development, labour 
productivity and gross industrial output value, Medicine sector shows 
lower performance than Electronics sector  (see  Ministry of Science and 
Technology of the People’s Republic of China,  2011).  The differing  test 
results  indicate that the 8-year time lag is not suitable for China’s 
medicine sector. The 8-year time lag is broadly accepted in pharmaceutical 
industry  studies of mature markets such as Japan, America and Europe 
(for example Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). However, comparing with 
mature markets, the China’s medicine sector has a different situation. 
China was still staying at the imitative innovation stage in pharmaceutical 
industry during the test period of 1993-2008 (Ding et al., 2011). One of the 
potential explanations is that the time required for clinical trials and drug 
approvals in China is shorter than time in mature markets (Wang and Kang, 
2005). Therefore, based on the analysis, the time lag of Medicine sector 
adapted in this research is consistent with the one for other sectors. 
2.2.3.4  Data Sources 
As the subject of this first study is China’s high-tech industry, both data of 
inputs and outputs  from 1995-2009  were taken from China Statistics 
Yearbook on High-tech industries, as  compiled by the Chinese State 
Statistical Bureau. China’s high-tech industry is divided into 5 sectors and 
21 sub-sectors according to the categorization in the yearbook. The 
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dataset includes sectors of Manufacture of Medicines (with 3 sub-sectors), 
Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft (with 2 sub-sectors), Manufacture 
of Electronic Equipment and Communication Equipment (11 sub-sectors), 
Manufacture of Computers and Office Equipment (with 3 sub-sectors), and 
Manufacture of Medical Equipment and Measuring Instrument (with 2 sub-
sectors).  Their categorization of China’s high-tech industry in that 
yearbook is shown in Table 2.1. Based on that categorization, the R&D 
investment efficiency could be analysed at three distinct levels: the whole 
high-tech industry, the five big high-tech sectors and the 16 high-tech sub-
sectors. The primary results are summarized below. This is the most up-
to-date and detailed data on China’s high-tech industry currently available. 
China Statistics Yearbook on High-tech industries is published every year, 
and is free to download for both Chinese and English versions from the 
official website of Chinese State Statistical Bureau. 
All financial inputs and outputs were expressed in Chinese currency, as 
10,000s RMB$  Since the duration of the sample period was more than ten 
years, the expenditure indicators  were adjusted  by comparable price 
index in 1995, to remove the inflation impact over period.  The basic 
statistics for the main variables used to study the R&D performance of 
China’s high-tech industry from three levels (whole industry, sectors and 
sub-sectors) are reported respectively in Table 2.2, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.  
 
Table   2.1: Categories of China’s high-tech industry 
NO. 
 
Sectors  Abbr.  NO.  Sub-sectors* 
1  Manufacture of Medicines  Medicines  1  Manufacture of Chemical Medicine 
2  Manufacture of Finished Traditional Chinese 
Herbal Medicine 
3  Manufacture of Biological and Biochemical 
Chemical Products 
2  Manufacture of Aircrafts and  AAS  4  Manufacture and Repairing of Airplanes 
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Spacecraft   
 
5  Manufacture of Spacecraft 
3 
 
Manufacture of Electronic 
Equipment and 
Communication Equipment 
 
EEACE  6  Manufacture of Communication Transmitting 
Equipment 
7  Manufacture of Communication Exchanging 
Equipment 
8  Manufacture of Communication Terminal 
Equipment 
9  Manufacture of Radar and Its Fittings 
10  Manufacture of Broadcasting and TV Equipment 
11  Manufacture of Electronic Vacuum Appliances 
12  Manufacture of Semiconductor Appliances 
13  Manufacture of Integrate Circuit 
14  Manufacture of Electronic Components 
15  Manufacture of Domestic TV Set and Radio 
Receiver 
16  Manufacture of Other Electronic Equipment 
4  Manufacture of Computers 
and Office Equipment 
CAOE  17  Manufacture of Entire Computer 
18  Manufacture of Computer Peripheral Equipment 
19  Manufacture of Office Equipment 
5  Manufacture of Medical 
Equipment and Measuring 
Instrument 
MEAMI  20  Manufacture of Medical Equipment and 
Appliances 
21  Manufacture of Measuring Instrument 
*There are 21 sub-sectors in categories of China’s high-tech industry. Due to the lack of data in some sub-
sectors, only 16 sub-sectors met the completeness criteria for this research. (Sub-sectors NO. 5, 7, 9, 10, 19 
were excluded). 
Table   2.2: Descriptive statistics for main variables in the whole industry 
study 
Variables  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  
Maximum  Minimum 
R&D expenditure   1616497  1296985.664  4084257.48  178474.1 
Full-time equivalent of R&D 
personnel  
111700.7  38337.46342  188986.54  57838 
Accumulated patents stock   2518  2627.829523  8141  312 
Patent applications   12417.25  13564.50523  39656  713 
Value-added from new  56663054  33088083.42  107298051  14243655 
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products  
Sale revenue for new products   55305287  33364143.32  108102978.8  12272350 
Sample size of DMU  12       
Data sources: Data comes from China Statistics Yearbook on High-tech industries, as compiled 
by the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. China’s high-tech industry is divided into 5 sectors and 
21 sub-sectors according to the categorization in the yearbook. This is the descriptive 
statistics of data in the first level study about the whole China's high-tech industry. Here the 
unit of R&D expenditure, value-added from new products and sale revenue for new products 
is 10,000 RMB$; the unit of patent applications and accumulated patent stock is item. 
 
 
Table   2.3: Descriptive statistics for main variables in 16 sub-sectors study 
Variables  Mean 
Standard 
deviation   Maximum  Minimum 
R&D expenditure (2001)  23305  24029.9  88187.82  2944.948 
R&D personnel (2001)  3343.875  3520.659  14425  844 
Accumulated patents stock (2001)  44.625  56.74725  175  4 
Patent applications (2001)  106.4375  98.98079  331  6 
Value-added from new products (2001)  1696668  2145986  7447041  132983.9 
Sale revenue for new products (2001)  1648856  2039920  6811947  106166.1 
R&D expenditure (2008)  137491.6  119556.2  461649.2  18802.78 
R&D personnel (2008)  7373.378  6841.567  27720.36  1262.46 
Accumulated patents stock (2008)  229.5  181.1706  501  11 
Patent applications (2008)  1074.938  920.0535  3614  47 
Value-added from new products (2008)  4732791  5812012  20841837  629713.7 
Sale revenue for new products (2008)  4650793  5812697  20279665  584431.5 
Sample size of DMU  55       
Data sources: Data comes from China Statistics Yearbook on High-tech industries, as compiled 
by the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. China’s high-tech industry is divided into 5 sectors and 
21 sub-sectors according to the categorization in the yearbook. This is the descriptive 
statistics of data in the third level study about the comparison research of 16 sub-sectors 
from China's high-tech industry in 2001 and 2008. Here the unit of R&D expenditure, value-
added from new products and sale revenue for new products is 10,000 RMB$; the unit of 
patent applications and accumulated patent stock is item. 
Table   2.4: Descriptive statistics for main variables in five sectors study 
Variables  Mean 
Standard 
deviation   Maximum  Minimum 
R&D expenditure (Medicines)  165645.2  110542.9  368216  42785 
R&D personnel (Medicines)  13841.83  3370.09  19584.38  9528 
Accumulated patents stock (Medicines)  417  326.526  1134  113 
Patent applications (Medicines)  1294.909  1026.891  3056  257 
Value-added from new products 
(Medicines)  3866045  2261652  8279468  1273707 
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Sale revenue for new products 
(Medicines)  3536810  2130015  7705194  1056384 
R&D expenditure (AAS)  152167.6  76563.53  256195.5  65067 
R&D personnel (AAS)  30680.5  6758.321  40748  18145 
Accumulated patents stock (AAS)  108.7273  51.74957  192  38 
Patent applications (AAS)  247.2727  229.9  810  79 
Value-added from new products (AAS)  2095044  1227502  3822463  428448.7 
Sale revenue for new products (AAS)  1952164  1193183  3840623  352557.1 
R&D expenditure (EEACE)  859331.6  725592.8  2163308  51289 
R&D personnel (EEACE)  44156.15  22345.48  95091.24  15398 
Accumulated patents stock (EEACE)  1104  1326.545  4268  84 
Patent applications (EEACE)  6499.091  7946.413  24680  243 
Value-added from new products (EEACE)  30395572  15549722  54364062  9887901 
Sale revenue for new products (EEACE)  29618161  15819338  54883987  8173422 
R&D expenditure (CAOE)  159545.3  142948.5  400446.3  5473 
R&D personnel (CAOE)  7647.945  4863.667  17483.75  1355 
Accumulated patents stock (CAOE)  171.1818  227.9126  711  6 
Patent applications (CAOE)  1177.727  1178.783  3266  34 
Value-added from new products (CAOE)  14116942  10742944  35056725  2228038 
Sale revenue for new products (CAOE)  13903414  10645668  34329416  2293097 
R&D expenditure (MEAMI)  55466.04  42979.41  152869.9  13860 
R&D personnel (MEAMI)  8348.066  1094.947  11132.08  6788 
Accumulated patents stock (MEAMI)  205.9091  177.1798  591  41 
Patent applications (MEAMI)  722  756.983  2634  100 
Value-added from new products (MEAMI)  1586269  1242651  4186301  425559.7 
Sale revenue for new products (MEAMI)  1494948  1158180  3822655  396889.9 
Sample size of DMU  32       
Data sources: Data comes from China Statistics Yearbook on High-tech industries, as 
compiled by the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. China’s high-tech industry is divided into 5 
sectors and 21 sub-sectors according to the categorization in the yearbook. This is the 
descriptive statistics of data in the second level study about the five sectors in China's high-
tech industry. Here the unit of R&D expenditure, value-added from new products and sale 
revenue for new products is 10,000 RMB$; the unit of patent applications and accumulated 
patent stock is item. 
2.3  Empirical Results 
2.3.1   Overall Efficiency of China’s High-tech Industry 
The R&D investment efficiency across the high-tech industry sectors was 
examined for the period 1998 to 2009, and the final results, including TE 
score, PTE score and SE score are summarized in Table 2.5. Examination at 
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the whole high-tech industry level indicates that the R&D investment 
efficiency in China’s high-tech industry was mostly unchanged over the 
period 1998 to 2009 (see Table 2.5). This was despite rising R&D 
expenditure over the period.  
Table   2.5: Efficiency scores and returns to scale of the whole high-tech 
industry in years 1998-2009 
Year 
Technical 
Efficiency 
Pure 
Technical 
Efficiency 
Scale 
Efficiency 
Returns 
To Scale 
1998  1  1  1  - 
1999  0.904  1  0.904  irs 
2000  1  1  1  - 
2001  1  1  1  - 
2002  1  1  1  - 
2003  1  1  1  - 
2004  1  1  1  - 
2005  1  1  1  - 
2006  0.948  0.975  0.973  drs 
2007  1  1  1  - 
2008  1  1  1  - 
2009  1  1  1  - 
Average  0.988  0.998  0.99    
irs and drs stand for increasing and decreasing returns 
to scale, respectively. 
 
The only two obvious changes were the downturns in years 1999 and 
2006. Both of these appear to result from reductions in Scale Efficiency 
(SE); however, the first downturn was associated with increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) and the second with decreasing returns to scale (DRS). Except 
for these two years, all the other R&D investment efficiencies from 1998 to 
2009 were unchanged. The potential conclusion is that, even with more 
than ten years  development, the R&D investment efficiency in China’s 
high-tech industry has not exhibited any dramatic improvement.  
2.3.2  Patents Performance 
This result suggests a disappointing  prospect for the development of 
China’s high-tech industry investment. To investigate further the factors 
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which may underlie the  unchanged efficiency, the growth ratios of the 
inputs and outputs were  analysed  further  (Figure 2.1).  This  analysis 
showed  that although increasing R&D expenditure appeared to be 
correlated with a dramatic increase in the number of patent applications, 
there only appeared to be a limited economic benefit in terms of new high-
tech product revenues. This finding in  turn may suggest  that although 
increasing R&D investment (inputs) does  appear to have  improved  the 
efficiency of technology production in terms of patents, this improvement 
did  not result in a complementary  increase in new product revenue, 
suggesting that the commercialization process for technology was  still 
inefficient. This would explain, at least in part, the flat R&D performance 
of the whole high-tech industry over the period of observation. However, 
this does not rule out a positive longer-term effect; this point should be 
returned to in the discussion. 
 
Figure   2.1: The growth ratio of R&D investment inputs and outputs 
2.3.3  Further Analysis 
2.3.3.1  Technical Efficiency 
The TE scores reflect the overall R&D investment efficiency. Most of the 
sectors showed significant fluctuation over the period (see Table 2.6 and 
Figure 2.2). The R&D investment efficiency of the Computer sector (CAOE) 
was consistently the highest until 2006. The Electronics sector (EEACE) 
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The  calculation  of  growth  ratio  is  based  on  the  data  of  1998.  all  the  indicators  from  the  other  years 
compared with the data from 1998. for example, the patent stock growth ratio (2007)=(patent stock 2007-
patent stock 1998)/patent stock 1998. 
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and the Instrument sector (MEAMI) followed the Computer sector until 
2006, but then overtook it in 2007 and 2008. Aerospace (AAS) was the 
lowest-performing sector of the five high-tech sectors. 
Table   2.6: Technical efficiency scores of five sectors in years 1998-2008 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE  MEAMI 
1998  0.381  0.102  0.598  1  0.459 
1999  0.373  0.141  0.525  1  0.507 
2000  0.333  0.157  0.634  0.72  0.706 
2001  0.468  0.089  0.411  0.833  0.643 
2002  0.538  0.139  0.46  0.765  0.571 
2003  0.473  0.123  0.43  1  0.693 
2004  0.533  0.199  0.506  1  0.622 
2005  0.55  0.096  0.663  1  0.993 
2006  0.771  0.172  0.745  0.956  0.632 
2007  0.689  0.339  1  0.951  0.859 
2008  0.633  0.341  1  0.887  1 
Average  0.522  0.173  0.634  0.919  0.699 
Rank  4  5  3  1  2 
 
Figure   2.2: The annual variation of the R&D investment TE in five high-tech 
sectors from 1998 to 2008 
2.3.3.2  Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) 
The PTE scores, which reflect the pure R&D investment efficiency 
excluding scale effects, showed a similar pattern of fluctuation and change 
to the TE analysis. The Computer sector achieved the highest and most 
consistent PTE scores from 1998 through to 2008 (see Table 2.7  and 
Figure 2.3). The PTE scores of the Electronics sector were the second 
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highest but fluctuated more over the period. All the other three sectors 
showed an improvement in their PTE scores over the period. Over this 
period, the Aerospace sector also had the lowest PET scores, echoing the 
pattern of TE results. 
Table   2.7: Pure technical efficiency scores of five high-tech sectors in years 
1998-2008 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1998  0.393  0.104  1  1  0.55 
1999  0.381  0.144  0.818  1  0.566 
2000  0.335  0.162  1  0.792  0.782 
2001  0.47  0.111  0.759  1  0.694 
2002  0.539  0.163  0.794  0.874  0.605 
2003  0.474  0.153  0.838  1  0.72 
2004  0.572  0.206  1  1  0.634 
2005  0.588  0.165  0.936  1  1 
2006  0.846  0.193  0.808  1  0.637 
2007  0.689  0.353  1  1  0.869 
2008  0.647  0.402  1  1  1 
Average  0.539  0.196  0.905  0.97  0.732 
Rank  4  5  2  1  3 
 
Figure   2.3: The annual variation of the R&D investment PTE in five high-
tech sectors from 1998 to 2008 
2.3.3.3  Scale Efficiency (SE) 
Scale efficiency (SE) scores, which reflect various classes of the returns to 
scale of R&D investment, did not show any consistent pattern of change 
across the sectors during this period. SE was highest in the Medicine 
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sector, followed by Instrument and Computer sectors (see Table 2.8 and 
Figure 2.4).  
Table   2.8: Scale efficiency scores and returns to scale of five high-tech 
sectors in years 1998-2008 
   Medicines  AAS   EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
Year  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS 
1998  0.97  drs  0.984  irs  0.598  drs  1  -  0.835  Irs 
1999  0.978  irs  0.981  irs  0.642  drs  1  -  0.896  Irs 
2000  0.995  drs  0.966  irs  0.634  drs  0.909  drs  0.903  Irs 
2001  0.995  irs  0.796  drs  0.542  drs  0.833  drs  0.928  Irs 
2002  0.998  irs  0.85  drs  0.579  drs  0.875  drs  0.944  Irs 
2003  0.999  drs  0.801  drs  0.513  drs  1  -  0.963  Irs 
2004  0.932  drs  0.966  drs  0.506  drs  1  -  0.981  Irs 
2005  0.935  drs  0.583  drs  0.708  drs  1  -  0.993  Irs 
2006  0.911  drs  0.892  drs  0.921  drs  0.956  drs  0.993  Drs 
2007  1  -  0.958  drs  1  -  0.951  drs  0.988  Drs 
2008  0.978  drs  0.848  drs  1  -  0.887  drs  1  - 
Average  0.972 
 
0.875 
 
0.695 
 
0.946 
 
0.948 
 
Rank  1     4     5     3     2    
RTS is returns to scale. irs and drs for increasing and decreasing returns to scale, 
respectively. 
 
Figure   2.4: The annual variation of the scale efficiency scores in five high-
tech sectors from 1998 to 2008 
The average SE scores of the Electronics sector was the lowest of all the 
high-tech sectors although  it has begun to increase since 2005. At the 
same time, the SE score of the Computer sector started to decline. Based 
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on the observation of the SE score progress, the initial conclusion is that 
there was no marked difference in returns to scale across the sector 
during this period.  Further analysis of the SE data indicated that returns 
to scale (RS) metrics might provide useful indices for the management of 
R&D investment efficiency. There are three possible classes of returns to 
scale: decreasing (DRS), increasing (IRS) and constant (CRS). CRS is 
indicated by an SE score of 1; DRS, signified by a decrease in the relative 
output for a given incremental input, and an associated decline in the 
consequent revenue/profit. The policy implications for such a sector 
appear to be that active monitoring and management of RS metrics may 
provide useful indices for control and allocation of R&D investment. IRS, 
signified by an increase in the relative output for a given incremental 
input, suggests that for such a sector the incumbent R&D investment is 
insufficient to fully utilize the potential production capacity, therefore 
making the sector suffer from scale inefficiency. China’s high-tech sectors 
suffered from DRS for most of the test period, with the exception of the 
Instrument sector. The Electronics and Instrument sectors both saw CRS, 
signifying the best scale efficiency performance in 2008; Electronics, 
suffered from DRS before 2007, whereas the Instrument sector suffered 
from IRS before 2006.  
In summary, it appears that most of the high-tech sectors in China have 
been suffering from decreasing returns to scale over the decade 1998-
2008. This DRS trend may be a consequence of uncontrolled expansion of 
enterprises in these sectors, and/or increasing intensity of market 
competition. Another possible explanation is the monopolistic position of 
the high-tech sector in China, effectively reducing/removing competition.  
2.3.3.4  Individual Output/Input Ratio Analysis 
As shown in Table 2.9  and Table 2.10, ratio analysis was  employed to 
examine the differences on individual output/input items among the five 
sectors. Table 2.6 presents the ratios of number of patents over the three 
inputs respectively: R&D expenditure, R&D personnel and the accumulated 
patents stock. Here, sectors 1 to 5 represent the Medicines sector, 
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Aerospace sector, Electronics sector, Computer sector, Instrument sector, 
respectively. 
Table   2.9: Individual output/input ratio analysis in terms of number of 
patents in years 1998-2008 
 
Table 2.10  shows that: (1) The  Computer  sector  performed at the best 
level on R&D personnel ratio and patent stocks ratio. (2) The Instrument 
sector ranked first in R&D expenditure ratio but did not perform well in 
the other ratios. (3)  The  Electronics  sector  ranked second in all 
output/input ratios. (4)  The  Aerospace  sector  operated least efficient 
among the five sectors.  (5)  The Medicines  sector  performed only better 
than  the  Aerospace  sector. Noticeably, it ranked third in the R&D 
personnel  ratio due to its consecutive increase in full-time equivalence 
productivity on patents between 2001 and 2007. 
Table  2.10  represents the ratios of new product annual sales to three 
outputs in each industry: R&D expenditure, R&D personnel and the 
accumulated patents stock. This analysis shows that the Computer sector 
and Electronics sector ranked first and second across every ratio. The 
Medicines sector and Instrument sector operated less efficiently, and 
again the Aerospace sector exhibited  the lowest performance. This 
analysis supports the initial conclusion from the earlier analyses that the 
Computer sector is the most efficient sector within China’s high-tech 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
sector 1 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.050 0.056 0.082 0.086 0.093 0.155 0.171 0.156 0.084 3
sector 2 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.012 0.021 0.027 0.009 5
sector 3 0.016 0.018 0.026 0.036 0.053 0.081 0.099 0.141 0.179 0.276 0.260 0.108 2
sector 4 0.025 0.019 0.018 0.065 0.091 0.242 0.186 0.202 0.150 0.237 0.187 0.129 1
sector 5 0.015 0.015 0.028 0.033 0.038 0.063 0.066 0.109 0.111 0.168 0.237 0.080 4
sector 1 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 4
sector 2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 5
sector 3 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.010 2
sector 4 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 3
sector 5 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.017 0.016 1
sector 1 1.404 2.434 2.112 2.442 3.168 2.413 4.237 3.504 5.900 2.642 2.695 2.996 4
sector 2 0.908 1.946 2.447 0.434 1.737 1.266 2.686 1.230 2.326 6.986 4.219 2.381 5
sector 3 2.893 4.958 7.989 4.618 5.150 5.019 5.906 6.541 5.249 6.811 5.783 5.538 2
sector 4 3.778 13.50 10.69 5.596 8.087 7.275 10.81 35.11 6.875 4.530 6.905 10.29 1
sector 5 2.128 3.293 3.484 3.213 1.913 2.976 2.792 6.333 2.343 3.735 4.457 3.333 3
rank sector
                 
patent 
number/f
ull-time 
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ce on R&D
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industry, followed with the Electronics sector and Instrument sector; the 
Aerospace sector has the worst performance on R&D investment efficiency. 
Table   2.10: Individual output/input ratio analysis in terms of new product 
annual sales in years 1998-2008 
 
2.3.3.5  Summary of Analysis: Sector-level Indices  
Based on the analysis of the TE, PTE, SE and output/input ratio, the 
Computer sector achieved the best R&D investment efficiency among 
China’s five biggest high-tech sectors. However, apparently suffering from 
decreasing returns to scale, its efficiency has been declining since 2006. 
On present trends, the Electronics sector and Instrument sector might be 
predicted to overtake the Computer sector, as the best R&D investment 
efficient high-tech sector in China, based on their performance in the test 
of DEA and output/input ratio. The other two sectors - medicines sector 
and Aerospace sector have been suffering from low R&D investment 
efficiency, which may come from the effects of monopoly, and may call 
into question that investment strategy. 
2.3.4  Detailed Sub-sector Analysis 
Following on from the sector-level ratio analysis, the R&D investment 
efficiency within specific sub-sectors was moved on to explore. Of the 21 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
sector 1 110.87 113.78 152.62 191.02 200.68 256.8 246.81 237.43 291.1 444.1 393.4 239.88 3
sector 2 14.234 14.708 20.222 54.349 44.81 71.58 64.014 86.101 96.91 137 128.6 66.5895 5
sector 3 530.81 361.06 579 639.8 729.48 819.8 790.52 714.71 605.8 862.5 577.2 655.514 2
sector 4 1692.3 868.01 710.29 1603.7 1286.9 2486 1941.7 2895.6 2139 1799 1964 1762.48 1
sector 5 58.469 62.735 83.255 93.43 83.929 146.8 150.41 218.12 261.3 379.2 343.4 171.003 4
sector 1 24.691 22.673 26.744 26.694 27.079 22.84 19.019 19.05 17.96 22.7 20.93 22.7624 4
sector 2 5.4184 6.1262 10.224 13.765 16.617 15.79 12.116 13.29 11.95 13.48 14.99 12.161 5
sector 3 159.36 85.849 94.808 54.541 57.206 43.61 35.993 30.159 26.28 28.63 25.37 58.3461 2
sector 4 418.98 205.55 76.859 141.49 99.069 83.7 118.02 73.187 100.4 63.81 85.73 133.341 1
sector 5 28.636 28.77 33.568 28.382 21.149 27.19 23.719 27.023 25.04 32.63 25.01 27.3737 3
sector 1 5772.6 11012 12873 9261.2 11258 7529 12203 8937.9 11110 6858 6795 9419.18 4
sector 2 4052.4 10292 21684 5418.5 26361 15879 19568 24677 19359 45081 20003 19306.8 3
sector 3 97303 101978 175781 80994 71024 50975 47021 33243 17783 21277 12859 64567 2
sector 4 254789 618894 418527 137442 114501 74797 112838 502089 97839 34363 72578 221696 1
sector 5 8444.5 13891 10528 9012.5 4255.3 6941 6347.1 12686 5516 8409 6468 8408.89 5
new 
product 
sales/full-
time 
equivalen
rank
new 
product 
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high-tech sub-sectors covered in the Bureau data, only 16 could be 
accepted into analysis: 5 had to be excluded because of incomplete data. 
More detailed analysis of the 16 defined sub-sectors revealed that their 
individual R&D investment efficiencies changed dramatically in year 2001 
and 2008.  
The overall pattern which emerges from the sub-sector analysis is of 
gradual decline in TE and PTE, some rise in SE and a fairly dramatic rise in 
the number of sub-sectors undergoing DRS. Over the same sample period, 
average SE scores across the sub-sectors were increasing, and the number 
of sub-sectors which were suffering from DRS rose dramatically. In 
addition, fewer sub-sectors  were performing with high R&D investment 
efficiency (see Table 2.11). In Figure 2.5(a) and 2.5(b), the distribution of 
PTE/TE ratios was plotted, and indicate their relationship to the average 
PTE and TE scores (solid lines). In Figure 2.6(a) and 2.6(b), the situation as 
a series of four-quadrant grids framing the potential zones of behaviour 
between key parameters was portrayed. The positive relationship between 
TE score and  PTE score in Figure  2.5a could be observed. And the 
relationship is much stronger in Figure 2.5b, which suggests the PTE level 
is more important in improving the TE score.  
In Figure 2.5a: (1) The lines perpendicular to the x-axis and the y-axis are, 
respectively, the average value of the TE score and PTE score for the 16 
high-tech sectors, (2) The numbered points on the grid represent the 
individual sectors represented in table  2.11. Black means increasing 
returns to scale, red means decreasing returns to scale, and green means 
constant returns to scale. 
In Figure 2.5b: (1) the lines which are perpendicular to the x-axis and the y-
axis are, respectively, average value of TE and PTE scores  of 16 sub-
sectors, that is x=0.599, y=0.747. (2) The numbers represent the various 
sub-sectors in Table 2.11. The black colour means increasing returns to 
scale, the red colour means decreasing returns to scale, and the green 
colour means constant returns to scale.  Figure 2.5b shows the equivalent 
data for 2008 on the same axes. 
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In both Figure 2.5a and 2.5b, the sectors in zone A exhibit both high PTE 
and TE scores. Sectors in zone B show high PTE scores, but low TE scores. 
Zone C sectors exhibit low score on both PTE and TE. There are few 
sectors in zone D, making high TE score with low PTE level an uncommon 
occurrence. 
Table   2.11: Process efficiency scores of R&D investment in 16 China's 
high-tech sub-sectors in 2001 and 2008 
Ind. 
*Sub-
sector 
NO. 
Abbr.  TE     PTE     SE     RTS 
         2001  2008 
 
2001  2008 
 
2001  2008 
 
2001  2008 
medicines 
1  CM  0.533  0.314 
 
0.97  0.54 
 
0.55  0.581 
 
Drs  Drs 
2  FTCHM  1  0.551 
 
1  0.959 
 
1  0.575 
 
-  Drs 
3  BABCP  0.429  0.562 
 
1  0.575 
 
0.429  0.977 
 
Irs  Irs 
AAS   4  ROA  0.104  0.234     0.237  0.413     0.44  0.566     Drs  Drs 
EEACE 
6  CTRE  0.363  0.535 
 
0.375  0.787 
 
0.967  0.68 
 
Irs  Drs 
8  CTEE  1  0.252 
 
1  0.255 
 
1  0.987 
 
-  Irs 
11  EVA  0.672  0.389 
 
0.778  0.394 
 
0.863  0.986 
 
Irs  Irs 
12  SDA  0.245  0.335 
 
1  0.469 
 
0.245  0.715 
 
Irs  Irs 
13  IC  0.399  0.786 
 
1  1 
 
0.399  0.786 
 
Irs  Drs 
14  ELC  0.418  0.367 
 
0.544  0.585 
 
0.77  0.628 
 
Drs  Drs 
15  DTSARR  1  0.816 
 
1  1 
 
1  0.816 
 
-  Drs 
16  OEE  0.576  1 
 
1  1 
 
0.576  1 
 
Irs  - 
CAOE 
17  ENC  1  1     1  1     1  1     -  - 
18  CPE  0.869  0.88     0.926  1     0.939  0.88     Drs  Drs 
MEAMI 
20  MEAA  1  1 
 
1  1 
 
1  1 
 
-  - 
21  MI  0.689  0.564 
 
0.85  0.977 
 
0.811  0.577 
 
Drs  Drs 
   mean     0.644  0.599     0.855  0.747     0.749  0.797          
*The sub-sector No. corresponds with those shown in Table 2.1, and represents the same sub-sectors 
with the numbers shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the shift in the PTE and TE scores of the 16 sub-sectors 
between 2001 and 2008. This analysis reveals no sub-sector  staying in 
Zones B or C in 2008; more sub-sectors appear in Zone A and B. These 
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changes indicate that the overall Scale efficiency level across the 16 sub-
sectors improved, which may be the consequence of the consistent 
increase of R&D investment inputs in China. However, a decline of the PTE 
level across these sub-sectors accompanied the SE improvement, which 
again highlights the importance of PTE improvement as a key 
management index for the increasing of overall R&D investment efficiency 
level within China’s high-tech sub-sectors. 
 
 
1 
3 
4 
6 
11 
12  13 
14 
16 
18 
2, 
8, 
15, 
17, 
20 
21 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
2001  TE 
P
T
E
 
Figure 2.5a: the comparison of PTE and TE scores of 16 sub-sectors in 
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Figure   2.5: The comparison of PTE and TE scores of 16 sub-sectors in 2001 
and 2008 
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  Figure 2.5b: The comparison of PTE and TE scores of 16 sub-sectors in 
2008 
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Figure   2.6: The comparison of PTE and SE scores of 16 sub-sectors in 2001 
and 2008 
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There are three sub-sectors in the Medicines sector: Chemical Medicine, 
Herbal Medicine, and Biological Products. Chemical Medicine sub-sector 
(CM) and Herbal Medicine sub-sector (FTCHM), which were separately 
suffering from the decreasing of PTE and CE experienced the decreasing 
R&D efficiency. Biological Products sub-sector (BABCP) which was benefit 
from the great improvement of its CE, improved a little in its TE. Airplanes 
sub-sector (ORA) which is from Aerospace sector, improved its R&D 
investment efficiency through the development of both PTE and CE. In 
Electronics sector, four sub-sectors (CTRE, SDA, IC, and OEE) which most 
benefited from the improvement of PTE, increased their TE score during 
year 2001 to 2008. The other four sub-sectors in Electronics sector 
experienced the decreasing of TE based on different reasons. Entire 
Computer sub-sector (ENC) from the Computer  sector and Medical 
Equipment sub-sector (MEAA) from the Instrument sector were the most 
efficient sub-sectors about R&D investment both in year 2001 and 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low scale  High scale 
High 
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Figure   2.7: Proposed strategy grid for companies/sectors with varying 
levels of technical efficiency and scale 
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Based on the above study, a model (see figure 2.7)  is  designed to help 
industries evaluate their positions on these key indices of innovation and 
identify the most appropriate actionable strategies/steps to improve their 
R&D investment efficiency. 
Dragon Zone sectors are in a strong position: for sectors in this zone, the 
amount of R&D investment input is sufficient, leading to the best returns 
to the scale; the capacity of resource allocation and innovation 
productivity is near optimal, leading to highest R&D investment output. 
This is the desired goal for most if not all sectors each. 
Tiger Zone: for sectors in this zone, the capacity of resource allocation and 
innovation productivity is also approaching the optimum, favouring  high 
R&D investment output, but the level  of R&D investment inputs is 
suboptimal  leading to decreasing or increasing returns to the scale 
scenarios (DRS or IRS). To move to the Dragon zone, companies in the 
Tiger zone, firstly need to identify the polarity of their scale inefficiency – 
decreasing returns to the scale (DRS) which implies R&D investment 
inputs have been used inefficiently, or increasing returns to the scale (IRS) 
which suggests  R&D investment inputs is insufficient to exploit fully the 
company/sector’s capacity.  Secondly, based on the earlier analysis, 
companies/sectors could adopt a different course of action – increasing 
R&D investment inputs if suffering from IRS, or decreasing R&D 
investment inputs if the industry is showing signs of DRS effects.  
Ox Zone: for companies/sectors in this zone, the amount of R&D 
investment input is sufficient but not excessive, leading to the best 
returns to scale. But resource allocation and innovation productivity is 
relatively weak, producing the observed R&D investment inefficiency. 
Sectors or companies in this zone need to apply R&D investment more 
efficiently, and improving innovation productivity is the main approach. 
Rabbit Zone: companies or sectors in this zone are likely to have issues 
both on the scale of R&D investment and innovation productivity.  The 
immediate needs are therefore to judge which scale problem is in effect - 
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IRS or DRS,  then attempt to change the quality and level of the R&D 
investment inputs, and also concentrate on improving the pure technical 
efficiency.  
For policy makers, the findings and the proposed model suggest that 
companies or sectors: 
(1) Keep the advantage of ‘Dragon’ industries, which is the most efficient 
engine for economic growth; 
(2) Give policy support to help control the R&D investment inputs in ‘Tiger’ 
industries, which are the potential high efficient engine for economic 
growth;  
(3) Help to control the R&D investment inputs in ‘Rabbit’ industry, that is 
the fast way to improve their R&D investment efficiency;  
(4)  Help both ‘Rabbit’ and ‘Ox’ industries to improve their resource 
allocation ability and innovation productivity, which might take a longer 
time to catch.  
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
This study applied the CCR (which is designed under the assumption that 
production exhibits constant returns to scale) and BCC (which assumes 
that there are variable returns to scale) DEA models to evaluate the 
relative efficiency of R&D investments in China’s high-tech industries. The 
principal econometric inputs employed were R&D expenditure, R&D 
personnel full-time equivalent (FTE), and the accumulated patents stock. 
Three main outputs were selected: the number of applied patents number, 
the value-added  from new products and the sale revenue for new 
products. The subsequent analysis was conducted at three different levels: 
across the entire high-tech industry, across the five major high-tech 
sectors, and then across the 16 high-tech sub-sectors, as defined in the 
source Chinese government data.  
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The primary results from this  study are that: the R&D investment 
efficiency  in China’s high-tech industry was  nearly unchanged over test 
period; most of the sectors showed significant fluctuation on R&D 
investment efficiency over the period; average SE increased among sub-
sectors, and these findings were discussed in more detail in the ensuing 
sections. 
2.4.1   Lack of Immediate Impact of R&D Investment   
The first and most striking result of the analysis at the overall high-tech 
industry level indicates that the R&D investment efficiency in China’s high-
tech industry was nearly unchanged over the period 1998 to 2009. It is 
perhaps a little surprising that the overall R&D investment performance of 
high-tech industry didn’t  show any increase, even though the R&D 
expenditure steadily increased during the examination period. Further 
analysis revealed that the increased R&D expenditure was associated with 
a dramatic increase (see Figure 2.1) in the number of patent stock, yet 
there was a limited increase of the economic return from new products 
over the high-tech industry. This finding suggests that the increase of the 
R&D inputs has brought the obvious improvement of the technology 
production efficiency, but that hasn’t yet led to an equivalent improvement 
in the efficiency of the technology commercialization. This may be one 
reason why the R&D investment of the whole high-tech industry did not 
perform better during the study period. 
2.4.2  Variable and Fluctuating Performance across Sectors  
Most of the sectors showed significant fluctuation on R&D investment 
efficiency over the period. All of them except the Instrument sector were 
suffered from DRS in most test years.  The Computer sector performed the 
highest on R&D investment efficiency but declined since 2006. Both 
Electronics and Instrument sectors showed the potential of being the most 
R&D investment efficient sectors in China. The R&D investment efficiency 
of the Aerospace sector was lowest among the five sectors in China. 
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There are three indices observed through DEA analysis: TE score, PTE 
score and SE score. 
For TE score, the Computer sector (CAOE) was highest for many years. The 
Electronics sector (EEACE) and the Instrument sector (MEAMI) performed 
well following the Computer sector. Aerospace (AAS) performed lowest of 
the five high-tech sectors. However the TE score of the Computer sector 
started to decline in 2006. Compared with the decline of computer sector, 
Electronics and Instrument sectors experienced an improvement of TE 
scores over period. 
The PTE scores showed a similar pattern to the TE analysis. The Computer 
sector achieved the highest and most consistent PTE scores during 1998 
to 2008. Electronics sector were second highest but unstable over the 
period. All the other three sectors showed an improvement in their PTE 
scores. And  the Aerospace sector still owned  the lowest PET scores, 
similar to the TE results.  
Scale efficiency (SE) scores didn’t show any consistent pattern of change 
across the sectors during this period. SE was highest in the Medicine 
sector, followed by Instrument and Computer sectors (see Table 2.8 and 
Fig. 2.4). The average SE scores of the Electronics sector was the lowest of 
all the high-tech sectors although it has begun to increase since 2005. And 
at the same time, the SE score of the Computer sector started to decline in 
2006. Further analysis of the SE data indicated that China’s high-tech 
sectors suffered from DRS for most of the test period, with the exception 
of the Instrument sector.  
2.4.3   Average SE Increased Among Sub-sectors 
16 high-tech second-class sub-sectors were chosen and tested. The result 
comparison between 2001 and 2008 showed that, their R&D investment 
efficiencies changed dramatically. Their average TE score decreased with 
the decreasing average PTE score. The average SE scores across the sub-
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sectors however, were increasing. At the same time, sub-sectors were 
suffering from the decreasing returns to scale.  
2.4.4   Summary Conclusion 
In summary, China’s high-tech industries would still appear to need time 
to improve their R&D investment efficiency. In the past, many Chinese 
scholars and government officials have argued that China’s high-tech 
industries should first increase their R&D investment to the level or close 
to the level of that in developed countries, in order to reach the same 
scientific and technological level of western countries (Zhong et al., 2011). 
However,  the  DEA analysis  of this study illustrates that despite a 
continuous increase of the R&D investment input, the efficiency of the 
R&D investment has not yet showed a clear and consistent improvement. 
On the contrary, more sectors and sub-sectors suffered from the 
decreasing returns to scale, which may be due to the low absorptive 
capacity for the potential outputs of the increasing R&D inputs.  
On the other hand, some scholars and government officials have 
emphasized that China needs to enhance the capacity for independent 
innovation. However, comparing the huge increase of the applied patents 
number with the unchanged R&D investment efficiency, the conclusion is 
that the problem of China’s high-tech industry may not be its lack of 
independent innovation, but the inefficiency of its technology 
commercialization processes. Of course, this low commercialization 
performance may stem from low quality of independent innovation. This 
hypothesis could be examined in further research, by the study of 
innovation productivity process in China’s high-tech industry. 
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3.  Chapter 3: Patterns of Open Innovation: 
The Case of Procter & Gamble 
Abstract 
Open innovation (OI) describes how organizations realize value beyond 
corporate boundaries by utilizing both internal and external sources of 
expertise to enhance their innovation and commercialization capabilities. 
It has become increasingly popular as an enterprise strategy in both 
industry and academia, and has been adopted, at least in part, by many 
companies. Despite this popularity, here is a dearth of evaluation of R&D 
effectiveness and a lack of suitable quantitative indices. To address this 
problem, this study has adapted and applied Data Envelopment analysis 
(DEA) and Malmquist Index analysis (MI) to measure innovation 
performance.  These techniques are used to compare the pre-  and post-
transition levels of performance achievement of Procter & Gamble (P&G), a 
widely recognized and public early adopter of OI, with a group of its main 
competitors, which have not adopted OI. Most detailed analysis of the 
time-course revealed that the R&D efficiency of Procter &  Gamble 
improved rapidly and substantially after its embracing of OI, an effect 
which is termed as the ‘open rise’, but that there is also a transient decline 
in R&D efficiency at the beginning of OI adoption (‘open dip’) and an 
unexpected and marked decline (‘open drop’) after the peak positive effect. 
Keywords 
Open innovation; performance evaluation; DEA; MI; Proctor & Gamble; open 
rise; open drop; open dip. 
 
 
 
 
49 | Page 
     Chapter 3. Patterns of Open 
Innovation: The Case of Procter & Gamble  
3.1  Introduction 
Since the publication of Chesbrough’s book in 2003, the concept of open 
innovation (OI) has continued to receive wide attention from practitioners 
and researchers (Gassmann et al, 2010). A recent industry survey indicated 
that OI is one of the tools that the largest number of executives 
considered using (Rigby  and  Bilodeau,  2011)  and by  2009 there were 
already more than 150 academic papers on the topic (Dahlander and Gann, 
2010). However, the initial studies of OI tended to focus on successful and 
early adopters (e.g., Huston and Sakkab, 2006; Chesbrough and Crowther, 
2006), and to  be descriptive conceptually (Huizingh, 2011). Evaluating 
open versus closed innovation approaches, requires  more  quantitative 
approaches to measurement and functional indices of innovation (Enkel et 
al, 2009).   The identification or development of an  appropriate metrics 
system for evaluating the performance of open versus closed innovation 
should help  companies find the balance between open and closed 
approaches (Enkel and Lenz, 2009), and it has recently been argued that 
the  next stage of  studies  in  OI should include performance measures 
(Huizingh, 2011).  
If suitable performance metrics of indices were available  and OI  were 
effective in increasing R&D productivity, there should be a positive 
differential between OI and pre-OI conditions  on measures  of R&D 
efficiency. Because the most important benefit provided by OI is claimed 
to be the chance to increase the productivity of the adopter’s R&D (Ili et al, 
2010).  In order to assess the  change over time, indices of the overall 
efficiency of the R&D process  are needed.  Surprisingly, only in recent 
years have a few examples in the literature discussed R&D efficiency by 
using quantitative approaches with regard to R&D at the firm level begun 
to appear (Wang and Huang, 2007).  Zhang et al. (2003) examined the 
effects of different  types of ownership to the R&D efficiency through 
analysing the Chinese firms. Revilla et al. (2003) studied performance of 
public-private research collaborations through analysis of 281joint 
projects from 118 Spanish firms and found that  R&D efficiency varied 
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depending on firm size and level of firm knowledge. Guan  et al. (2006) 
studied the relationship between innovation capability and 
competitiveness through analysing 182 industrial innovative firms. There 
is no research developed to measure the R&D efficiency performance of 
the OI-adopted firm. 
As discussed in  the first paper,  there are two major approaches for 
evaluating efficiency: SFA (stochastic frontier analysis) and DEA (Data 
Envelopment analysis) which belongs to non-parametric analysis 
techniques.  Comparing with SFA, DEA is more suitable to measure R&D 
efficiency.  Another  candidate  of measuring R&D efficiency which also 
comes  from non-parametric analysis techniques  is  Malmquist  Index 
analysis (MI). Both DEA and MI have previously been applied to assess the 
efficiency of economic processes with identifiable multiple inputs and 
outputs  (Wang and Huang, 2007; Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). By 
adapting these techniques and applying them longitudinally to time series 
data,  the performance of R&D efficiency on the OI adopters can be 
evaluated to assess that whether adoption of OI strategy has helped firms 
to achieve the main benefit which is improving R&D productivity. 
To  explore  and validate the efficacy  of this approach to metrics,  this 
research undertook a comparative case study of Procter & Gamble (P&G), 
an  early  and public adopter of OI strategy,  with a clear comment point 
circa 1999 (Dodgson et al, 2006). For the comparison and validation, and to 
better understand the relative efficacy  of  OI  versus closed innovation 
strategies, four leading competitors  were identified,  based on the 
categorization of BIS’s ranking of top R&D firm. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in sections. Section 3.2 makes 
the literature review about studies on measuring OI performance, P&G’s 
innovation strategy and R&D time lag. Section 3.3 introduces the two 
techniques utilised in this research – DEA and MI. Section 3.4 describes the 
data selected in this study. Section  3.5 shows the results  of the 
comparative analysis of P&G case. The final conclusion is summarised in 
section 3.6. 
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3.2  Literature Review 
3.2.1  Evaluation of OI Performance 
Several approaches to the assessment of OI have been put forward in the 
literature. Ili et al (2010) summarized the previous research and designed 
management tools to observe the status of OI in the automotive industry. 
Remneland-Wikhamn and Wikhamn (2011) designed a three-dimensional 
assessment tool which they  utilised to measure the ‘OI climate’  in  an 
organization. Another attempt at introducing an OI assessment tool was 
made by  Al-Ashaab et al (2011), who developed an operational 
measurement tool based on the balanced scorecard to measure the 
outcomes of industry-university collaboration. However, most of  these 
previous studies focus on evaluating the circumstances  favouring  the 
adoption of OI. No indices have been proposed or developed to measure 
the result of OI adoption and the subsequent performance of OI adopters. 
Previous quantitative studies for OI normally employed financial indices to 
reflect the firm’s performance, such as turnover relating to new products 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; Faems et al, 2010). Although a firm’s financial 
indices are useful, this may not disclose the efficiency of OI strategy since 
they  typically  don’t consider the R&D activities and OI cost in the 
organizations. Therefore, an  appropriate metrics system that could 
monitor the performance of OI is still needed (Enkel and Lenz, 2009; 
Huizingh, 2011).  
3.2.2  OI Firms 
The foregoing studies of OI have referred to many case studies of how 
firms implement the OI strategy to enhance their innovation and 
commercial capacity (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003b, 2006a; Sakkab, 2003; Dyer et 
al., 2004; Tennenhouse, 2004). P&G is one of the most famous companies 
which adopted OI strategy at an early date and apparently achieved great 
success through OI adoption. P&G  was first studied as an  example of 
adoption of OI in non-high-tech industry by  Chesbrough (2003b). After 
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that, P&G has emerged and been studied as an OI company in a number of 
papers (for example: Chesbrough, 2006a; Chesbrough, 2006b; Gassmann, 
2006; Huizingh, 2011; Lichtenthaler, 2011). There are also some OI studies 
specially focusing on the case of P&G. Dodgson et al. (2006) analysed 
Procter and Gamble’s ‘Connect and Develop’ strategy as a case study of 
the major organizational and technological changes associated with OI, 
documented the important facilitating role of information and 
communication technologies for P&G’s adoption of OI. P&G’s OI strategy 
and its Connect and Develop model for innovation  was  systematically 
reviewed (Huston and Sakkab, 2006), but there is no literature focusing on 
evaluating the performance of OI strategy on P&G.  
In June 1999, P&G launched a specific  new strategy to increase growth 
through innovation called Organisation 2005 (Dodgson et al, 2006). With 
adoption of Organisation 2005, the firm planned to stimulate innovation 
by making P&G’s internally focused and fragmented communications more 
outwardly focused and cohesive (Schilling, 2005). Through these efforts, 
P&G changed its R&D strategy to a ‘Connect and Develop’ strategy and 
enjoyed major success in terms of business growth through new, 
externally sourced products and technology (Gassmann, 2006). The firm 
announced that they were able to increase their product success rate by 
50% and the efficiency of their R&D by 60% by introducing OI strategy 
(Enkel et al, 2009). With more than 35% of the company’s innovations and 
billions of dollars in revenue produced by radical strategy of OI (Huston 
and Sakkab, 2006), to measure whether the adoption of OI strategy has 
triggered such a big impact on P&G’s innovation capability, the 
performance of the R&D investment efficiency in P&G is studied in this 
research.  P&G would therefore seem to have all the attributes required for 
an effective case study of the performance of OI pre- and post-adoption. 
3.2.3  R&D Time Lag 
To measure the performance of R&D investment efficiency, both the 
innovation inputs and outputs must be considered. Because of the time 
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needed to complete a R&D, introduce products to market (e.g. packaging, 
pricing and marketing) and gain a market share, there is a  sector-
dependent time lag for the economic consequences and impacts of R&D to 
show up following the initial R&D ‘priming’ investment  (Kafouros and 
Wang, 2012). Previous studies have distinguished two separate lag effects 
in the total time to market from R&D (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984). The 
first time lag is the “gestation lag” which refers to the time needed to 
complete an R&D project. The second one is the “application lag” which 
refers to the time lag between project completion and commercial 
application (Kafouros and Wang, 2012).  
A number of studies have made estimates of the time lag between an R&D 
investment and an associated measurable economic outcome.  The 
estimated  time lag ranges  from 1 to 4 years, with 2 being the median 
figure. Mansfied et al. (1971) estimated the lag from R&D to innovation 
was about 3 years for firms. Leonard (1971) reported that the R&D impact 
on the average began in the second year. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) 
examined the lag between R&D investment and economic benefit, and 
found mean time lag to be about 4 years. Pakes and Schankerman (1984) 
estimated the average gestation lag which is usually between 9 months 
and 1 year. And the total time lag between R&D outlay and its first 
revenues is 1.2 to 2.5 years. Griliches and Mairesse (1984) reported that 
the lag effect drops sharply after 2 years based on some evidence. Seldon 
(1987) measured the time lag of R&D in the forest products industry, and 
found the best-fitting lag is 2 years for both private and public R&D. lev 
and Sougiannis (1996) estimated lagged R&D measures for six main 
industries, and found the benefits of R&D are usually maximized in 2 or 3 
years. In another study, Branstetter and Sakaibara (2002) examined the 
time path of the benefits of research consortia, and had the result that the 
patenting activity of these consortia is maximized in a 3-year lag.  
The  variability  estimates  of  the  time lag in  R&D  in this research may 
reflect that the samples in most studies are different covering different 
periods, sectors and markets. Several studies indicate that with the growth 
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of the internet and intense competition, the average time required to 
compete a project is falling significantly (Kessler, 2003; Kafouros, 2006). 
Given such factors, one would expect the time lag of R&D to be shorter 
after the early 1990s when the worldwide web was implemented, and that 
the R&D lead times should  reflect the product life-cycles of different 
industries.  
One obvious difference is between high-tech industry and low-tech 
industry. The study result of Kafouros and Wang (2012) shows that 
elasticity of R&D for larger and high-tech firms peaked 1 year after the 
investment has been made, while it peaked after 2 years for smaller low-
tech companies. This appears to indicate that the time lag of R&D may be 
shorter for high-tech industry compared with low-tech industry. Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) estimated  the corresponding lag for the computing, 
electrical, electronics and other industries was 2 years, and Kafouros and 
Wang (2012), showing the peak of the contribution of R&D is either 1 or 2 
years after the investment has been made, supporting that 2 years is 
reasonable average estimate. 
3.3  Method 
3.3.1  Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEA is an established programming methodology  which be applied to 
assess production efficiency using multiple inputs and outputs (see, e.g., 
Kozmetsky and Yue, 1998; Yeh, 1996). Ground breaking work by Rousseau 
and Rousseau (1997, 1998) proved the potential of DEA-analysis to assess 
R&D activities. Subsequent studies have provided supporting evidence for 
its use in evaluating innovation efficiency, especially for the high-tech 
industries  (see, e.g., Guan and Chen, 2010; Chen et al., 2006; Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia et al., 2007; Zhong et al., 2011). Two standard variations of 
the DEA model are used in the present study: the CCR model (Charnes et 
al., 1978) and the BCC model (Banker et al., 1984). Section 2.2.1 in Chapter 
2 and Appendix 1 describe the two models in more detail. 
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3.3.2  Malmquist Index Analysis 
Malmquist Index Analysis (MI) (Malmquist, 1953) is designed to solve 
panel data and show the productivity change in the way of decomposing it 
into technical change and technical efficiency change. The computation of 
MI bases on the framework of DEA. Before introducing the detailed model 
of MI, we define the variables which will be used in the computations. 
We define the time periods as t = 1,⋯,T and the production technology of 
DMU𝑜, in time t as Pt representing the transformation of the inputs xo
t into 
the outputs yo
t . Thus we have 
Pt = {(xo
t,yo
t): xo
t can produce yo
t} 
The distance function (Färe et al., 1994; Shephard, 1970) is defined as 
Do
t(xo
t,yo
t) = min{θ: (xo
t,yo
t/θ) ∈ Pt}. 
Thus Do
t(xo
t,yo
t) ≤ 1 if (xo
t,yo
t) ∈ Pt. Since Do
t(xo
t,yo
t) can be used to measure the 
efficiency at time t, it can be evaluated by the CCR model (3) but in the 
way of output oriented. That is, 
Do
t(xo
t,yo
t)−1 = max𝜃,𝜆   𝜃 
𝑠.𝑡.    𝜃yo
t ≤ Yt𝜆 
        Xt𝜆 ≤ xo
t 
  𝜆 ≥ 0                                                                                                                               (5)     
In order to assess changes in productivity over time, (Färe et al., 1994) 
defined the mixed period distance functions in the following. 
Do
t(xo
t+1,yo
t+1) = min{θ: (xo
t+1,yo
t+1/θ) ∈ Pt}  
Do
t+1(xo
t,yo
t) = min{θ: (xo
t,yo
t /θ) ∈ Pt+1} . 
Similar to (5), these two functions are evaluated as 
Do
t(xo
t+1,yo
t+1)−1 = max𝜃,𝜆   𝜃 
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𝑠.𝑡.    𝜃yo
t+1 ≤ Yt𝜆 
        Xt𝜆 ≤ xo
t+1 
              𝜆 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                          (6)     
Do
t+1(xo
t,yo
t)−1 = max𝜃,𝜆  𝜃 
𝑠.𝑡.    𝜃yo
t ≤ Yt+1𝜆 
        Xt+1𝜆 ≤ xo
t 
     
            𝜆 ≥ 0                                                                                                                                       (7)     
Färe et al. (1994)  specifies an output-oriented M  I  which  based on 
Shephard’s work (1970), as: 
Mo(xo
t+1,yo
t+1,xo
t,yo
t) = �
Do
t �xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do
t �xo
t ,yo
t �
Do
t+1�xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do
t+1�xo
t ,yo
t � �
1
2
                                          (8)                          
Malmquist Index (8) could be divided (Färe et al., 1994) into:  
Mo(xo
t+1,yo
t+1,xo
t,yo
t) = Te × T × S 
Where   Te =
Do,BCC
t+1 �xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do,BCC
t �xo
t ,yo
t �  
            T = �
Do
t �xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do
t+1�xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do
t �xo
t ,yo
t �
Do
t+1�xo
t ,yo
t ��
1
2
 
     S =
Do
t+1�xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do,BCC
t+1 �xo
t+1,yo
t+1�
Do,BCC
t �xo
t ,yo
t �
Do
t �xo
t ,yo
t �                                                        (9) 
Here  Do,BCC
t+1 (xo
t+1,yo
t+1)  and  Do,BCC
t (xo
t,yo
t)  are the distance functions 
computed by the BCC model (4). Te represents the technical efficiency 
improvement; T represents technology improvement  and  S  represents 
scale efficiency. 
The Malmquist Index of time period t+1 computed in the previous section 
is compared to the preceding time period, i.e., t. However, it is difficult to 
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observe the chronological change throughout the sample period as we 
only see the successive change for every time period. Therefore, 
Hashimoto and Haneda (2008) proposed a variant of MI by fixing t to the 
first time period of sample period in model (8), i.e., t=1. 
Then  the  indices  Mo(xo
2,yo
2,xo
1,yo
1),Mo(xo
3,yo
3,xo
1,yo
1),⋯,Mo(xo
T,yo
T,xo
1,yo
1)   are 
computed accordingly.  Note that the indices when t=1 could be all 1. 
3.4  Model and Data 
3.4.1  Model 
To explore the difference between the closed innovation paradigm and the 
OI paradigm, Chesbrough (2006b) developed two models to encapsulate 
their action principle (see figure 3.1a). By comparing these two models, it 
could  potentially  be found  that the main difference between  these 
paradigms is the innovation process.   
In the innovation process under the older,  closed innovation model, 
research projects are launched from the science and technology base of 
the firm. They progress through the process, and some of the projects are 
stopped, while others are selected for further work. Subsets of these are 
chosen to go through to the market (Chesbrough, 2006b).  
In contrast, in the OI model, projects can be launched from either internal 
or external technology sources, and new technology can enter into the 
process at various stages. In addition, projects can go to market by many 
routes, such as through out-licensing, or a spin-off venture, in addition to 
going to market through the company’s own marketing and sales channels 
(Chesbrough, 2006b).  
The main difference between  these two models is the conduct and 
performance of the innovation  process itself. Although the OI  model 
provides broader strategy selection throughout its innovation process, 
both  OI  and closed innovation paradigms follow the same principle: 
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minimise the firm’s R&D investment inputs, and maximize the firm’s 
benefit at the same time. In the OI model, R&D inputs could either occur 
inside or outside of the firm, and the firm could select other ways (out-
licensing et al.) to increase the corporate profit in addition to marketing 
and selling products. The goal of adopting of  this strategy is still to 
improve the R&D investment efficiency i.e. – minimise the R&D inputs and 
maximise the outputs at the same time. So, by observing the variation of 
the R&D investment efficiency, the performance of the OI model could be 
compared with the performance of closed innovation model (see Figure 
3.1b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Innovation Process 
R&D expenditure  
Number of 
employees 
Technical improvement 
Economic benefit 
Figure 3.1b: OI Performance Model 
Figure 3.1a: Closed Innovation Model and Open Innovation Model (Chesbrough, 2006b) 
Figure   3.1: Closed innovation, open innovation and OI performance models 
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3.4.2  Inputs, Outputs and Time Lag 
R&D investment is often a complex process, with multiple inputs and 
outputs. One of the advantages of adopting DEA analysis is that multiple 
inputs and outputs can be measured, more than can be accommodated 
using conventional econometric techniques (Cooper et al., 2004). This 
multiple DEA analysis study was begun by selecting the appropriate 
inputs and outputs based on the previous literature, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1b.  
As discussed in section 2.2.3.1, the  inputs to innovation production 
activities are mainly physical resources and manpower. Since the analysis 
was focusing on the industry and sector levels in the emerging market, 
knowledge capital stock was also adapted as an input in Chapter 2. The 
research subjects have changed in this research –  they are companies 
from same sector. So the accumulated patent stock which was employed 
as proxy of knowledge capital  stock can only disclose the level of 
knowledge capital stock inside individual company. However, in OI 
paradigm, the input of knowledge capital stock is not only from company 
itself but could also come from outside. Therefore, the accumulated patent 
stock  cannot reflect the real level of knowledge capital  stock for one 
company. The ideal index would be the one which could measure the level 
of knowledge capital stock truly absorbed by the company no matter it is 
from inside and outside of the company. However, there is no dataset 
available for such input.  
So the main inputs here are physical resources and manpower, which are 
usually measured in annual total R&D expenditures and R&D personnel 
(Wang and Huang, 2007). 
The  two main  inputs selected in this study are R&D expenditure  and 
number of employees. The R&D expenditure refers to the total R&D 
expense, covering all projects involving both internal and external ones 
supported by the firm. The R&D expenditure input index has been widely 
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used, and found to be suitable in previous studies (Guan and Chen, 2010; 
Zhong et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2006). 
Number of employees is adopted in this research as the index of mainly 
manpower on R&D. R&D personnel is widely employed as the input for 
measuring R&D efficiency (for example, Zhong et al., 2011). The study in 
Chapter 2 about the R&D efficiency  of China’s high-tech industry also 
employed R&D personnel as the index of mainly R&D manpower. However, 
two reasons may affect  the suitability of R&D personnel  as the R&D 
manpower index in this research. Firstly, the companies studied here are 
from Nondurable household product industry not the high-tech industry. 
Their innovation capability does not heavily depend on their R&D 
department as the high-tech industry. Many of those successful product 
ideas  may  come from non-R&D  employees,  such as  employees from 
marketing.  Therefore,  only calculating the R&D personnel as the 
innovation input in this industry may underestimate the real manpower 
input in R&D. Secondly, since this study is aimed to measure the 
innovation efficiency within the OI strategy, it should be understood that 
the manpower put into innovation in the OI model is not as same as the 
one in the Closed Innovation model. Making P&G for example, the aim for 
launching Connect & Develop  is to acquire  50% of innovation not from 
inside  but outside their company  (see  Huston and Sakkab, 2006). To 
achieve this goal, they chose to leverage their own employees. And the 
innovation  becomes  no longer the job only  for researchers but the job 
which needs the cooperation from different departments. For example 
technology support plays an important role  in the shift of P&G’s OI 
strategy (see Dodgson et al, 2006). Therefore, R&D personnel inside the 
company  cannot  represent  the real R&D manpower in OI age. The real 
manpower in innovation may include most relevant employees especially 
for  the non-high-tech  industry.  It will be meaningful if the comparison 
study about manpower input between the R&D personnel and the general 
number of employees  could be developed. However,  only  limited R&D 
personnel data is available in certain years from some companies’ annual 
reports, which makes it hard to do the measurement. Therefore, the 
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number of employees is adopted to represent the human resource inputs 
in this study.  Here the number of employees  is an estimate of total 
company employees excluding interns, co-ops  and employees of joint 
ventures.  
The main outputs of R&D activities are technical improvement and 
economic benefit (see Zhong et al., 2011). The initial, direct outcome of 
R&D investment is the technical improvement, estimated in this case as 
the issued patent number. As being discussed in Section 2.2.3.2, although 
patent cannot include all invention and reflect the quality of invention (see 
Griliches, 1990), it is still a fairly reliable measure of innovation 
production (see Acs et al., 2002; Pakes and Griliches, 1984). The number of 
patent applications which is employed as the index refers to the quantity 
of accepted patent applications by the patent office in the given year.  
The other key outcome is the economic benefit, estimated in this case by 
the net sales and operating incomes as the final outputs in this study. The 
aim for companies doing innovation is to improve their capability of 
producing revenues, which could be reflected on their  net sales and 
operating incomes. The ideal indices may be the sales and operating 
incomes on new products. However, these kinds  of data haven’t been 
publicized by the research subjects - these five companies. And they are 
not provided by other database. The  general  net sales and operating 
incomes may be not as suitable as the ones on new products, while since 
nondurable household products  industry has short product life cycle, 
these commercial indices reflect the economic benefit on new products to 
some extent. Therefore, the net sales and operating incomes are employed 
to measure the economic benefit in this study. 
Previous studies indicated that time lags between the inputs and the 
outputs could be important factors. Following these studies,  the 
preliminary test was given in this study aimed to find the suitable time lag 
between inputs and outputs, which shows that 1-year lag for the issued 
patent number and 2-year lag for the net sales and operating incomes are 
appropriate. (For example, if  the dataset of the inputs is in 2003, the 
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output data of the issued patent number should be in 2004 with 1-year lag, 
and the outputs data of the net sales and operating incomes should be in 
2005 with 2-year lag). 
As discussed previously  (see Section 2.2.3.3), the robustness of this 
selection can be tested in two ways: firstly, by choosing two consecutive 
cross-sectional datasets to provide an approach for a robustness test by 
longitudinal comparisons (see Guan and Chen, 2010; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 
et al., 2007); secondly, by varying  the length of time lags to provide a 
robustness test (e.g., Hollanders and Celikel-Esser, 2007). Cross-sectional 
dataset already included into the data analysis due to this study utilising 
panel data. For the other robustness test, two different time lags 1-year (1-
year lag for the issued patent number and 1-year lag for the commercial 
revenue) and 3-year time lags (2-year lag for the issued patent number and 
3-year lag for the commercial revenue) were selected and adapted, in order 
to see whether current introduction of time lag has an effect of the final 
results. The analysis results show that, although the exact score per 
company per year has changed, the general performance of each company 
looks similar which indicates  that current introduction of time lag has 
limited effect on the general analysis results. And because this 2 years’ 
time lag was selected based on preliminary test, it is more suitable to be 
adapted in this study. The analysis results from the 1-year time lag and 
the 3-year time lag can been seen in Table A.10-A.12 and Table A.13-A.15 
in the appendix. 
3.4.3  Case Data Sources 
P&G is widely studied as the representative of a class of firms adopting OI 
strategy at an early date which is followed by an apparently associated 
sequence of commercial success.  Based on  previous studies, P&G was 
chosen  as the representative  OI firm in this study. To reference  its 
performance  to  other firms from the same sector, four R&D-intensive 
companies from the same sector are selected to do the comparison study. 
The reference companies were picked from the 2010 BIS (Department for 
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Business, Innovation and Skills in the UK)’s R&D ranking of the top 1000 
world companies by their R&D spending. BIS’s ranking includes all the R&D 
intensity companies around the world and ranks them based on their R&D 
expenditure in 2009. Following the ranking, four companies –  Unilever, 
Henkel, Reckitt Benckiser and Clorox, which are the top R&D intensity 
companies, were selected (see table 3.1). All the five sample companies are 
from ‘Nondurable household products’ sector based on the categorization 
by BIS’s R&D ranking of the top 1000 world companies. (BIS publishes the 
R&D ranking of the top world companies every year. This data is free to 
download from BIS’s official website). 
Table   3.1: the sample firms in this research 
Industry description  Open innovation firm  Comparison firms 
Nondurable household 
products 
Procter & Gamble, USA 
Unilever, UK 
Henkel, Germany 
Reckitt Benckiser, UK 
Clorox, USA 
 
The data’s time series is from 1990 to 2011. And much of the data 
required was available from official government sources and established 
business databases. The R&D expenditure, the number of employees, net 
sales and operating incomes were  collected from Datastream (Thomson 
Reuters) and the issued patent number was collected from the database 
offered by United States patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Datastream 
is an established and widely used dataset which provides both current and 
historical global financial and economic information with various types of 
data items from both developed and emerging markets. USPTO is the 
official  organization  which owns the  USPTO  search  engine  to provide 
search bibliographic details or full text of US patents from 1976. It is the 
mainstream patent data source in relative studies focusing on cross-
market analysis. It  is free to use through their website 
(http://patft.uspto.gov/).  All monetary values are adjusted for inflation 
using the US domestic manufacturing Producer Price Index (with index 
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year 1989). The basic statistics for the main variables used to study the 
R&D performance of P&G and its competitors are reported in Table 3.2. 
Table   3.2: Descriptive statistics for main variables in P&G cas study 
Variables  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  
Maximum  Minimum 
R&D expenditure   502628.9  499290.7  1628051  25073.56 
Number of employees  87725.56  92557.79  308000  4700 
Patent applications   124.27  151.7752  599  0 
Net sales  19641309  17295408  54362552  1570236 
Operating incomes  2831329  2984605  12138044  249768 
Sample size of DMU  100       
Data sources: Data of R&D expenditure, number of employees, net sales and operating 
incomes are from  Datastream (Thomson Reuters); data of patent applications is from 
United States patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Here the unit of R&D expenditure, net 
sales and operating incomes is 1000$; the unit of patent applications is item. 
3.5  Results 
3.5.1  DEA Result  
3.5.1.1  Technical Efficiency 
In the DEA analyses, the TE scores reflect the overall R&D investment 
efficiency: the bigger the score, the higher the R&D efficiency: a firm has 
the highest possible R&D efficiency if its score is 1 in a given year. The 
detailed results are  shown below.  Based on the average score for the 
period  1990 to 1999 (pre-open period), Reckitt Benckiser was the most 
efficient company on R&D investment among these five companies. Clorox 
and Henkel were ranked  second and third, and Unilever was  the  least 
efficient R&D Company, with Procter & Gamble only slightly better than 
Unilever.  For  the  period  2000 to 2009 (post-open period), Procter & 
Gamble’s average R&D efficiency  across the whole period rose 
significantly,  second, only to  Reckitt Benckiser. Clorox ranked third, 
though its average score was higher than for pre-open period. Henkel and 
Unilever, which both showed the lower R&D efficiency, ranked fourth and 
last (see Table 3.3). 
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P&G’s average R&D efficiency in the pre-open period was 0.581, the second 
lowest in relation to the reference companies. If, for example, the average 
score of the five companies is taken as an index of the industry’s R&D 
performance, P&G’s R&D efficiency was behind the average level of the 
industry  (0.686)  prior  to P&G adopting  an  OI strategy. The situation 
changed dramatically after 1999 when P&G launched its OI initiatives. 
Over the post-open period P&G’s average R&D efficiency score of 0.759 
was the second highest efficient of all the firms. While with the average 
score 0.686 and 0.689, the average industry level of  R&D efficiency 
performance was flat during both the pre-open and post-open periods (see 
Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure   3.2: The Comparison of R&D Investment Efficiency between Procter 
& Gamble and Industry Average Level 
Table   3.3: DEA technical efficiency index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
  
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Average 
1990-
1999 
Unilever  0.482 0.534 0.620 0.611 0.573 0.510 0.483 0.508 0.434 0.447  0.520 
Procter & Gamble 0.519 0.479 0.431 0.458 0.507 0.522 0.621 0.700 0.832 0.739  0.581 
Henkel  0.506 0.384 0.459 0.764 0.807 1.000 0.714 0.868 0.860 0.672  0.703 
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Reckitt Benckiser  0.905 0.926 1.000 0.998 0.853 0.717 0.748 0.983 0.791 0.646  0.857 
Clorox  0.668 0.857 0.631 0.640 0.700 0.819 0.825 1.000 0.876 0.684  0.770 
Average  0.616 0.636 0.628 0.694 0.688 0.714 0.678 0.812 0.759 0.638  0.686 
  
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Average 
2000-
2009 
Unilever  0.455 0.487 0.436 0.387 0.399 0.489 0.447 0.525 0.553 0.511  0.469 
Procter & Gamble 0.674 0.692 0.728 0.769 0.831 1.000 0.791 0.736 0.735 0.637  0.759 
Henkel  0.980 0.661 0.672 0.594 0.491 0.519 0.452 0.484 0.462 0.421  0.574 
Reckitt Benckiser  0.831 0.862 0.959 0.957 0.842 1.000 0.883 1.000 1.000 0.969  0.930 
Clorox  0.729 0.703 0.744 0.665 0.637 0.724 0.696 0.806 0.797 0.604  0.711 
Average  0.734 0.681 0.708 0.674 0.640 0.746 0.654 0.710 0.709 0.628  0.689 
 
3.5.1.2  Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) 
The PTE scores reflect the pure R&D investment efficiency excluding scale 
effects. Clorox owned the highest average PTE score during the pre-open 
period. Unilever and Procter & Gamble followed it,  ranking second and 
third, with Henkel fourth (Table 3.4). Over the post-open period, Procter & 
Gamble became the most efficient company on PTE with an average score 
0.973,  with  Reckitt Benckiser and Unilever second and third  and  Clorox 
last (although it had exhibited the highest average PTE score over the pre-
open period, the overall range of PTE scores across these five companies 
was not that large). 
 
Table   3.4: DEA pure technical efficiency index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
  
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Average 
1990-
1999 
Unilever  0.826 0.870 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.905 0.868 0.887 0.762 0.807  0.893 
Procter & Gamble  0.951 0.893 0.808 0.829 0.809 0.805 0.913 0.983 1.000 0.920  0.891 
Henkel  0.702 0.584 0.651 0.834 0.885 1.000 0.948 0.964 0.932 0.794  0.829 
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Reckitt Benckiser  0.914 0.936 1.000 1.000 0.862 0.723 0.759 1.000 0.806 0.646  0.865 
Clorox  1.000 0.860 0.686 1.000 0.817 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.893 0.690  0.895 
Average  0.879 0.829 0.829 0.933 0.875 0.887 0.898 0.967 0.879 0.771  0.874 
  
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Average 
2000-
2009 
Unilever  0.862 0.952 0.845 0.746 0.748 0.905 0.817 0.963 1.000 0.946  0.878 
Procter & Gamble  0.892 0.935 1.000 1.000 0.941 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 1.000  0.973 
Henkel  0.980 0.776 0.884 0.828 0.760 0.823 0.742 0.789 0.757 0.704  0.804 
Reckitt Benckiser  0.836 0.878 0.972 0.966 0.882 1.000 0.888 1.000 1.000 0.993  0.942 
Clorox  0.739 0.725 0.744 0.712 0.724 0.766 0.755 0.808 0.818 0.658  0.745 
Average  0.862 0.835 0.889 0.850 0.811 0.899 0.840 0.912 0.908 0.860  0.868 
 
Figure 3.3 shows a comparison of PTE performance between P&G and the 
industry level. As for the TE analysis, here the average PTE score of five 
companies is employed as the index of the industry performance. P&G has 
showed a higher PTE score than the industry since 1997,  although  its 
score declined somewhat during 1998 to 2000. In the post-open period, 
P&G showed the highest score and a more stable PTE performance. This 
seems to suggest  that the adoption of OI strategy has improved 
innovation productivity in P&G. But  unlike  its  TE score,  which exhibited 
‘inverted curvilinear performance’, P&G’s PTE did not decline after the mid-
way point in 2005, unlike P&G’s TE score, which fell away rapidly. 
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Figure   3.3: The Comparison of PTE score between Procter & Gamble and 
Industry Average Level 
3.5.1.3  Scale Efficiency (SE) 
Scale efficiency (SE) scores reflect various classes and levels of returns to 
scale on R&D investment. There are three possible classes of returns to 
scale:  decreasing (DRS), increasing (IRS) and constant (CRS). CRS is 
indicated by an SE score of 1; DRS, signified by a decrease in the relative 
output for a given incremental input, and an associated decline in the 
consequent profit; IRS, signified by an increase in the relative output for a 
given incremental input.  
In the pre-open period, Reckitt Benckiser and Clorox were first and second 
on average SE score. Both of them were experiencing increasing return to 
scale (IRS), indicating that a given level of R&D inputs was producing a 
relative increase in R&D output in these two companies. Henkel, P&G and 
Unilever were ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively. All these three 
companies  were  suffering  from decreasing returns  to scale (DRS), 
indicating that for a given level of increase in the R&D input, less relative 
R&D output was produced. In the post-open period, Reckitt Benckiser and 
Clorox were still ranked at first and second for the average SE score, while 
P&G has moved from fourth to third, and  Unilever still had the lowest 
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average score. During this post-open period, all five companies suffered 
from DRS at some point.  Apart  from  P&G and Clorox, all companies 
performed  with  lower average SE scores compared with the pre-open 
period (see Table 3.5).  
Table   3.5: DEA scale efficiency index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                      
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Average 
1990-
1999 
Unilever  0.584  0.614  0.62  0.611  0.573  0.563  0.556  0.572  0.57  0.553  0.582 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
  P&G  0.546  0.537  0.533  0.553  0.626  0.649  0.681  0.713  0.832  0.803  0.647 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Henkel  0.72  0.658  0.705  0.916  0.912  1  0.752  0.901  0.922  0.847  0.833 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  -  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Reckitt 
Benckiser 
0.99  0.989  1  0.998  0.989  0.991  0.986  0.983  0.981  0.999  0.991 
 
irs  irs  -  drs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  - 
 
Clorox  0.668  0.996  0.92  0.64  0.857  0.819  0.825  1  0.981  0.991  0.870 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  -  drs  irs 
 
Average  0.702  0.759  0.756  0.744  0.791  0.804  0.760  0.834  0.857  0.839  0.785 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Average 
2000-
2009 
Unilever  0.527  0.512  0.517  0.519  0.533  0.54  0.547  0.545  0.553  0.54  0.533 
  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs   
P&G  0.755  0.74  0.728  0.769  0.884  1  0.791  0.736  0.761  0.637  0.780 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  -  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Henkel  1  0.852  0.759  0.717  0.646  0.63  0.61  0.614  0.61  0.597  0.704 
 
-  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Reckitt 
Benckiser 
0.994  0.982  0.986  0.991  0.954  1  0.995  1  1  0.976  0.988 
 
irs  drs  drs  drs  drs  -  drs  -  -  drs 
 
Clorox  0.986  0.97  1  0.935  0.881  0.945  0.921  0.998  0.974  0.919  0.953 
 
irs  irs  -  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Average  0.852  0.811  0.798  0.786  0.780  0.823  0.773  0.779  0.780  0.734  0.792 
 
P&G’s SE score showed a similar pattern to its TE score, the now familiar 
inverted curvilinear profile. P&G’s SE score increased after  2003 and 
reached a  peak in 2005,  followed by a subsequent  decline. Figure 3.4, 
shows the performance of P&G’s SE score with the average SE score across 
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the five  companies are compared. Adopting the average SE score as an 
index of the industry’s SE, from the comparison it could be found that P&G 
had lower Scale Efficiency (SE) than the rest of the industry before 2003, 
but from 2003-2006  the company made an inverted curvilinear 
performance and surpassed the whole industry on this index,  only to 
return to lower performance again after 2006 (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure   3.4: The Comparison of SE score between Procter & Gamble and 
Industry Average Level 
3.5.2  MI Results 
There are five indices generated by the Malmquist index analysis (MI). This 
study uses two of the indices: Malmquist index and frontier shift index, 
which are also known as the total factor productivity change (TEPCH) and 
technical change (TECHCH) respectively. The Malmquist index reflects the 
total factor productivity change for individual companies,  while  frontier 
shift index  reflects  ‘industry-wide productivity change’ (Hashimoto and 
Haneda, 2008). Therefore, these two indices were  adapted to measure 
separately the total R&D efficiency and the industry-wide R&D productivity. 
3.5.2.1  Malmquist Index 
The Malmquist index indicates the total R&D efficiency change of a firm 
over time (Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). The type of Malmquist index 
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analysis employed in this study is the cumulative technique. The indices 
received in each year are all calculated from the reference year 1994 in 
which the values are all 1. Therefore, the index values from this analysis 
are different to those in the DEA results, which makes the ranking of the 
R&D efficiency among the sample companies seem different. In the pre-
open period, Henkel ranked first and Reckitt Benckiser ranked last on the 
average score. With average score 1.097, P&G stayed in the middle among 
the five companies, while the ranking changed dramatically in the post-
open  period. P&G and Reckitt Benckiser ranked first and second 
respectively with average scores of 1.437 and 1.199. In pre-open period, 
P&G showed a R&D efficiency performance under the average level. It has 
started to move  beyond the industry’s average performance since 2000 
and led the R&D efficiency for the most years. Intriguingly, the dip of R&D 
efficiency is found for P&G around 1999 and its R&D efficiency has 
declined since 2006. Therefore, based on the result, it can be found that 
the R&D efficiency of P&G had constantly improved since its adoption of 
OI strategy in year 1999.  
Table   3.6: Cumulative Malmquist index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
  
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Average 
1990-
1999 
Unilever  1.000 1.084 1.276 1.246 1.210 1.070 1.000 1.057 0.908 0.950  1.080 
Procter & Gamble 1.000 0.951 0.852 0.905 1.004 1.093 1.243 1.296 1.533 1.091  1.097 
Henkel  1.000 0.864 0.916 1.327 1.404 1.691 1.266 1.697 1.657 1.153  1.298 
Reckitt Benckiser  1.000 1.033 1.148 1.131 1.037 0.894 0.889 1.108 0.941 0.778  0.996 
Clorox  1.000 1.084 1.050 1.177 1.264 1.498 1.264 1.894 1.614 1.015  1.286 
Average  1.000 1.003 1.048 1.157 1.184 1.249 1.132 1.410 1.331 0.997  1.151 
  
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Average 
2000-
2009 
Unilever  0.952 1.092 0.971 0.844 0.850 1.060 0.934 1.097 1.174 1.061  1.004 
Procter & Gamble 1.139 1.223 1.405 1.457 1.571 1.807 1.548 1.465 1.448 1.305  1.437 
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Henkel  1.385 1.143 1.166 1.046 0.852 0.894 0.894 1.051 0.964 0.869  1.026 
Reckitt Benckiser  1.033 1.140 1.121 1.046 1.210 1.505 1.099 1.229 1.391 1.220  1.199 
Clorox  1.146 1.170 1.248 1.180 0.907 1.185 1.204 1.472 1.400 1.048  1.196 
Average  1.131 1.154 1.182 1.115 1.078 1.290 1.136 1.263 1.275 1.101  1.172 
It strongly supports the conclusion of previous studies, and demonstrates 
the significant benefit of OI strategy for P&G. Even compared with the 
other four firms, the development trend of R&D efficiency for P&G is still 
obvious, especially compared with its big competitor Unilever which had 
experienced  the flat R&D efficiency  across the period based on the 
Malmquist index (see Table 3.6). 
3.5.2.2  Frontier Shift Index 
The average frontier shift index across  all firms is an appropriate 
indicator to view R&D efficiency change at the industry level (Hashimoto 
and Haneda, 2008). Therefore, the industry’s R&D efficiency performance 
can be assessed by the analysis of the average firms’ score on frontier 
shift index. 
Table   3.7: Cumulative frontier shift index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
  
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Average 
1990-
1999 
Unilever  1.000 0.994 1.107 1.195 1.197 1.117 1.164 1.543 1.246 1.051  1.161 
Procter & Gamble 1.000 0.951 0.944 1.183 1.256 1.355 1.243 1.850 1.533 1.091  1.241 
Henkel  1.000 0.882 0.962 1.053 1.114 1.342 1.005 1.517 1.315 0.915  1.111 
Reckitt Benckiser  1.000 1.033 1.148 1.131 1.037 0.894 0.889 1.108 0.941 0.778  0.996 
Clorox  1.000 1.084 1.050 1.177 1.264 1.498 1.264 1.894 1.614 1.015  1.286 
Average  1.000 0.989 1.042 1.148 1.174 1.241 1.113 1.582 1.330 0.970  1.159 
  
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Average 
2000-
2009 
Unilever  1.317 1.343 1.288 1.195 1.330 1.587 1.153 1.228 1.383 1.226  1.305 
Procter & Gamble 1.139 1.223 1.405 1.457 1.571 1.807 1.548 1.630 1.596 1.305  1.468 
Henkel  1.099 0.907 1.034 1.069 0.763 1.137 1.088 1.270 1.210 0.973  1.055 
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Reckitt Benckiser  1.033 1.140 1.121 1.046 1.210 1.505 1.099 1.229 1.391 1.220  1.199 
Clorox  1.146 1.170 1.248 1.180 0.907 1.185 1.204 1.472 1.400 1.048  1.196 
Average  1.147 1.157 1.219 1.189 1.156 1.444 1.218 1.366 1.396 1.154  1.245 
 
Table 3.7 shows that the average scores had a flat performance during the 
test period, which indicates that the industry’s R&D efficiency did not have 
any great change. This result corresponds to the prior findings from DEA 
analysis about the industry’s performance. Therefore, there is strong 
evidence to demonstrate that the increase of R&D efficiency on P&G is not 
triggered by the macro benefit such as the better industry-wide 
performance.  
3.6  Discussion 
This study sets out to determine if (1) the indices of innovation could be 
applied  to test whether OI was proving  an productive  strategy, by (2) 
analysing the performance of  P&G before and after its adoption of OI in 
1999, and in doing so (3) explore what other insights such a quantitative 
view might afford us. The discussion considers first the main 
observations for each of the individual indices (see Table 3.8), and then 
the collective implications of these finding for a new potential ‘Three-
Stage’ model of OI adoption. 
Table   3.8: Adoption of Open Innovation and Indices of Innovation 
Indices  Subject          
   P&G (10 Year Average)  Industry (10 Year Average) 
  
Pre-open 
period 
Post-open 
period 
Pre-open 
period 
Post-open 
period 
Technical 
Efficiency (TE) 
0.581  0.759  0.686  0.689 
 
(+30.64%) 
 
(+0.44%) 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency (PTE) 
0.891  0.973  0.874  0.868 
 
(+9.20%) 
 
(-0.69%) 
Scale Efficiency 
(SE) 
0.647  0.78  0.785  0.792 
   (+20.56%)     (+0.89%) 
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Malmquist Index analysis is employed to verify the research result: it disclosed a 
very similar profile for P&G’s R&D performance to that shown by the DEA analysis, 
showing the ‘open rise’ after adoption of OI, the ‘open drop’ after six years, and 
‘open dip’ immediately in the adoption year 1999. 
3.6.1  Productivity Pre- and Post-adoption 
Technical Efficiency (TE)  is  the broadest overall index of its R&D 
effectiveness; Pure  Technical  Efficiency  (PTE)  is  a pure measure of the 
effectiveness of the R&D process exclusive of other scale effects; Scales 
Efficiency (SE) score is a measure of the effect of scale of operation. 
The first finding is that P&G’s average scores for all three indices – TE, PTE, 
and SE - increased in the post-open period when compared with pre-open 
period, while the average scores for all 3 indices across the industry 
‘control’ group were effectively flat for the whole period, showing none of 
the profile changes exhibited by P&G. Not all of the profile changes were 
of the same magnitude. P&G’s average Technical Efficiency (TE) increased 
by approximately 30% in the post-open period compared with the pre-open 
level, whereas P&G’s  average Pure  Technical  Efficiency  (PTE)  also 
increased significantly in post-open period compared with pre-open period, 
but much less dramatically at just 10%.  P&G’s average Scales Efficiency (SE) 
score was between the other two indices, showing a 20% increase in the 
post-open period compared with the pre-open level (see Table 3.8). 
The benefit of switching to OI could also be assessed by correlating the 
operating incomes with R&D expenditure growth. Figure  3.5 shows that 
with the average R&D expenditure growth rate P&G showed the biggest 
increase on average operating incomes in  the post-open period. This 
provides  a strong evidence to support the success of OI strategy 
switching. 
3.6.2  Post-adoption Response Profile 
All  three primary ‘indices” of innovation  –  Technical Efficiency, Pure 
Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency -  follow a similar ‘curvilinear’ 
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developmental sequence,  with a characteristic initial dip,  followed by a 
significant rise and then a drop of similar magnitude and ratio, except that 
the  PTE scores did not show any drop.  Given the flat  and  stable 
performance of the reference competitor group, and the magnitude and 
duration of the change, the simplest interpretation of the ‘Open Rise’ at 
P&G to be that it does indeed reflect a positive effect of the switch to an OI 
strategy.  The transient ‘Open Dip’ could reasonably be interpreted as a 
temporary loss of efficiency during transition to the new strategy.  The 
‘Open Drop’ observed was unexpected, as was its magnitude, and invites a 
number of possible interpretations ranging from absorption of the 
relevant market opportunities to inconsistent execution of partnering 
activities: in any event, not what adopters of OI are seeking.  Further 
research on indices may identify other cases of the observed ‘Open Drop’, 
which so far has not been reported previously.   
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Figure   3.5: Correlation of operating incomes and R&D expenditure growth 
3.6.3  Other Insights and Implications  
As  both  the  DEA and MI  analyses  revealed,  the overall indices of R&D 
performance  exhibited  an ‘inverted  curvilinear’ profile.  The  graphical 
profile observed for P&G in this study supports the previous conclusion of 
Laursen and Salter (2006), based on a Tobit regression analysis of the UK 
manufacturing sector. From which they concluded that ‘searching widely 
and deeply is curvilinear relative to performance’, based on the ‘inverted 
curvilinear’ relationship they observed between OI and firm performance. 
The  interpretation  is  that at one extreme the risk may be to set the 
Unilever 
Henkel 
P&G 
Clorox  Reckitt 
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
8000000
9000000
10000000
11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131
Y axis shows geometic mean of annual operating incomes (GMAOI). X axis shows the 
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research net too wide and catch an unmanageable number of 
opportunities and at the other to set it too narrow and catch too little. 
Another  implication would be that secondary management indicators of 
performance trends that correlate with the overall econometric 
performance indices applied here would be useful additions to the 
management toolset for informed innovation.  
With respect to the individual indices, since PTE reflects pure R&D 
efficiency exclusive of Scale Efficiency, it can also conclude that the pure 
R&D efficiency of P&G increased after the OI adoption point, again 
supporting the notion that the adoption of OI strategy appears to have 
helped the company improve its pure R&D efficiency. In contrast to the TE 
result, PTE did not show a continuing and obvious decline in the post-open 
period, leading us to conclude that other factors, such as scale effects, 
must be responsible for the overall decline of R&D efficiency at P&G over 
that period. 
Interestingly, the majority of the companies  studied  –  including P&G – 
tended to suffer from greater decreasing return to scale (DRS) effects in 
the post-open period than in the pre-open period.  The interpretation of 
this observation is that in a closed innovation scenario, given the 
limitation of the scope of management to a company boundary and the 
production principles in use inside that boundary, increasing R&D inputs 
might be expected to follow the law of diminishing marginal returns and 
lead to decreasing R&D outputs. 
In an  OI  scenario, firms can access and absorb sources of R&D beyond 
their internal R&D activities and can thus expand their R&D horizons and 
maintain scale efficiency, which is account for the ‘Open Rise’ seen in the 
SE score after adoption of OI. Since the PTE score did not show ‘Open Drop’ 
effect, it maybe that the inverted curvilinear profile of P&G’s overall R&D 
efficiency may be driven or determined by its Scale Efficiency (SE) 
performance.  One explanation might be that external R&D projects 
normally operate outside the firm by another organization or individuals, 
and  an increase in external R&D projects could entail a risk that the 
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company who launched the projects loses management control, and lead 
to a reduction of scale inefficiency. 
3.6.4  A Three-Phase Model for OI Adoption 
To account for these three  observations  and their sequence,  this study 
proposes  a ‘Three-Phase’ model of OI adoption  (Figure 3.6a), where the 
initial dip, followed by a cycle of rise and fall (drop), reflects what may be 
one pattern of company response to the onset of OI.  
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Figure   3.6: OI adoption model and OI scenarios 
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This study has  already discussed the concepts and potential 
interpretations of the three ‘phases’ of the post OI-adoption response, but 
there are other conceivable response scenarios. For example, two clear 
alternative scenarios are what might be called ‘rise and sustain’, where 
there is no ‘open drop’ effect, and ‘stay flat’, where there is no change 
(Figure 3.6b). There is no data for these at present. 
3.7  Concluding Remarks 
The  result appears to show that not only can OI be effective in 
transforming R&D performance, but there may be a predictable sequence 
of effects and a definable range of outcome scenarios. The quantitative 
methods  of this study appear to meet the needs identified  in the 
preceding literature (Huizingh, 2011) for more quantitative approaches to 
the measurement of OI, which  this paper has  attempted to address by 
applying DEA and MI  linear programming techniques.  Using these 
techniques, it would appear this study has shown convincing quantitative 
indices which track increases in OI efficiency in the case of P&G relative to 
its competitors.  
Although the most obvious interpretation of the results is that adopting 
OI  can lead to a dramatic improvement in R&D performance, other 
explanations are of course possible.    For  example, a bull market could 
have an uplift effect; a change of management might have impact, and so 
forth.   However, the temporal apposition of the effect, the existence of 
parsimonious causal mechanisms, and the lack of similar effects in 
competitors not  making the strategic shift to OI  –  in effect a control – 
suggest that there may indeed be an effect worthy of further investigation 
with a wider range of cases, and perhaps at sector or industry level. The 
period of adoption also coincided with an extended period of stock market 
decline: the ‘dot bomb’ era, also seeming to rule out any general market.  
However, although the results of this study show positive improvement on 
several of the key indices, the pattern is not simple, and OI should not be 
regarded as a panacea. Even the early adopter of OI still faces a significant 
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management challenge in implementing OI. So although OI may be a route 
to  more ideas and commercial  opportunities from external sources, the 
companies who are adopting and will adopt OI strategy should recognize 
that implementation has to be  managed and monitored to realize  OI 
efficiency gains. This research appears to suggest that one of key indices 
to  manage  is  the scale efficiency of R&D within the industrial OI 
ecosystem, where Scale Efficiency may affect OI efficiency in two distinct 
phases, at the initial and later stages of execution.  
Although more efficient R&D is what the companies seek in moving to OI, 
moving to OI is not a guarantee for more efficient R&D: if companies are 
less than totally prepared for the new management challenges likely to 
emerge from the strategic transition from closed to open, they might for 
example anticipate problems in R&D source allocation and external project 
control, which in turn could impact the scale inefficiency in the companies’ 
R&D, and this kind of scale inefficiency might be  expected  at the 
beginning of OI adoption.  
This study has several potential contributions both in practice and 
research. Since few studies have been concerned with measuring the 
performance of OI, this study is one of the first to provide quantitative 
indices to evaluate the performance of OI. In this comparative study, the 
relative performance of OI versus closed innovation appears to be a clear 
win for open, at least in one adoptive organization.  This finding and these 
tools should  help  companies to find the right balance and monitor the 
development of OI in their organizations. With the means of measuring the 
performance of OI, scholars could go  beyond the descriptive study and 
pursue further applicable  research about the efficacy of OI  in a wider 
range of companies, sectors, and industries. For practitioners who plan to 
do OI, the management control might be developed to face the emergence 
of R&D efficiency deadline at the beginning and later stages of OI 
adoption.  For practitioners who are already opened, they should 
understand staying in OI does not mean continuous higher R&D efficiency: 
management of OI efficiency should be paid more attention  after  the 
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adoption of OI strategy. To keep their successful story, they might keep 
innovative not only for OI but also for OI efficiency.  
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4.  Chapter 4: Indices of Innovation: Strategic 
Application of Open Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Abstract 
With rising costs  and flat output for new drug  approvals, the 
pharmaceutical industry is threatened by an uneconomic future. Since the 
former traditional strategies such as Mergers  & Acquisitions and 
increasing R&D investment did not help to improve the R&D efficiency, the 
pharmaceutical companies appear to have turned implicitly or explicitly to 
open innovation as a new  strategy. Because of the lack of quantitative 
econometric studies, there is still a question of whether open innovation is 
the best prescription for the pharmaceutical industry.  A systematic review 
of the recent literature on open innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
highlights questions of its strategic value, level of adoption, and current 
effectiveness as a strategy. Using DEA and MI, the ‘indices of innovation’ 
which have been identified and developed, this study measured whether 
or not ‘open’ innovation strategy has helped the industry to improve the 
R&D efficiency, and other evidence highlighting the relative inefficiency of 
earlier strategies. One combination of strategies – focused innovation + 
open innovation – is examined as a potentially effective prescription for 
the sustained success in the pharmaceutical industry. Future management 
suggestions have been given to support the transition of pharmaceutical 
companies moving into the open age.   
Keywords 
Pharmaceutical industry; open innovation; R&D efficiency; focused 
innovation. 
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4.1  Introduction 
The Pharmaceutical industry has long been recognized as highly 
dependent on science, research and development. R&D spending has been 
growing at an average compounded rate of 12.3% since 1970 (PhRMA, 
2009). In 2011, 16.7% of total sales were spent on R&D, higher than most 
other R&D intensive industries (PhRMA, 2012). However, the rate of 
approvals of new molecular entities (NMEs) by US Food Drug 
Administration (FDA) is basically flat for several decades (see Figure 4.1). 
The industry today is spending much more money to launch one drug into 
market compared with before: in 1976, it cost US$54 million to develop a 
new drug (DiMasi, 2001); but now this number has grown to more than 
US$ 1 billion (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007). The industry is clearly facing 
huge challenges in innovation. This cost and innovation pressure is 
forcing the industry to search for the new way to increase R&D 
productivity. Many pharmaceutical companies appear to have turned 
implicitly or explicitly to open innovation as a savior strategy.  
The original concept of OI suggested that companies can optimize their 
productivity by accessing the best sources of expertise regardless of 
location, and many firms increasingly rely on external sources of 
innovation by emphasizing that ideas, resources and individuals flow in 
and out of organizations (Chesbrough, 2003b).  In contrast to OI, closed 
innovation (CI) was the traditional way for firms to innovate and had been 
a very successful strategy in the past, especially in the pharmaceutical 
industry. However, with the changing commercial environment, it has or is 
becoming unsustainable in several industries where a number of “erosion” 
factors operate (Bianchi at al., 2011). More companies realized that there 
are more commercial opportunities both inside  and outside the firms’ 
boundaries.  Because  an  OI process  can  involve multiple internal and 
external technology sources and multiple internal and external 
technologies commercialization channels (Christensen et al., 2005; Lettl et 
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al., 2006; West and Gallagher, 2006), firms could operate their innovation 
process in two directions: inbound and outbound (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 
2009).  A wider cultural trend toward OI has been observed and it has 
taken on greater saliency in light of its successful application in some 
industries (Ili at al., 2010). OI or variations of it seems, for example, to 
have taken hold strongly in software industry (West and Gallagher, 2006) 
and also in consumer goods (Dodgson et al., 2006). Companies from other 
industries are also talking about the adoption of OI. As a R&D intensive 
industry, companies from pharmaceutical industry are showing great 
interests about OI.  
Despite the theoretical and practical potential of OI to provide a path for 
pharmaceutical industry to remain successful into the future, there are 
surprisingly few studies focussing on the implementation and 
performance impact OI in Pharmaceutical companies (Hughes and 
Wareham, 2010; Chiaroni et al., 2009). Based on  a  systematic  literature 
review of the economics of innovation in  the world’s leading 
pharmaceutical companies, this study explores two key questions vital to 
the future of the industry:  Is OI proving an effective strategy for 
pharmaceutical industry, and how can R&D productivity best be measured? 
4.2   Industry Pressures 
Previous studies discovered that R&D productivity in Pharmaceuticals has 
been declining (Scannell et al., 2012), as indicated by ever increasing R&D 
expenditure but flat R&D output.  This section reviews the impact of these 
and other major pressures. 
4.2.1  Rising R&D Expenditure  
R&D expenditures have been increasing steadily for decades. Figure 4.1 
can show this increasing trend. In Pharmaceutical industry, R&D spending 
has growen at an average compounded rate of 12.3% since 1970 (PhRMA, 
2009). NME costs have grown  exponentially at an annual rate of 13.4% 
since the 1950s, and only 27% of companies have costs per NME below $ 1 
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billion (Munos, 2009). The ‘capitalized’ cost per NME launch is $1778 
million (Paul et al., 2010).  
 
Figure   4.1: NME approvals and drug companies' spending on R&D 
4.2.2  Flat NME Performance   
Whatever the reasons, the industry  major challenge is that R&D 
expenditure has been rising  but the number of new molecular entities 
(NMEs)  has remained flat for three decades. Observing  the number of 
NMEs would yield an estimate of the performance of the R&D output in 
Pharmaceutical industry. Figure 4.1 shows that the trend line of approvals 
of NMEs by US Food Drug Administration (FDA) is basically flat with the 
peak point 53 approvals in 1996. Even the peak point for NMEs in 1996 is 
not explained by better R&D productivity. There has been speculation that 
the peak in 1996 was caused by the FDA processing a backlog of 
applications with the help of the recently approved user fees, which was 
caused by the enactment of prescription drug user act (PDUFA) in 1992 
(Munos, 2009).  
4.2.3  Declining Sales Growth 
This R&D output challenge is  also be observed in  sales performance. 
Although  total  global pharmaceutical sales have  been increasing  from 
2001 to 2008, the speed of growth has slackened (see Table 4.1). At the 
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same time, the big pharmaceutical companies face the familiar challenge 
of patent expiry on their blockbuster products, which seriously affect 
pharmaceutical present and future sales. Consistent with earlier analyses 
continuing with the current business model may result in a reduction of 5-
10% in sales and 20-30% in net income in 2012-2015 (Munos, 2009). 
Table   4.1: Global Pharmaceutical Sales, 2001-2008 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total World market 
(current US$ in 
billions) 
393  429  499  560  605  648  715  773 
Growth Over Previous 
year ($Constant 
US$ Growth) 
11.80%  9.20%  10.20%  7.90%  7.20%  6.80%  6.60%  4.80% 
Source: IMS Health Market Prognosis (includes IMS Audited and Unaudited markets) (2009).  
4.2.4  Regulatory Pressures   
Some observers contend  that  this  unsatisfactory  R&D  performance  was 
caused by regulatory changes. However, countries with a more demanding 
regulatory apparatus, such as the US and the UK, have also  fostered a 
more innovative and competitive pharmaceutical industry (see the ranking 
of pharmaceutical companies on market capitalization in Table 4.2). The 
reasonable interpretation may be that inventing the new drugs is getting 
harder, since the spring of the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (mainly in terms of 
targets) has now dried up ((Talaga, 2009).  In view of the fact that 
increasing  internal R&D expenditure is not reflected in a proportional 
response in sales, new strategies were required. 
Table   4.2: The top 10 pharmaceutical companies on market capitalization 
Country  Name   Market Capitalization ($M) 
USA  Johnson & Johnson  99183 
Switzerland  Novartis  82388 
USA  Pfizer  80040 
Switzerland  Roche  73010 
USA  Merck  66615 
UK  GlaxoSmithKline  63584 
USA  Abbott Laboratories  47863 
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UK  AstraZeneca  47459 
France  Sanofi-Aventis  46324 
 USA  Amgen  32655 
Data resource: 2010 BIS (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in the UK)’s R&D 
ranking of the top 1000 world companies by their R&D spending  
4.3  Industry Responses 
Prior to the emergence of OI, the other strategic alternatives which have 
been tried do not seem to have worked. The main alternatives adopted - 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and increasing R&D investment - have 
proven largely unsuccessful or at least insufficient.  This section reviews 
these and other strategic responses  to the pressures identified in the 
preceding analysis. 
4.3.1  Mergers and Acquisitions: No Increase in Net Shareholder Value 
M&As  have always been a feature of the  Pharmaceutical industry 
landscape from its earliest beginnings. Actually, from the statistics given 
by Munos (2009), among the 261 organizations which have registered at 
least one NME since 1950, 137 organizations, over 50% of the total number, 
have disappeared through M&A.  
In recent decades, it appears that M&A strategies have been increasingly 
been employed in attempts to halt the decline in productivity and 
profitability. However, M&As do little to close the innovation gap in this 
industry, serving only to provide temporary bottom-line relief, while the 
titanic enterprise, though larger, continues to sink. Such strategies do not 
really deliver breakthrough drugs, but instead often induce  a loss of 
motivation amongst the industrial scientific community because of 
associated reorganization and downsizing (Lundberg and Reilly, 2009), 
and frequently a rationalization of the portfolio. Sometimes a partial, if not 
total, extinction of the ‘acquired’ partner’s drug discovery culture can even 
happen (Talaga, 2009). 
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This conclusion is strongly supported by recent econometric  research. 
Ornaghi (2009) studied the effects of mergers on the R&D activity of 
consolidated firms 1988-2004. His analysis discloses that merged 
companies have on average, worse performances than the group of non-
merging firms. This suggests that M&A are not an effective way to 
promote an innovation culture or remedy a deficit of innovation, at least 
for the big pharmaceutical companies, and in fact are often quite the 
reverse.  
Also, because of the particularly strong relationship between innovation 
capabilities and company revenues in the industry, M&As also affect the 
company’s financial performance. Large firms that merged experienced a 
similar change in enterprise value, sales, employees, and R&D, showed 
slower growth in operating profit, compared with similar pharmaceutical 
firms that did not merge (Danzon et al., 2007). Danzon et al (2007) 
concluded that for large pharmaceutical firms, mergers are a response to 
expected excess capacity due to patent expirations and gaps in a firm’s 
product pipeline. And for small firms, mergers are primarily an exit 
strategy in response to financial trouble.  
4.3.2  Increasing R&D Expenditure: Reaching the Limit 
There appears little chance that the pharmaceutical industry can maintain 
its historical success by increasing R&D expenditure. This is determined 
by the characteristics of Pharmaceutical R&D –  more R&D spending but 
with a smaller success percentage.  
The success of the Pharmaceutical industry for much of the last century 
depended on ‘blockbuster’  drugs, which remains a  major  goal  the 
companies in this industry are pursuing. Given the low (21%) probability of 
blockbusters, the company needs at least 2-5 NME launches per year 
(Munos, 2009). Therefore, 18-45 Phase 1 starts would be required annually 
in a typical large company based on the model given by Paul et al., (2010). 
However, such numbers are rarely achieved even in the  very largest 
companies.  
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Even if they cut down their goal to launch one NME per year, which 
indicates the company may have one blockbuster during five year time 
period, it is challenging. Because the number of discovery projects from 
target-to-hit, hit-to-lead and lead optimization is approximately 25, 20 and 
15 respectively (Paul et al., 2010), most companies are simply unable to 
achieve these numbers. Although there is recent benchmark data 
reflecting that the number of candidates entering Phase 1 trials has 
increased significantly, it is still insufficient to achieve 2-5 launches per 
year on  Phase  2 and 3 (Mathieu, 2008/2009; Hu  et al., 2007; Booth  and 
Zemmil,  2004).  The reality is many large pharmaceutical companies 
estimate they need to produce an average of 2-3 NMEs per year to meet 
their growth objectives. However, it is actually around 0.45 NMEs per year, 
resulting over time in a substantial pipeline gap for many companies (Paul 
et al., 2010). 
The interim conclusion must be that - based on the current R&D efficiency 
and the characteristics in Pharmaceutical industry – traditional business 
strategies such as purely increasing R&D expenditure or doing M&A will 
not make the industry sufficiently successful.  
4.3.3  Change of Strategy  
Since the innovation dynamics  of the past century  and transplanted 
business models do not appear to have produced sufficient increases in 
the pharmaceuticals,  a  new transformational approach to innovation  is 
needed to raise unsatisfactory levels of R&D efficiency. To realize this, the 
current emergent hypothesis seems to be that the innovation system in 
the  Pharmaceutical industry should be redesigned, and move from the 
traditional closed innovation system to the open innovation one.  
OI is not a new idea in the pharmaceutical industry: previous studies have 
demonstrated the long existence of OI-like  activities in Pharmaceutical 
industry. For example, in a 2008 OECD report, the pharmaceutical industry 
is considered to show levels of open innovation as high as other 
industries such as chemicals, and information and communication 
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technology (ICT) (Open Innovation in Global Networks, 2008). The OI trend 
can also be tracked from the studies of external collaboration activities in 
pharmaceuticals.  Examination of the publication activities of the  R&D 
laboratories of the major European and US pharmaceutical firms during 
the period 1995-2009,  a  high percentage of external collaborations is 
found  at the beginning of the period (62.1%,  1998),  which increases 
slightly in the following years (Rafols et al., 2012). Actually since 2000, it 
appears there is more research being performed outside than in. Many 
pharmaceutical companies have attempted to tap in to this and are moving 
more towards an OI model (Judd, 2013).  
Bianchi et al. (2011) collected and analysed the data about the adoption of 
OI by the top 20 worldwide bio-pharmaceutical players in the period 2000-
2007. Their study appears to suggest that:  
(1) Inbound open innovation is likely to take place mainly in the first three 
phases of the drug R&D process;  
(2) Outbound open innovation is mainly in the second part of the process;  
(3) OI activities in core therapeutic areas have decreased while activities in 
non-core therapeutic areas have increased; this  is  most  evident in the 
largest firms; 
(4) 63.5% of the alliances in inbound OI refer to non-core therapeutic areas, 
while alliances (mostly co-manufacturing and co-marketing agreements) in 
outbound OI largely refer to core therapeutic areas;  
(5) The vast majority of the in-licensing agreements (69.5%) refer to 
products in core therapeutic areas;  
(6)  Establishing  organisational modes for OI with universities and 
research centres is not a relevant phenomenon. 
In summary, the precedents in OI activities in the industry do not seem 
sufficient to justify wholesale adoption of OI by the industry. The reality is 
more complex. 
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4.4  Method 
4.4.1  Indices of Innovation 
As has been argued,  many  pharmaceutical  companies appear to have 
turned implicitly or explicitly to open innovation as a savior strategy. 
However, the most important questions – whether OI is the best strategy 
prescription for the pharmaceutical industry –  are still waiting to be 
answered. In fact, whether OI is working or not is still a serious research 
question which lacks literature contributions especially  from the 
quantitative evidence through the study of early and current OI adopters 
(see Enkel et al., 2009; Huizingh, 2011). To evaluate OI, the performance of 
R&D efficiency on the target firms could be an effective index. Because the 
most important benefit  provided  by OI  is the chance to increase the 
productivity of own R&D (Ili et al, 2010). Therefore, the logic here is to 
evaluate OI strategy through measuring the performance of R&D efficiency. 
And the suitability  and capability of this research design has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 through the study of P&G and its counterparts. 
As been discussed by Wang and Huang (2007), only in recent decade a few 
examples in the literature discussed R&D efficiency by using quantitative 
approaches with regard to R&D at the frim level (see Zhang et al., 2003; 
Revilla et al., 2003; Guan et al., 2006). And no studies developed to 
evaluate the performance of R&D efficiency in order to assess the OI 
performance. 
Two major approaches to measure the R&D efficiency have been discussed 
in previous chapters.  SFA (stochastic frontier analysis) and DEA (Data 
Envelopment analysis) which belongs to non-parametric analysis 
techniques  are major approaches for evaluating efficiency. DEA  was 
employed in this study, based on its obvious advantages and suitability. 
Malmquist  Index analysis (MI) which is another  candidate  of  measuring 
R&D efficiency from non-parametric analysis techniques  was also 
employed to verify the research results. Both DEA and MI have previously 
been applied to assess the efficiency of economic processes with 
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identifiable multiple inputs and outputs  (Wang and Huang, 2007; 
Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). By adapting these techniques and applying 
them longitudinally to time series data, the performance of R&D efficiency 
on the OI adopters can be evaluated to assess that whether adoption of OI 
strategy has helped firms to achieve the main benefit which is improving 
R&D productivity. 
Therefore this study employed two predictive ‘indices of innovation’ which 
were developed in the previous studies, and compared R&D efficiencies 
before and after adoption of open innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry  following the model which was developed in Chapter 3 (See 
Figure 3.1b). With the prediction that if open innovation is working, R&D 
efficiencies should rise over time, allowing for a delay due to the mean 
product lead-time  for  the period  for the individual company or for the 
industry.  
4.4.2  Inputs, Outputs and Time Lag 
R&D efficiency is the ratio of input in R&D (money, resources, and people) 
versus its output (new products, patents, publications) (Gassmann and 
Reepmeyer,  2005). The  goal of a highly productive R&D system is to 
efficiently translate inputs into the most desired and valuable outputs 
(Paul et al., 2010).  R&D investment is often a complex process, with 
multiple inputs and outputs. One of the advantages of adopting DEA 
analysis is that multiple inputs and outputs can be measured, more than 
can be accommodated using conventional econometric techniques (Cooper 
et al., 2004). This multiple DEA analysis study was begun by selecting the 
appropriate inputs and outputs based on the previous literature.  
As discussed previously in section 2.2.3.1and section 3.4.2, the inputs to 
innovation production activities are mainly  physical resources and 
manpower, which are usually measured in annual total R&D expenditures 
and R&D personnel (Wang and Huang, 2007). 
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The R&D expenditure refers to the total R&D expense, covering all projects 
involving both internal and external ones supported by the firm. The R&D 
expenditure input index has been widely used, and found to be suitable in 
previous studies (Guan and Chen, 2010; Zhong et al., 2011; Chen et al., 
2006). 
The R&D personnel includes all staff are engaged in either fundamental 
research, application research or experimental development (Zhong et al., 
2011). In Chapter 3, the number of employees was adopted as the index of 
mainly manpower on innovation in OI age. The reason for adapting this 
variable is that as a non-R&D intensive industry R&D personnel might not 
reflect its real innovation capability since human resources from other 
department are also enrolled into innovation process. And because of the 
lack of R&D personnel data, the comparison study between R&D personnel 
and number of employees cannot be made to observe which variable is 
more suitable.  While  pharmaceutical industry is very different from the 
Nondurable household products industry. Because it is the industry with 
very high level of R&D intensity, R&D personnel should be more suitable 
variable to measure the mainly manpower on innovation in pharmaceutical 
industry. However the only available data about human resource input is 
the number of employees. And there is no data of R&D personnel in these 
subject companies provided as time series  data during the test period. 
This data issue has been met in previous studies. In Hashimoto and 
Haneda’s study (2008)  of measuring the R&D efficiency in Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry, they dropped off the index of R&D mainly 
manpower due to the lack of the R&D personnel data, and only employed 
the R&D expenditure as the R&D input. The reason for that could be: (1) it 
is not suitable to replace the variable of R&D personnel with other data 
such as the number of employees, due to the R&D intensive characteristics 
of pharmaceutical industry; (2)  comparing  with R&D personnel, R&D 
expenditure takes the more part of R&D input in pharmaceutical industry 
and covers the financial expending of R&D manpower on certain level. In 
consistent with former studies, the financial support for R&D –  R&D 
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expenditure has been employed as the main R&D input in pharmaceutical 
industry. 
The outputs selected here are net sales, operating income and approved 
patent number.  The main outputs of R&D activities are technical 
improvement and economic benefit. The initial, direct outcome of R&D 
investment is the technical improvement, estimated in this case as the 
approved  patent number. The approved patent number refers to the 
quantity of accepted patent applications by the patent office in the given 
year.  
The other key outcome is the economic benefit, estimated in this case by 
the net sales and operating incomes as the final outputs in this study. The 
aim for companies doing innovation is to improve their capability for 
producing revenues, which could be reflected on their net sales and 
operating incomes. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, the ideal indices may be 
the sales and operating incomes on new products. However, there is not 
available for this kind of data. The  general net sales and operating 
incomes may be not as suitable as the ones on new products, but it is the 
most reasonable variables which could be found to measure the 
performance of R&D outputs. And their suitability has been demonstrated 
in former studies (see Chen et al., 2006; Guan and Chen, 2010; Hashimoto 
and Haneda, 2008; Zhong et al., 2011). 
Other input-output structures were also tried, such as adding the number 
of employees as another input and dropping off the patent number from 
output list. These research results revealed similar performance to the 
main finding observed here. This validates the suitability of the variables 
which were chosen and the reliability of the research findings.    
Other studies of time lags between the R&D input and output support that 
2 years is the reasonable average estimate across sectors (Kafouros and 
Wang, 2012; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Seldon, 1987;). However for the 
pharmaceutical industry, the time lags of R&D could be as long as 8 to 13 
years. Following these previous studies, the preliminary test was given in 
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this study aimed to find the suitable time lag between inputs and outputs, 
which shows that 8-year lag is appropriate. It is  in line with  previous 
studies (Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008; Odagiri and Murakami; 1992).  
As discussed previously  (see Section 2.2.3.3), the robustness of this 
selection can  be tested in two ways:  longitudinal comparisons through 
consecutive cross-sectional datasets (see Guan and Chen, 2010; Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia et al., 2007) and robustness text through varying the length 
of time lags (e.g., Hollanders and Celikel-Esser, 2007). Due to this study 
utilising panel data, cross-sectional dataset already included into the data 
analysis. For the other robustness test, two different time lags 7-year and 
9-year time lags  were selected and adapted, in order to see whether 
current introduction of time lag has an effect of the final results. The 
analysis results show that, the general  performance of two robustness 
test  is  consistent  with the one on 8-year time lag, which indicates  that 
current introduction of time lag has limited effect on the general analysis 
results. And because this 8  years’  time lag was selected based on 
preliminary test, it is more suitable to be adapted in this study. The 
analysis results from the 7-year time lag and the 9-year time lag can been 
seen in Table A.16-A.18 and Table A.19-A.21 in the appendix. 
4.4.3  Case Data Sources 
Certainly up to 2000, the pharmaceutical industry had a fortress mentality 
based on  closed innovation. Since 2000, there is more research being 
performed outside than in. Many pharmaceutical companies have 
attempted to tap in to this and are moving more towards an OI model 
(Judd, 2013), or claim they are. This trend has been found more obviously 
among the big pharmaceutical companies. Therefore the research subjects 
are the 10 top pharmaceutical companies around the world including the 
OI pioneers in this industry.  
Table   4.3: Descriptive statistics for main variables in Pharmaceutical study 
Variables  Mean  Standard  Maximum  Minimum 
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deviation  
R&D expenditure   1431672  1007372  5904504  278875.8 
Patent applications   120.83  83.73637  342  18 
Net sales  18091873  11929251  44350777  2447593 
Operating incomes  4763779  3574869  16347140  488508.1 
Sample size of DMU  100       
Data sources: Data of R&D expenditure, number of employees, net sales and operating 
incomes are from Datastream (Thomson Reuters); data of patent applications is from 
United States patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Here the unit of R&D expenditure, net 
sales and operating incomes is 1000$; the unit of patent applications is item. 
 
The data’s time series is from 1994 to 2011, and much of the data required 
was available from official government sources and established business 
databases. The R&D expenditure, net sales and operating incomes were 
collected from Datastream (Thomson Reuters)  and the approved patent 
number was collected from the database offered by United States patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Datastream is an established and widely 
used dataset which provides both current and historical global financial 
and economic information with various types of data items from both 
developed and emerging markets. USPTO is the official organization which 
owns the USPTO search engine to provide search bibliographic details or 
full text of US patents from 1976. It is the mainstream patent data source 
in relative studies focusing on cross-market analysis. It  is free to use 
through their website (http://patft.uspto.gov/). All monetary values were 
adjusted for inflation using the US domestic manufacturing Producer Price 
Index (with index year 1993). The basic statistics for the main variables 
used to study the R&D performance of P&G and its competitors are 
reported in Table 4.3. 
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4.5  Results 
4.5.1  Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Results  
4.5.1.1  Technical Efficiency 
In the DEA analyses, the TE scores reflect the overall R&D investment 
efficiency: the bigger the score, the higher the R&D efficiency: a firm has 
the highest possible R&D efficiency if its score is 1 in a given year. Overall 
the average TE score of the industry has declined during the period 1994-
2003 with more stability since 2000; most companies show a declining TE 
score while a few companies have exhibited more positive performances. 
The detailed results are discussed below. 
Table   4.4: DEA technical efficiency index   
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                       
  
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Average  
Pre-
open 
Post-
open 
Pfizer   1.000 0.906 1.000 0.714 0.552 0.428 0.280 0.272 0.300 0.217 0.567  0.767 0.267 
J&J   0.834 0.740 0.672 0.600 0.561 0.542 0.489 0.421 0.376 0.326 0.556  0.658 0.403 
Merck   1.000 0.832 0.562 0.418 0.443 0.444 0.400 0.422 0.520 0.390 0.543  0.617 0.433 
TAKEDA  0.415 0.430 0.512 0.472 0.458 0.473 0.489 0.494 0.531 0.354 0.463  0.460 0.467 
Abbott   0.483 0.466 0.400 0.396 0.391 0.450 0.449 0.432 0.451 0.427 0.435  0.431 0.440 
Bristol  0.507 0.650 0.461 0.482 0.536 0.411 0.365 0.285 0.284 0.269 0.425  0.508 0.301 
AstraZeneca 0.557 0.553 0.540 0.562 0.563 0.259 0.278 0.367 0.293 0.247 0.422  0.506 0.296 
Novo   0.487 0.532 0.320 0.361 0.273 0.338 0.445 0.469 0.477 0.512 0.421  0.385 0.476 
Daichi  0.333 0.287 0.271 0.254 0.339 0.284 0.302 0.302 0.358 0.306 0.304  0.295 0.317 
Lilly  0.536 0.414 0.311 0.263 0.218 0.245 0.233 0.247 0.257 0.224 0.295  0.331 0.240 
Average 
0.615 0.581 0.505 0.452 0.433 0.387 0.373 0.371 0.385 0.327         
 
Based on the average score for the period of 1994-2003, with an average 
score of 0.567, Pfizer was the most efficient company on R&D investment 
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among these ten companies. J&J and Merck were ranked second and third 
with average scores of 0.556 and 0.543. Lilly was the least efficient R&D 
Company, with Daichi only slightly better than Lilly. Their average scores 
were 0.304 and 0.295. If year 2000 is picked up as the start year for the 
pharmaceutical companies thinking outside (Judd, 2013), the comparison 
study can be made between the periods 1994-1999 (pre-open period) and 
2000-2003 (post-open period). In the pre-open period, Pfizer, J&J and Merck 
were still ranked first three with average scores of 0.767, 0.658 and 0.617. 
Lilly and Daichi were the two least efficient R&D companies, with Novo 
Nordisk (Novo) slightly better. While the ranking changed dramatically for 
the post-open period, Novo’s average R&D efficiency rose from 0.385 in 
pre-open period to 0.476 in post-open period, becoming the most R&D 
efficient company. With the average score 0.267, Pfizer ranked ninth 
among ten companies, only slightly better than Lilly (see Table 4.4). 
If the average score of the ten companies was taken as an index of the 
industry’s R&D performance, it could be observed that the R&D efficiency 
in the pharmaceutical industry has declined from 0.615 in 1994 to 0.327 in 
2003 (see Figure 4.2). Among the 10 individual companies, Pfizer showed 
the biggest drop in R&D efficiency, from 1 in 1994 to 0.217 in 2003. Its 
R&D efficiency declined dramatically up to 2001, then levelled out. This 
phenomenon is not only found on Pfizer:  Merck also experienced a huge 
decline up until 1998, but kept its R&D efficiency score around 0.4 after 
that. A similar situation also happened at Lilly by 1998. Since 1998, Lilly’s 
R&D efficiency stopped declining and came up with a slight increase from 
0.218 in 1998 to 0.257 in 2002. J&J also showed a dramatically decline 
from 0.834 to 0.326 during 1994-2003 but unlike the others, there is no 
inflection point year which led it to a more stable R&D efficiency. 
AstraZeneca experienced a huge decline in 1999 on the R&D efficiency, 
from 0.563 in 1998 to 0.259 1999. This decline may have been triggered by 
the merger that happened in 1999 (the merger of the  Sweden-based  Astra 
AB  and the UK-based  Zeneca Group). Bristol’s R&D efficiency declined 
from 0.507 in 1994 to 0.269 in 2003.  
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Except for the companies which were talked about, the other companies 
(Daichi, Abbott, TAKEDA and Novo) performed more stable on the R&D 
efficiency. These companies did not show a higher  performance at the 
beginning, while their R&D efficiency did not decline dramatically as the 
other companies showed. Among them, Novo showed an interesting 
performance of the R&D efficiency. Its R&D efficiency firstly experienced a 
decline during 1994 to 1999, whilst increasing after it with the score from 
0.338 to 0.512. 
 
Figure    4.2:  The performance of average TE score  in  Pharmaceutical 
industry 
4.5.1.2  Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) 
The PTE scores reflect the pure R&D investment efficiency excluding scale 
effects. Overall compared with TE, the PTE scores showed less variation at 
both industry and company levels, and the gradient of the decline in PTE 
was more constant.  More details are discussed below. 
J&J owned the highest average PTE score of 0.927 during the period 1994-
2003. Pfizer and Novo followed it with scores 0.888 and 0.788,  ranking 
second and third. Lilly had the lowest PTE score of 0.349, following Daichi 
with PTE score 0.452. Over both the pre-open period and the post-open 
period,  Pfizer, J&J and Novo were still the top three companies on the 
average PTE score, with J&J’s average score increasing from 0.894 to 0.975. 
Both Daichi and Lilly performed lower on the average PTE score in the 
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post-open period than in the pre-open period. They still ranked last two in 
the post-open period (see Table 4.5). 
Taking the average PTE score as the industry’s PTE index, it  could  be 
observed that – unlike the TE score - the pharmaceutical industry’s PTE 
experienced only a slight decline at the beginning and a slight increase 
after 2000. When compared with the industry’s TE performance, its PTE 
score was much more stable across the testing years. Compared with the 
continuous decline for TE, J&J’s PTE score increased from 0.84 in 1994 to 1 
in 2003. It was the only company to show a continuous increase across the 
study period. Pfizer, Novo and Merck all exhibited  fluctuating PTE 
performance,  their PTE first declining  then  starting  to increase around 
1997 to 2000. AstraZeneca’s PTE declined dramatically in 1999 (the merger 
year), while it recovered slightly after 2001. Bristol’s PTE score has kept 
declining since 1998. Abbott showed an increase on PTE from 0.396 in 
1998 to 0.53 in 2003, after a slight decline at the beginning.  TAKEDA and 
Daichi’s PTE fluctuated during 1994 to 2003. Lilly experienced a slight 
increase from 1999, after the decline of its PTE since 1994.  
Table   4.5: DEA: Pure Technical Efficiency index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                       
  
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Average  
Pre-
open 
Post-
open 
J&J   0.840 0.900 0.873 0.881 0.891 0.980 0.951 0.975 0.975 1.000 0.927  0.894 0.975 
Pfizer   1.000 0.911 1.000 0.903 0.819 0.783 0.735 0.792 1.000 0.934 0.888  0.903 0.865 
Novo   1.000 0.944 0.699 0.686 0.440 0.585 1.000 0.908 0.863 0.754 0.788  0.726 0.881 
Merck  1.000 0.875 0.613 0.533 0.621 0.693 0.681 0.743 1.000 0.882 0.764  0.723 0.827 
TAKEDA  0.503 0.527 0.698 0.658 0.555 0.553 0.617 0.610 0.639 0.380 0.574  0.582 0.562 
AstraZeneca 0.625 0.616 0.587 0.603 0.588 0.488 0.433 0.553 0.553 0.512 0.556  0.585 0.513 
Bristol   0.516 0.655 0.462 0.513 0.654 0.574 0.515 0.468 0.444 0.384 0.519  0.562 0.453 
Abbott   0.510 0.483 0.410 0.398 0.396 0.460 0.452 0.478 0.517 0.530 0.463  0.443 0.494 
Daichi  0.498 0.437 0.456 0.470 0.560 0.398 0.435 0.414 0.482 0.374 0.452  0.470 0.426 
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Lilly   0.571 0.432 0.324 0.264 0.263 0.300 0.305 0.346 0.348 0.337 0.349  0.359 0.334 
Average  0.707 0.681 0.616 0.596 0.579 0.567 0.609 0.621 0.687 0.594         
 
4.5.1.3  Scale Efficiency (SE) 
Scale efficiency (SE) scores reflect various classes and levels of returns to 
scale on R&D investment. There are three possible classes of returns to 
scale: decreasing (DRS), increasing (IRS) and constant (CRS). CRS is 
indicated by an SE score of 1; DRS, signified by a decrease in the relative 
output for a given incremental input, and an associated decline in the 
consequent profit; IRS, signified by an increase in the relative output for a 
given incremental input.  Overall, the average SE score of the industry 
showed a  small decline,  which was also  seen  for most of individual 
companies, the majority of which  suffered from DRS during the period 
1994-2003. The detailed results are discussed below (see Table 4.6). 
In the period of 1994-2003, Abbott  and  Lilly were first and second on 
average SE score. Pfizer, J&J and Novo were ranked last three among ten 
companies. TAKEDA’s average SE score increased from 0.796 in the pre-
open period to 0.842 in the post-open period, while Lilly declined  from 
0.916 to 0.720 over the same period. Novo’s average SE score remained 
flat at  0.539 in the pre-open period and  0.548 in the post-open period, 
while J&J decline from 0.742 to 0.414 over the same period. Lilly showed a 
similar performance decline - suffering from DRS - after 1998, with its SE 
declining from 0.827 to 0.664 the same year. Companies including Pfizer, 
J&J, Merck and Bristol declined more dramatically on SE. Pfizer declined 
from 1 to 0.233. J&J showed the decline from 0.993 to 0.326. Merck’s SE 
score declined from 1 in 1994 to 0.442 in 2003. Bristol’s SE score declined 
from 0.982 in 1994 to 0.607 in 2001. 
All these companies suffered from DRS in most years, indicating that for a 
given level of increase in the R&D input, less relative R&D output was 
produced. As found before with TE and PTE performance, ASTRAZENECA 
experienced a huge decline in 1999, and started to suffer from DRS in the 
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same year. TAKEDA, Daichi and Novo were experiencing increasing return 
to scale (IRS) across the testing period, which indicates that a given level 
of R&D inputs was producing a relative increase in R&D output in these 
three companies. TAKEDA’s SE score increased from 0.825 in 1994 to 0.932 
in 2003. Daichi also experienced an increase on SE from 0.668 to 0.818 
during 1994-2003. Compared with them, Novo had  a more fluctuated 
performance, while its SE also increased from 0.487 in 1994 to 0.679 in 
2003 (see Table 4.6).     
Table   4.6: DEA scale efficiency index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                       
  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average  
Pre-
open 
Post-
open 
Abbott   0.948 0.967 0.976 0.994 0.988 0.977 0.994 0.903 0.872 0.806  0.943 0.975  0.894 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  drs  drs  drs 
 
   
Lilly   0.940 0.959 0.960 0.994 0.827 0.815 0.763 0.714 0.739 0.664  0.838 0.916  0.720 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
   
TAKEDA  0.825 0.816 0.734 0.717 0.826 0.855 0.793 0.811 0.832 0.932  0.814 0.796  0.842 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs 
 
   
Bristol  0.982 0.991 0.997 0.940 0.819 0.716 0.708 0.607 0.639 0.702  0.810 0.908  0.664 
 
irs  irs  irs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
   
AstraZeneca 0.892 0.898 0.920 0.932 0.957 0.530 0.643 0.665 0.530 0.482  0.745 0.855  0.580 
  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs       
Merck  1.000 0.951 0.918 0.784 0.713 0.640 0.588 0.568 0.520 0.442  0.712 0.834  0.530 
  -  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs       
Daichi  0.668 0.656 0.594 0.541 0.606 0.712 0.694 0.730 0.743 0.818  0.676 0.630  0.746 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs 
 
   
Pfizer  1.000 0.994 1.000 0.791 0.674 0.547 0.382 0.343 0.300 0.233  0.626 0.834  0.315 
  -  irs  -  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs       
J&J  0.993 0.822 0.770 0.682 0.630 0.554 0.514 0.432 0.385 0.326  0.611 0.742  0.414 
  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs       
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Novo   0.487 0.563 0.458 0.527 0.620 0.577 0.445 0.516 0.552 0.679  0.542 0.539  0.548 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs 
 
   
Average  0.874 0.862 0.833 0.790 0.766 0.692 0.652 0.629 0.611 0.608         
4.5.2  Malmquist Index Analysis (MI) Results 
Malmquist  Index analysis  (MI), which has previously  been applied for 
similar analyses in the pharmaceutical industry (Hashimoto and Haneda, 
2008) was employed to cross-reference the DEA results. MI generates two 
key indices, the Malmquist Index and the Frontier Shift Index, which are 
employed in this research to verify and cross-reference the DEA results. 
The Malmquist index, in the context of production, expresses a total factor 
for productivity change, while the frontier  shift index  reflects  ‘industry-
wide productivity change’ (Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). Therefore, these 
two indices are adapted to separately measure the total R&D efficiency of 
a company, and the industry-wide R&D productivity. 
4.5.2.1  Malmquist Index 
The Malmquist index indicates the total factor R&D efficiency change of a 
firm over time (Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). MI which is employed here 
is the cumulative one, which is different from DEA. The indices for each 
year are all referenced to the baseline year 1994 where the values are all 
taken as 1.  The values of the indices calculated thus differ from those 
produced by DEA, which shows a similar picture of performance, but a 
slightly different  ranking of the R&D efficiency among the sample 
companies.  Based on the average score from 1994 to 2003, TAKEDA, 
Daichi and Abbott  showed the highest R&D efficiency. Suffering from 
relatively huge declines in R&D efficiency, Pfizer, Lilly and Merck ranked 
the last three among ten companies. Comparing  their performance 
between pre-open and post-open periods, Pfizer, J&J, AstraZeneca and 
Bristol  declined dramatically in  R&D efficiency, while Novo showed a 
bigger increase compared with others during this period, and  TAKEDA, 
Daichi and Abbott all showed slight increases.  
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Taking  the annual average score as the index of the industry’s R&D 
efficiency  performance, this shows  similar patterns of performance to 
those found with DEA analysis. The R&D efficiency performance of Pfizer, 
Lilly and Merck also match those observed in the DEA results: they showed 
stable performance after huge declines before 2000 and 1998. There was 
also a huge gap in R&D efficiency between 1998 and 1999 for AstraZeneca. 
Compared with others, Daichi, Abbott and TAKEDA exhibited more stable 
R&D efficiency. Consistent with the earlier findings, Novo showed an 
increasing R&D efficiency after a decline during 1994 to 1999. In summary, 
the Malmquist index results are very consistent with the findings from 
DEA on the total R&D efficiency performance on both firm and industry 
levels (see Table 4.7). 
Table   4.7: Cumulative Malmquist index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                       
  
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Average  
Pre-
open 
Post-
open 
TAKEDA  1 0.999 1.027 1.005 1.053 1.066 1.096 1.038 1.215 0.853 1.035  1.025 1.051 
Daichi  1 0.895 0.815 0.688 0.983 0.787 0.846 0.815 1.106 0.876 0.881  0.861 0.911 
Abbott  1  0.98 0.746 0.722 0.796 0.868 0.876 0.818 0.927 0.871 0.860  0.852 0.873 
Novo  1 1.092 0.631 0.758 0.584 0.642 0.851  0.93 1.011 0.917 0.842  0.785 0.927 
Bristol  1 1.237 0.909 0.929 0.974 0.784 0.706 0.562 0.555 0.471 0.813  0.972 0.574 
AstraZeneca  1 0.996 0.953 0.959  0.99 0.467 0.499 0.695 0.523 0.436 0.752  0.894 0.538 
J&J  1 0.893 0.741 0.677 0.642 0.607 0.561 0.485 0.446 0.402 0.645  0.760 0.474 
Pfizer  1 0.913 0.896 0.672 0.563 0.428 0.297 0.271 0.303 0.228 0.557  0.745 0.275 
Lilly  1 0.797 0.506 0.433 0.378 0.416 0.399  0.43 0.462 0.402 0.522  0.588 0.423 
Merck  1 0.723  0.51 0.403 0.406 0.415 0.382 0.389 0.459 0.386 0.507  0.576 0.404 
Average  1.000 0.864 0.721 0.629 0.596 0.467 0.428 0.454 0.439 0.371         
4.5.2.2  Frontier Shift Index 
The average frontier shift index across all firms has been viewed  an 
appropriate indicator to view R&D efficiency change at the industry level 
(Hashimoto and Haneda, 2008). The observed performance on the average 
frontier shift index indicates that  the industry’s overall R&D efficiency 
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declined for several years after 1994, and a more stable performance after 
year 2000, which supports the prior findings in this research about the 
industry’s performance (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.8). 
 
 
Figure    4.3: The performance of average frontier shift index  in the 
pharmaceutical industry during 1994-2003 
Table   4.8: Cumulative frontier shift index 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
  
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Average  
AstraZeneca  1 0.773 0.626 0.607 0.566 0.521 0.494 0.443 0.495 0.455 0.598 
Bristol  1 0.732 0.482 0.471 0.494 0.429 0.387 0.361 0.449 0.439 0.524 
Lilly  1 0.776 0.579  0.55 0.523 0.485 0.446  0.42 0.505 0.421 0.571 
J&J  1 0.754 0.628 0.565 0.536 0.506 0.468 0.422 0.475 0.442 0.580 
Merck  1 0.723  0.51 0.449 0.459 0.415 0.382 0.389 0.459 0.386 0.517 
Pfizer  1 0.913 0.896 0.672 0.563 0.499  0.48 0.442 0.518 0.466 0.645 
Abbott  1 0.678 0.567 0.542  0.47 0.454 0.424 0.413 0.448 0.421 0.542 
TAKEDA  1 0.791 0.664 0.586 0.494 0.463 0.454  0.43 0.504 0.435 0.582 
Daichi  1  0.68 0.482 0.514  0.48 0.449 0.407 0.434 0.464 0.408 0.532 
Novo  1 0.832 0.504 0.472 0.497 0.494 0.452 0.453 0.534 0.447 0.569 
Average  1.000 0.779 0.623 0.557 0.501 0.472 0.443 0.434 0.494 0.435   
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4.6  Discussion 
4.6.1  What the Indices Reveal 
So what did the index analyses reveal about the effectiveness of current 
R&D strategies in the pharmaceutical industry?  
The overall picture confirms the long term decline in R&D productivity, but 
shows some recent slowing of the rate of decline. The pattern of results 
across the three key DEA indices (TE, PTE and SE) shows that the 
underlying cause of decline was decreasing returns to scale (DRS), 
indicating  that  the addition of resources had proceeded beyond the 
optimal point. The results of the MI analyses were completely consistent 
with these findings. The remainder of this section discusses these results 
in detail, examining the evidence for the relative contributions of open 
innovation, M&A activity, and increasing R&D investment, before the next 
section (4.6.2) going  on to consider the wider potential impact of OI 
activities on performance.   
4.6.1.1  Patterns of R&D Efficiency and OI in the Industry 
The analysis of the average score of the ten pharmaceutical companies 
showed that the overall R&D efficiency of the pharmaceutical industry 
declined during the period 1994-2003. Since the industry’s pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) -  which reflects R&D efficiency -  was more stable, 
suggesting the decline was related to and perhaps triggered by –  the 
industry’s SE status, which showed a continuous decline across the testing 
period. This appears to indicate that the R&D inputs in the pharmaceutical 
industry have in this case gone beyond their most efficient level, 
producing less R&D output per dollar input for the industry as a whole. 
One interesting finding here is that since the major decline in the 
industry’s R&D efficiency in the period1994-1999, it has slowed down 
since then, which happens to coincide with the start of the OI adoption 
phase for many pharmaceutical companies. This suggests but does not 
prove a causal relationship between OI adoption and R&D efficiency; for 
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one thing adoption in companies was not simultaneous and the 
consistency of strategic intent across companies is unclear. Even if it is 
not triggered by OI directly, this phenomenon may indicate companies are 
starting to switch their strategies and perceive the opportunities outside 
in a different light, which could signal a major change in the research 
paradigm of the pharmaceutical industry.  
Common patterns of R&D efficiency performance were observed across 
some of the companies. Pfizer, Merck and Lilly all experienced a huge 
decline in their R&D efficiencies at the beginning of the study period, 
while they all stopped the decline and showed more stability subsequently; 
though similar in pattern, these effects occurred at slightly different times 
for each company: 1997, 1998 and 2000 respectively for Merck, Lilly and 
Pfizer. Starting to benefit from external R&D activities and resulting 
incoming business opportunities beyond the company boundary could be 
one possible reason. Other interpretations are also plausible, such as the 
industry moving back to the traditional model after drying up of the low-
hanging fruit. However, this change of the R&D efficiency may be more 
likely to be triggered by factors affecting an individual company, rather 
than sector-wide industrial changes. Because no evidence could be found 
to support that all sample companies followed the similar performance.  
And since all three companies suffered from the declining SE, the simplest 
explanation is that the later stable R&D efficiency performance was 
triggered by the increase of the pure technical efficiency: the increase of 
PTE since 1997, 1998 and 2000 respectively for Merck, Lilly and Pfizer 
tends to  support this conclusion. These rises in pure technical efficiency 
seem to suggest that the strategic shift is becoming successful for some 
companies. This suggests OI a major factor in explaining and halting or 
slowing the decline in these companies, and the emergence of OI as a 
potential strategic ploy in pharmaceutical innovation.  
4.6.1.2  M&As: Ineffective 
The results of the DEA and MI analyses  also  highlight the relative 
inefficiency of M&A activity as a strategy. In a recent comparison between 
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Lilly and selected companies which have been heavily involved in M&As 
including J&J, Pfizer and Bristol, Munos (2009) found that those companies 
that have relied heavily on M&A tend to lag behind those that have not on 
NME  output. However,  the  analysis results did not show that Lilly 
performed better than other three companies on R&D efficiency (TE). Lilly 
showed higher R&D scale efficiency than J&J, Pfizer and Bristol which 
implies its R&D input level is more efficient, while its pure R&D efficiency 
was lower compared with the others.  
On the other hand, AstraZeneca’s case also supported the conclusion  that 
M&As have not been synergistic in pharmaceuticals: AstraZeneca’s R&D 
efficiency experienced a big decline in its merger year 1999, and both its 
PTE and SE scores showed the decline in that year. Compared with PTE, its 
SE suffered more from the merger, and did not recover its former level 
subsequently. AstraZeneca suffered from DRS after 1999, which indicated 
that the increase of its R&D inputs had proceeded beyond its optimal level, 
and brought less R&D outputs.  
Although some conflicting evidence has been found in from the different 
analyses, these are relatively minor and it seems clear that M&As have not 
been the best strategic prescription for the embattled pharmaceutical 
industry. The data shows that the industry cannot be saved only by this 
traditional business strategy. Since M&As have been adopted by the 
pharmaceutical industry throughout its history, and on an increasingly 
large  scale in recent decades, if they were effective the industry’s R&D 
efficiency should increase or at least stop declining after 1990s. This did 
not happen.   
4.6.1.3  Increasing the R&D Investment: Ineffective  
Simply increasing the R&D investment does not seem to have led to a 
direct increase in R&D efficiency in the industry. This is observed in the 
failure of ever-increasing R&D expenditure to alter the flat, static rate of 
new drug approvals (Figure 4.1). Further evidence for this is also found in 
the pharmaceutical industry’s SE score, which continued declining across 
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the testing period, indicating that the scale of the industry’s R&D inputs 
was more inefficient. Based on the individual companies’ performance, it 
appears  the scale inefficiency did not come from the IRS but DRS, which 
means that too much R&D resources has been poured into the industry 
which leads to inefficiency in R&D productivity. Most companies in this 
research suffered from DRS in most years, and these companies’ increases 
on R&D inputs did not bring them similar or increased R&D outputs 
compared with their earlier performance.  
However, this does not mean that increasing the R&D investment is not 
necessarily ineffective in all cases. In the present study, TAKEDA, Daichi 
and Novo were still showing IRS effects,  indicating that compared with 
others these three companies still have a chance to increase their R&D 
efficiency through increasing R&D inputs. Novo appears to be something 
of a special case: its R&D inputs are actually below the R&D input level for 
the best SE (scale efficiency).  
4.6.2  Practice and Potential of OI in the Industry 
So what do the results with the indices imply when taken in conjunction 
with other evidence about the effectiveness of current R&D strategies – 
and OI in particular - in the pharmaceutical industry? 
4.6.2.1  OI Precedents in the Industry 
Given that results to date on OI adoption in the pharmaceutical industry 
did not show the clear positive result observed for P&G in the previous 
study (see Chapter 3), the potential interpretation may be that based on 
the precedents of OI activities in the industry, there does not seem to be 
sufficient to justify wholesale adoption of OI by the industry.  
The reality is more complex: 
(1) OI strategy can be seen as a way to reduce the production/operational 
cost or accelerate the marketing speed. Companies prefer to collaborate 
with small-medium  ‘product’  and  ‘platform’  biotech firms to target and 
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identify projects for  pre-clinical testing, but  do post-approval activities 
with large companies because of their mature large-scale R&D operations. 
These characteristics of the external collaborations suggest a tendency to 
outsource and diversify the disciplinary base (Rafols et al., 2012), which 
may indicate that open innovation starts with simple outsourcing deals to 
reduce overcapacities, cut cost, grow through complementary assets or 
reduce risks (Gassmann et al., 2010), but not a way to extend R&D ideas 
beyond the company’s boundary. Most outbound OI activities occur in the 
latter part of the process, perhaps because firms are more likely to invite 
external organisations for exploiting the results of their innovation 
activities, ensuring a quicker and wider access to the market, but not for 
exploring their innovation. 
(2) OI can also be applied in non-core areas as a supplementary activity. 
More OI activities are in non-core areas, which may be because the firms 
prefer to enter into relationship with a partner holding very dissimilar 
competencies to capture new ideas from them for extending their 
business. OI activities in this case are  therefore  more  of  a supplement 
than a necessity.  
(3) OI may also be used as a temporary and emergent solution or ‘catch-
up’.  The high percentage of OI activities in the later process reflects 
inbound activities such as licensing-in, to compensate for the lack of 
output from basic research toward the start of drug discovery process. 
These may indicate OI activities are more like to be employed to solve 
some emergent or tactical problem, such an IP gap, through direct 
licensing-in activities, but not the long term strategies related to 
innovation capability such as those in basic research. 
In summary, these precedents in OI activity have so far fallen well short of 
the industry’s requirement, especially for addressing the grand challenges 
of  R&D efficiency  and overall productivity. However, this situation has 
continued to evolve, with more OI activities being adopted to address the 
industry’s ever more serious R&D challenge. 
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4.6.2.2  Current OI Developments in the Industry 
Some of the latest OI strategies and activities have begun to reach beyond 
the original concept and to extend the open concept further, or with more 
specific variants of it. Large pharmaceutical companies have begun to 
work more actively together – as well as with small – and medium-sized 
enterprises and academic institutions –  on pre-competitive research 
(Barnes et al., 2009). Based on the previous studies, several OI activities 
launched by the big pharmaceutical companies are summarized (see Table 
4.9). 
 
 
 
Table   4.9: Selected OI initiatives by major pharmaceutical companies 
Name  Year  Founder  Type  Remark 
Innocentive  2001  Eli Lilly 
open 
source  
first internet problem-solving platform 
(Hunter and Stephens, 2010) 
Phenotypic 
Drug 
Discovery 
Initiative 
(PD2) 
2009  Eli Lilly 
open 
source  
Innocentive and PD2 are champions of 
open-source R&D initiatives created 
and spun out by Lilly (Harnessing open 
innovation, 2009). 
open its 
internal 
library 
2009  Pfizer 
Open 
source 
Pfizer began allowing other 
organizations to screen against their 
internal compound library (Hunter and 
Stephens, 2010). 
Sage 
Bionetworks 
2009 
Eric Schadt and 
Stephen Friend 
(both moving 
from senior 
positions at 
MERCK); Merck 
open 
access 
Sage is another open-access platform 
aiming at building complex, predictive 
models of disease using logistics and 
data from Merck and seed money 
from private sources (Talaga, 2009). 
The  idea is to integrate large-scale 
biological information into models and 
then enable other scientists to 
leverage that information in an open-
access way (Harnessing open 
innovation, 2009). 
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provide 
compounds 
from its 
library 
2010  GSK 
Open 
source 
The one spearheaded by GSK in 
January to freely provide 13,500 
malarial compounds from its own 
library for others to test and develop.  
The patent 
pool 
2009  GSK and Alnylam  
  In the field of neglected tropical 
diseases, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
announced the creation of a patent 
pool, which aims to remove IP as a 
barrier to research into treatments for 
neglected diseases. GSK has put more 
than 800 patents for compounds or 
processes into this pool, and Alnylam 
has added a further 1,500 patents 
(Hunter and Stephens, 2010). 
Stevenage 
Bioscience 
Catalyst  
2009 
GSk, EEDA, 
Wellcome Trust, 
Technology 
Strategy Board, 
BIS 
open 
innovation 
campus 
The UK's first open innovation 
bioscience campus, pioneering a 
unique culture to drive early stage 
biotech, pharma and medtech 
developments (from its website). 
a shift 
towards an 
open 
innovation 
model  
2009  Johnson&Johnson    
Johnson&Johnson’s  Head of 
Pharmaceutical R&D, Paul Stoffels, 
announced a shift towards an open 
innovation model for the company in 
2009 (Hunter and Stephens, 2010). 
Recently, OI in the pharmaceutical industry has also been pursued through 
public private partnerships (PPPs) and open source initiatives. PPPs, in 
theory at least, constitute an attractive OI business model for 
pharmaceutical companies to  address major issues in the field of R&D, 
combining expertise from various research communities like Academia, 
Biotechs and/or drug discovery solution providers (Tralau-Stewart, 2008). 
Several drug development challenges, such as biomarker identification 
and validation, are increasingly being addressed at a pre-competitive level 
often through public- private partnerships commented a Nature editorial 
(Harnessing open innovation, 2009). There are several PPPs listed in Table 
4.10. 
Table   4.10: Selected public–private partnerships 
Name   Website 
Biomarkers Consortium     http://www.biomarkersconsortium.org  
Critical Path Institute Consortia   http://www.c-path.org/consortia.cfm 
EBI Industry Programme   http://www.ebi.ac.uk/industry/ind-prog-
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index.html 
Health Commons   http://sciencecommons.org/projects/ 
Innovative Medicines  Initiative http://imi.europa.eu/index_en.html 
Serious Adverse Events Consortium   http://www.saeconsortium.org 
Division of Signal Transduction Therapy 
(also  known as the Dundee kinase 
consortium) 
http://www.ppu.mrc.ac.uk/technologies/dstt.php 
Resource: Harnessing open innovation, 2009 
 
As the related, but quite distinct ‘open’ idea, ‘Open source’ R&D provides a 
platform to encourage volunteers use online communities  to address a 
problem in which they share an interest. Open source has also sprung up 
in Pharmaceutical industry in recent years also focusing on precompetitive 
research through data sharing. Apart the open source activities mentioned 
previously, there are several other collaborations among industry 
organizations (Strauss, 2010).   However,  ‘open source’  is different in 
principle to ‘open innovation’, as the former involves fully shared source 
information or even product, whereas the latter is typically much more 
restricted e.g. to specific IP. 
The companies in this industry have deliberately established a strategic 
priority to improve their relationships with external organisations in both 
inbound and outbound open innovation processes. Both the financial 
support  for the establishment and management of OI and the 
management preparation for OI activities have begun to appear (Bianchi et 
al., 2011). 
4.6.2.3  The Emerging Strategic Imperatives for OI  
As has been described, OI activities have been developing significantly in 
the pharmaceutical industry over the past decade. The effectiveness and 
the determinants of adoption of new strategies  such as OI can be 
influenced by a number of specific factors (Chiaroni et al., 2009). For the 
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pharmaceutical industry, two characteristics  –  collaboration and 
connection - may lead the industry into OI strategy. 
(1)  For collaboration, the R&D challenge in Pharmaceutical industry 
requires wider and deeper R&D collaboration among various organizations. 
Since the halcyon days of relatively easy, ‘low-hanging fruit’ targets which 
have now dried up, to survive in the future more difficult targets require 
more sophisticated and multidisciplinary approaches. The remaining new 
targets are more complicated and less likely to be solved by one company 
of whatever size, since more information, knowledge and data should be 
required from various experts and companies. No individual organization 
has the resources to maximize the potential of molecular data to inform 
drug development. ‘We are going to have to be smarter about identifying 
the nodes in pathways where we need to intervene and the biomarkers 
that will tell us whether or not we are targeting the right pathway for a 
disease with a particular agent’ commented a Nature editorial (Harnessing 
open innovation, 2009). Unlike other high-tech industries (such as the 
software industry) the information imbalance in the pharmaceutical 
industry  is higher. Therefore, more information with of the right kind 
should be fluent among different companies and organizations to lower 
the risks and costs for drug discovery. To do so, initiatives that aim to 
engage entire research communities to interact with integrated models of 
disease, to refine them and judge their accuracy are needed (Harnessing 
open innovation, 2009). Presently, it appears to be very early days. 
(2)  For connection,  a  more open and connected ecosystem is  needed  in 
Pharmaceutical industry. A closer examination made by Munos (2009) 
confirms that the expected NME output and the number of companies are 
closely correlated in a nonlinear manner that explains 95% of the changes 
in expected NME output by changes in the number of companies. As the 
number of companies (inclusive of SMEs) increases, the expected NME 
output increases more than proportionally, suggesting a positive 
stimulatory effect of SMEs. This is possibly because a larger community of 
companies could accelerate the acquisition of knowledge and enable all 
115 | Page 
     Chapter 4. Indices of Innovation: 
Strategic Application of Open Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
companies to be more productive in the area. Therefore, if the innovation 
networks could be organized in the pharmaceutical industry, SMEs will 
benefit from the development expertise owned by major pharmaceuticals, 
and large companies will harness the scientific diversity and more 
productive R&D in SMEs. This would be a potential win-win game lowering 
the cost and increasing the output for both SMEs and major 
pharmaceuticals. 
4.6.3  The Search for a New Prescription: Emerging Variations  
Our DEA and MI analyses also revealed some interesting variations in 
company strategies that could be described as ‘hybrid’ rather than ‘pure OI’ 
strategies. In contrast to the general decline of R&D efficiency across the 
sample company group over the period, there were several companies that 
performed better during the testing period: Daichi, TAKEDA, Abbott 
showed a more stable performance on the R&D efficiency, while Novo’s 
R&D efficiency had been increasing steadily since 1998. These companies’ 
superior performance may reflect their specific individual strategies 
relative to other players. Novo Nordisk is highly focused on two particular 
disease areas, TAKEDA and Daichi are entrenched in and highly focused 
on their home-country markets, and Abbott sells products and services in 
addition to drugs (Munos, 2009).  
Compared with the other mainstream pharmaceutical companies, TAKEDA, 
Daichi and Abbott also showed stable R&D efficiency based on their stable 
PTE and SE performance. These  niche-market and the conglomerate 
business strategies may help these companies differentiate themselves 
and survive from the recession in a better state. However, these strategies 
may be not suitable for other major pharmaceutical companies, or at least 
could not satisfy their global ambitions and existing drug-focused future. 
If these strategies do not work, Novo could be exhibiting an interesting 
alternative model part way between open and closed, that might  be 
termed ‘focused innovation’. Novo is the worldwide leader healthcare 
company in diabetes care (Gasparin, 2010). This business strategy 
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focusing on one or several disease areas is defined as ‘Focused 
Innovation’ in the pharmaceutical industry. Focused innovation  may not 
have helped Novo be as successful as the other big pharmaceutical 
companies at the beginning, as indicated by Novo’s lower R&D efficiency 
at the beginning compared with others. However, this company really 
showed an increase since 1998. The result become is more intriguing for 
the OI hypothesis, when it is taken into account that Novo is also an OI 
adopter. Gasparin (2010) found that OI is used in different projects in 
Novo, and continuing to make experiment with OI may be the way to 
expand the innovative capabilities of the device development within Novo. 
If Novo had followed the common trend in the pharmaceutical moving to 
OI around 2000, then it might explain why it experienced the R&D 
efficiency decline at the beginning while started to increase since 1998. 
Only adopting focused innovation  could not help it to increase its R&D 
efficiency, while when it came with OI Novo’s R&D efficiency showed a 
continuous increase. In the further analysis, it is found that this ‘focused 
innovation  + open innovation’ strategy (FI+OI) may help  the company 
improve its pure R&D efficiency because of a huge increase of its PTE 
since 1998. Since Novo’s SE is still  far away from the highest R&D 
efficiency, it still has the space to improve its R&D efficiency through 
increasing R&D inputs following  FI+OI. As previously discussed, as the 
industry remains to highly dependent on R&D, the pharmaceutical industry 
is a science business totally different from many other traditional 
industries. More deep and broad professional collaboration should be 
developed based on the certain disease areas. Therefore, ‘FI+OI’ may be 
one of the  prescriptions  for  sustainable  success in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
4.7  Concluding Remarks  
Given the acute  lack of recent  studies  of  OI in the industry,  and the 
national and global economic importance of the industry,  this  study 
addressed the key question of whether OI is proving an effective strategy 
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for the  pharmaceutical industry, and how R&D productivity can  best  be 
measured. 
The initial review of the literature  confirmed the now well-established 
picture of escalating R&D spending, rising regulatory barriers, and static 
new drug approvals, that have opposed R&D efficiency  gain for several 
decades. Previous studies also provided evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
M&A as a strategy and the clear lack of effect of simply the increasing of 
R&D investment, both of which were confirmed with the quantitative DEA 
and MI techniques. 
Overall, the results of DEA and MI analyses indicated that: 
(1)  The  ‘Indices  of  innovation’  based on DEA and MI as  developed and 
applied in  this study were  demonstrated to be suitable for measuring 
innovation performance for OI, and probably other types of innovation 
(2)  Applying these techniques revealed that the  R&D efficiency of the 
pharmaceutical industry is changing only  slowly: the R&D efficiency of 
industry declined steadily over the period 1994 to 2003 although the rate 
of decline has slowed since 1999.  
(3) Although other interpretations may exist, OI is still a leading candidate 
as an explanation for some or all of the change in R&D efficiency. 
(4) Other strategies for innovation also came to light, including ‘hybrid’ 
strategy combinations such as  ‘focused’  innovation  -  a  niche  market 
strategy based on limiting the number of therapeutic areas, combined with 
elements of open innovation  -  which may prove a viable future 
prescription for the pharmaceutical industry. 
(5) Although OI activities and new forms of ‘open’ intervention continue to 
arise, OI activities to date appear to have fallen far short of the industry’s 
sustainable growth requirements.  
The findings of this study have a number of implications for policy: 
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Given the increasing mobility of expertise of the science base, broader and 
deeper  collaboration is needed to stimulate the improvement of R&D 
productivity  in the pharmaceutical  industry.  The industry should say 
goodbye to the old time ‘command and control’ world of in-house (closed 
innovation), and open their boundary to embrace ‘open’ R&D and 
commercialization opportunities outside (OI).  Judging by the present 
study, there is still a long way for the pharmaceutical industry to go in 
being  successful in exploiting  the  possibilities of OI  in the digital  age. 
Moving into OI, the industry needs to overcome several serious barriers 
and face up to the severe management challenges involved in fundamental 
shifts of strategy and core competency. To help the pharmaceutical 
industry embrace OI and benefit from it, more studies are needed  to 
explore and overcome these barriers. 
Finally with respect to the outcome of this industry-level pharmaceutical 
study, it was perhaps no surprise to find no marked industry-level effects 
showing to date: the null hypothesis would be no change, with a positive 
change occurring if or when OI is effective at the industrial level. However, 
what we have observed so far is that the long-term decline in R&D 
efficiency over recent decades has started to slow, if only slightly.  This is 
admittedly a somewhat tantalising result at this stage. However, we have 
also been able to make the prediction that if OI is indeed effective at a 
sector  level, assuming adoption of OI in the period 2000-2005, and 
allowing for a product lead time of 10 years to elapse, we might 
reasonably expect to see any marked positive effects beginning to show 
up after approximately 2015.  So ends this paper: if OI is working, the 
industry’s R&D efficiency should begin to rise some time after 2015.  
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5.  Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1  Review of Findings 
5.1.1  Model Selection and Validation 
To answer the first question  of  whether  quantitative methods can  be 
identified, adapted, or developed to systematically measure the R&D 
efficiency of companies or sectors, data envelopment analysis (DEA) was 
been identified from the literature and then been selected and adapted to 
measure innovation and economic impact: specifically, changes in R&D 
efficiency.  The suitability and applicability of this technique was first 
explored in the study of the R&D efficiency in China’s high-tech industry. 
In  this research, the R&D efficiency in China’s high-tech industry was 
measured across sectors over approximately one decade. DEA was used to 
generate quantitative indices for comparison study respectively on three 
levels: the whole industry, the five sectors and the sub-sectors.  This 
analysis shows that overall R&D efficiency in China’s high-tech industry 
did not change during the test period, despite the sustained R&D 
investment in China. Most of the sectors fluctuated on R&D efficiency over 
the  period  with the Computer sector showing highest performance and 
Aerospace sector performing lowest. Most sectors and sub-sectors 
suffered decreasing returns to scale (DRS), presumably reflecting the 
current R&D investment have beyond the industry’s absorbing capability 
which leads to R&D investment inefficiency. The further analysis suggests 
that the problem of China’s high-tech industry may be from the 
inefficiency of its technology commercialization processes, with clear 
implications for state investment policy.  
5.1.2  Further Application and Examination 
The first study  explored and validated the  base  technique for the R&D 
efficiency  measurement.  And  DEA has been demonstrated to produce 
suitable indices for measuring R&D efficiency across  China’s high-tech 
industry analysis. The next step question was to understand ‘Could such 
121 | Page 
     Chapter 5. Conclusion 
measures be used to assess changes in OI performance through analysing 
the performance of R&D efficiency before and after OI adoption’.  To 
answer this question, the case study of Procter and Gamble (P&G) was 
analysed as a test case for  OI. Since P&G is a widely recognised  early 
adopter of OI  and highly depends on OI strategy (Huston and Sakkab, 
2006;  Enkel et al, 2009), it was  the most suitable study sample for 
measuring OI performance. The most important benefit for OI adoption is 
to increase the R&D productivity (Ili et al., 2010). The relative performance 
of OI-based and pre-OI strategies could be measured through the analysis 
of P&G’s R&D efficiency in both pre and post open periods. The results of 
these studies were cross-checked using another metric for economic 
impact identified in the initial research – the MI analysis, the results of 
which were consistent with those from the DEA analysis.  
A more detailed analysis of the time-course revealed that the R&D 
efficiency of P&G improved rapidly and substantially after its embracing of 
OI, an effect termed as the ‘open rise’, although there was also a transient 
decline in R&D efficiency at the beginning of OI adoption (‘open dip’), and 
an unexpected and marked decline (‘open drop’) after the peak positive 
effect  midway through the data period.  This is the first time to our 
knowledge that a seemingly sustained drop in performance is observed 
after the adoption of an open innovation strategy.  This apparent effect 
warrants further investigation with a wider.  The  ‘open  dip’  could 
reasonably be interpreted as a temporary loss of efficiency during 
transition to the new strategy, while the ‘open drop’ may have a number of 
possible interpretations ranging from absorption of the relevant market 
opportunities to inconsistent execution of partnering activities. This 
“Three-Stage’ model of OI adoption is proposed as a theoretical construct 
to guide be tested and further refined or refuted in future research.  
5.1.3  Deeper Study and Understanding 
In the case study of P&G, the ‘indices of innovation’ have been developed 
and demonstrated to measure the OI performance. So could such methods 
be used to test or predict the effectiveness of strategies proposed or 
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assumed to produce more efficient R&D for the pharmaceutical industry 
than the previous or current strategies? To answer this question, both DEA 
and MI have been applied to measuring the R&D efficiency in the 10 top 
pharmaceutical companies over the past decade (1994-2011). Although a 
continuous decline of R&D efficiency has been found both in the industry 
and most companies, there is evidence at both industry and firm levels 
showing the tapering off of the decline and more stable performance on 
R&D efficiency after year  2000.  Moving to OI is one possible  possible 
interpretation for this change. The research also provides evidence for the 
failure of former strategies in the pharmaceutical industry such as M&As 
and increasing the R&D investment. The  possibility  of other strategies 
such as niche market or focused innovation (FI) strategies was observed in 
this study. The  success of Novo in  increasing R&D efficiency by using 
multiple strategies rather than a ‘pure OI’ strategy leads to the further 
idea of hybrid strategies such as ‘focused innovation + open innovation’ 
(FI+OI).  Therefore, FI+OI may be an attractive prescription for the 
continuous success for some companies in the pharmaceutical industry. 
5.2  Policy Implications 
Throughout this three-step study, the main research question – whether OI 
is the best strategic  prescription for the pharmaceutical industry –  has 
been answered  in part.  Through the analysis of ‘indices of innovation’, 
moving to OI may be one route  for the better performance of R&D 
efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry in  the post-open  period, but 
other prescription may also  address the industry’s challenge. However, 
how to implement OI is still a question needs to be answered given the 
lack of relevant knowledge and experience in the industry. 
5.2.1  Identify the OI Barriers in the Pharmaceuticals  
As OI is still a new idea, implementation and management experience is 
limited, and barriers may exist when pharmaceutical companies move 
toward it.  
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The main barriers for pharmaceutical companies adopting OI strategy 
appear to be:  
(1) How to encourage people and organizations to contribute or share 
more but at the same time to protect their benefit and privacy?  
(2) How to share the benefit and right of the research results produced by 
OI collaboration?  
To overcome these barriers, companies could develop their management 
capabilities in several respects: 
(1) Consolidate Research Direction. Since different partners may have 
different goals for joining the OI club, they may be using different metrics 
to measure the outputs (Vargas et al., 2010). Therefore, controlling the 
direction of research in a network may be very important (Strauss, 2010). 
To control the direction, the standard method should be developed to 
judge the success of each stage in OI process. And at the same time, retain 
and guide incentives for both academic community and companies, such 
as IP or the right to publish are maintained (Harnessing open innovation, 
2009). 
(2) Flexible Management of  IP. Adopting OI doesn’t mean ignoring IP 
protection. In contrast, in order to encourage collaboration and 
engagement, IP should be fully protected. IP rights are the currency that 
fuels OI. If companies are dependent on the benevolence of a benefactor 
to fund the good ideas, OI activities will fail at the end (Harnessing open 
innovation, 2009). IP protection in the OI environment will be more 
challenging compared with closed environment. The first problem that 
must be solved is the ownership of the IP, which could be decided even in 
the pre-competitive initiatives stage. In some cases now the 
pharmaceutical companies want the information to enter the public 
domain to encourage research. However, both academic groups and SMEs 
participating in consortia want to retain the right to protect the IP around 
a particular biomarker (Harnessing open innovation, 2009). Therefore, 
proactive and flexible methods of IP management must be developed 
before moving into OI.   
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(3)  Frame  the Commercial Terms. Profit and/or share  allocation should 
also be considered at an early stage. Assessing and rewarding the value 
the different groups bring to the project will be one of the challenges 
increasingly faced when moving into OI (Judd, 2013).  In Hunter and 
Stephens’ study (2010), they give a suggestion for academic-industrial 
collaboration: there has been some progress in the use of ‘boilerplate 
agreements’ (for example, the Lambert Agreements in the UK) that aid 
discussion by starting from a point that is appropriate to the particular 
collaborative situation. They believe this is an approach that could be 
explored more widely for a range of sectors, including pharmaceuticals.  
(4) Manage the Network.  Pharmaceutical OI has been fostered and 
cultivated by internet and social networking platforms (Talaga, 2010). 
‘Innovation technology’ such as information and communication 
technologies helps to support the success of OI (Dodgson et al., 2006). 
Therefore, managing the relevant communication technology is important 
to guarantee the success of OI in Pharmaceutical industry. New technology 
must be effectively deployed to maximize the benefits of OI. For example, 
the building of expertise networks and databases to allow the best 
partners to work with each other and dissemination of information about 
projects across an organization (Hunter and Stephens, 2010). On the other 
hand, now internet technology is creating more and more new tools and 
approaches for researchers: aside from the obvious case of Google, 
companies like Facebook, for example,  have mastered how you handle 
petabyte-scale data distributed over massively parallel architectures and 
then integrate back to users – that’s the kind of problem facing biology 
and pharmaceutical now (Harnessing open innovation, 2009).  
In summary, pharmaceutical companies who intend to adopt OI strategy 
should be fully prepared and recognize the new challenges from R&D 
management, IP management and network management (see Figure 5.1).  
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5.2.2  Overcoming Management Challenges: New Models of OI Adoption 
To overcome the challenges and realize the benefit of OI, not only new 
variants of Open Innovation theories, processes and tools are needed, but 
also other management practices in companies need updating and even 
revolutionizing for effective execution in the new model world. To adopt 
OI strategy requires the efforts of every  department in the company. 
Realizing OI is not just the innovation management job, it should be a 
general management target.  There are also a number of specific 
management strands required in this approach: 
In human resource management, individuals who not only have relevant 
scientific expertise, but also possess strong external networks and are 
skilled in working with external organizations should be employed. At the 
same time, employee roles may need to be redefined to ensure sufficient 
continuity with external organizations, and to ensure knowledge is being 
maintained within the enterprise (Hunter and Stephens, 2010). 
In corporate culture management, senior management must recognize that 
resources have to be applied to nurture collaborations and monitor their 
progress to ensure success (Hunter and Stephens, 2010). All staff in the 
company should understand and positively get involved into this change, 
and embrace a more open and fully collaboration environment.  Culture 
management is also important between partners. Cultural and commercial 
differences between partners may constitute a serious hurdle in the 
negotiation process towards a successful risk sharing agreement in an OI 
frame (Talaga, 2009). 
In operational management, an integrated internal process to develop, 
manage and implement such type of OI alliances should be set-up. In 
particular, the management of OI collaboration should be performed in the 
same manner that Pharmaceutical industry is actually managing its 
internal project portfolio (Talaga, 2009).  
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In risk management, a major issue, especially for newcomers, is actually 
related to the evaluation of the risk and the costs that such business 
model will imply, at each phase of the process. 
Given the trend of moving to OI, there will be more pharmaceutical 
companies choosing the OI strategy in the future. However, since it is a 
relatively new concept, not enough theory and tools have been developed 
and demonstrated, especially in the Pharmaceutical industry. Studying 
from successful cases in other industries could be one available tactic. But 
this would have to be based on the full understanding of the 
characteristics of Pharmaceutical industry. More recent and promising are 
OI initiatives such as pre-competitive collaboration, covering wide 
interests in different disease areas, especially for big pharmaceutical 
companies. For the future success of OI in Pharmaceuticals,  more tools 
and pathways to OI need to be developed in the stages of drug R&D, 
including tapping into open access or open source initiatives in the pre-
competitive stage. Companies could also more focus on their strong 
innovation areas, to establish more professional but deeper relationships 
instead of wider  but more superficial collaborations with external 
organizations. In other word, more OI initiatives should be launched in 
each stage of drug R&D to make the company own both internal and 
external excellent innovation capability and connection on its limited 
focusing areas. 
The Pharmaceutical-OI adoption model has been developed to give a tool 
for managing OI activities in the pharmaceutical industry (see Figure 5.2). 
This model has four main levels, from core competence through to 
consumer or partner organisations, which were linked by inbound and 
outbound processes operating through  various  transfer mechanisms to 
the market. There are four quadrants to the model which respectively 
represent the company’s core competence – Patent, Channel, Research and 
Data. For each quadrant, several OI activities which could be developed 
based on the corresponding core competence are selected to set up the 
links to the corresponding external resources. 
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Interpretation: the smallest circle includes the core competence of the big pharmaceutical 
company. The medium circle includes the OI activities the company could adopt. Based on 
the category by inbound-outbound and commercial and non-commercial, the activities could 
classify into four dimensions.  Each dimension corresponds to the individual core 
competence. The elements included into the big circle are the external resources which the 
big company could benefit from to accelerate its R&D productivity.  
Figure   5.2: Pharmaceutical-OI adoption model 
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5.3  Core Contributions, Limitations and Further 
Research 
5.3.1  Core Contributions 
The sequence of research papers reported in this thesis was developed to 
address the two important research gaps in the study of innovation and 
its ‘open’ variant:  
(1) The scarcity of attention dedicated to measure the performance of OI, 
as recently highlighted by several authors (e.g. Huizingh, 2011). 
(2) The lack of contributions that systematically and longitudinally assess 
the extent and the determinants of diffusion of the OI paradigm in a 
specific industry (Chiaroni et al., 2009). 
Through the development of three papers’ studies, this thesis explores (a) 
the feasibility if DEA and MI as quantitative econometric ‘indices of 
innovation’, (b) their correlation with a known case of open  innovation, 
and (c) to test the hypothesis that open innovation is increasing R&D 
efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry. The core contributions emerged 
from the broad findings and contributions through the study of this thesis: 
(1) A set of ‘indices of innovation’ has been explored and evaluated for 
measuring innovation performance at several levels and using a variety of 
data sources. 
(2)  Understanding  of  the  diffusion  of so-called  ‘open’  innovation  in a 
specific industry  has been enhanced by developing the possibility of 
testing  whether OI is increasing R&D efficiency or not, and therefore 
whether it as the potential to be an effective strategic prescription for the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
(3) On the basis of (2), the prediction can be made that if OI (or indeed any 
other innovation strategy being applied) is working in the pharmaceutical 
industry, it should show up on the indices within the period of 2015 to 
2020. 
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5.3.2  Limitations of Data and Interpretation 
(1) One restriction is that the exact time and degree of OI adoption by the 
firms is hard to define precisely, there are limited cases studied in this 
research because of the difficulty to find the suitable cases where these 
parameters are sufficiently clear. 
(2) In line with (1), due to the limitation of available  cases and lack of 
relevant data, the regression framework didn’t  develop  to identify the 
causal impact of OI by controlling for other elements that might affect the 
R&D performance. The regression studies are very important to help us 
better understand the characteristics of OI and guide the practitioners 
better adopt OI strategy. This kind of studies should be developed when 
research conditions are fulfilled.  
(3) The limitation of data affected the adoption of ideal variables and also 
the development of comparison studies for variable judgement.  The 
relevant research could go deeper when the relative data are available. 
(4) The failure to observe any significant impact of OI on the performance 
of the industry thus far could be due to product lead times in the 
pharmaceutical industry being up to the 8-13 years, which prevents a final 
conclusion at this point on whether or not OI is working in the 
pharmaceutical industry, but has allowed a clear testable prediction to be 
made. 
(5) This study didn’t explore the process performance of OI, which could 
be very important for understanding and improving the management of OI 
since innovation is more like one process. Network DEA  could be a 
suitable follow-up technique, which can be employed to develop this line 
of investigation in the future. 
5.3.3  Further Research 
The study has addressed two research gaps in OI research: (1) the scarce 
attention dedicated to measuring innovation performance, in this case in 
relation to adoption of OI; and (2) The lack of contributions that assess the 
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adoption and applicability of the OI paradigm specific industries  other 
than high-tech. Studies which could follow on from this work include: 
(1)  More  classic and early OI adopters could be studied and measured 
through the ‘indices  of  innovation’  to provide more evidence of the 
efficacy or otherwise of OI, or other innovation strategies for R&D.  
(2) Both quantitative and qualitative studies could be developed to verify 
the exist of the three-stage OI adoption model, and also dig the primary 
interpretations for both ‘open dip’ and ‘open drop’.  
(3) Other case studies are needed to support the existing of ‘three 
alternative scenarios ’, and more importantly to find the way overcoming 
the management challenges.   
(4)  Given  more evidence of  the  advantages  of OI adoption, the future 
performance of R&D efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry should be 
studied when the firms’ data is available. 
(5) More case studies both from quantitative and qualitative studies are 
needed to fill up our knowledge about ‘FI+OI’  strategy, and more work 
should be done to support the management practice for this strategy.  
(6) The OI performance in other industries could be measured and studied 
through the ‘indices of innovation’ developed in this work to contribute 
our understanding about OI. 
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Appendices 
Table A.1: Technical efficiency scores of five high-tech sectors in years 
1997-2008 (2-year time lag) 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1997  0.144  0.095  0.648  1  0.227 
1998  0.282  0.11  0.557  1  0.296 
1999  0.26  0.197  0.608  0.816  0.296 
2000  0.186  0.083  0.482  1  0.355 
2001  0.297  0.136  0.49  0.782  0.223 
2002  0.256  0.098  0.407  1  0.246 
2003  0.366  0.163  0.381  1  0.346 
2004  0.329  0.168  0.519  1  0.497 
2005  0.425  0.139  0.507  0.916  0.417 
2006  0.77  0.239  0.764  0.99  0.412 
2007  0.497  0.235  0.728  0.95  0.53 
2008  0.503  0.581  1  1  0.756 
 
Table A.2: Pure technical efficiency scores of five high-tech sectors in 
years 1997-2008 (2-year time lag) 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1997  0.154  0.096  1  1  0.248 
1998  0.287  0.115  0.931  1  0.343 
1999  0.262  0.211  0.929  0.868  0.318 
2000  0.194  0.094  0.968  1  0.383 
2001  0.3  0.14  0.972  0.881  0.231 
2002  0.268  0.131  0.855  1  0.254 
2003  0.368  0.191  0.908  1  0.356 
2004  0.329  0.168  1  1  0.514 
2005  0.439  0.235  0.816  1  0.486 
2006  0.835  0.241  0.873  1  0.468 
2007  0.512  0.244  1  1  0.585 
2008  0.57  0.619  1  1  1 
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Table A.3: Scale efficiency scores and returns to scale of five high-tech 
sectors in years 1997-2008 (2-year time lag) 
   Medicines  AAS   EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
Year  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS 
1997  0.935  drs  0.992  irs  0.648  drs  1  -  0.915  Irs 
1998  0.982  irs  0.955  irs  0.598  drs  1  -  0.863  Irs 
1999  0.993  irs  0.937  irs  0.654  drs  0.94  drs  0.932  Irs 
2000  0.959  drs  0.874  drs  0.498  drs  1  -  0.926  Irs 
2001  0.989  irs  0.974  drs  0.504  drs  0.888  drs  0.963  Irs 
2002  0.954  irs  0.746  drs  0.476  drs  1  -  0.967  Irs 
2003  0.996  irs  0.858  drs  0.419  drs  1  -  0.973  Irs 
2004  0.999  -  1  -  0.519  drs  1  -  0.966  Irs 
2005  0.967  drs  0.591  drs  0.622  drs  0.916  drs  0.858  Irs 
2006  0.923  irs  0.99  drs  0.875  drs  0.99  drs  0.88  Irs 
2007  0.97  irs  0.963  drs  0.728  drs  0.95  drs  0.906  Irs 
2008  0.882  irs  0.938  drs  1  -  1  -  0.756  Irs 
RTS is returns to scale. irs and drs for increasing and decreasing returns to scale, respectively. 
 
Table A.4: Technical efficiency scores of five high-tech sectors in years 
1999-2008 (4-year time lag) 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1999  0.265  0.119  0.611  1  0.414 
2000  0.296  0.097  0.584  1  0.624 
2001  0.484  0.105  0.658  0.604  0.584 
2002  0.446  0.071  0.45  0.976  0.54 
2003  0.544  0.188  0.632  1  0.614 
2004  0.436  0.161  0.622  1  0.498 
2005  0.568  0.092  0.598  1  0.645 
2006  0.671  0.144  0.816  1  0.801 
2007  0.554  0.217  0.824  1  0.685 
2008  0.653  0.406  1  0.824  1 
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Table A.5: Pure technical efficiency scores of five high-tech sectors in 
years 1999-2008 (4-year time lag) 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1999  0.292  0.119  1  1  0.446 
2000  0.296  0.098  0.957  1  0.63 
2001  0.484  0.106  0.9  0.644  0.589 
2002  0.446  0.119  0.784  0.985  0.543 
2003  0.545  0.19  0.957  1  0.638 
2004  0.474  0.165  1  1  0.508 
2005  0.581  0.155  0.894  1  0.646 
2006  0.686  0.149  0.984  1  0.802 
2007  0.561  0.226  1  1  0.708 
2008  0.676  0.412  1  1  1 
 
Table A.6: Scale efficiency scores and returns to scale of five high-tech 
sectors in years 1999-2008 (4-year time lag) 
   Medicines  AAS   EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
Year  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS 
1999  0.908  drs  0.999  -  0.611  drs  1  -  0.929  Irs 
2000  1  -  0.998  -  0.61  drs  1  -  0.99  Irs 
2001  0.999  -  0.995  irs  0.732  drs  0.937  drs  0.993  Irs 
2002  0.999  -  0.601  drs  0.574  drs  0.992  drs  0.994  Irs 
2003  0.998  drs  0.992  drs  0.661  drs  1  -  0.962  Irs 
2004  0.921  drs  0.976  drs  0.622  drs  1  -  0.981  Irs 
2005  0.977  drs  0.589  drs  0.669  drs  1  -  0.999  Irs 
2006  0.979  drs  0.966  drs  0.83  drs  1  -  0.999  Irs 
2007  0.986  drs  0.961  drs  0.824  drs  1  -  0.967  Drs 
2008  0.967  drs  0.985  drs  1  -  0.824  drs  1  - 
RTS is returns to scale. irs and drs for increasing and decreasing returns to scale, 
respectively. 
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Table A.7: Technical efficiency scores of five high-tech sectors in years 
1998-2008 (8-year time lag for the Medicines sector and 3-year time lag for 
others) 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1998 
 
0.072  0.546  1  0.282 
1999 
 
0.12  0.475  1  0.289 
2000 
 
0.141  0.611  0.72  0.411 
2001 
 
0.063  0.403  0.833  0.37 
2002 
 
0.125  0.449  0.758  0.345 
2003  0.683  0.104  0.426  1  0.416 
2004  0.759  0.168  0.471  1  0.372 
2005  0.828  0.093  0.617  1  0.534 
2006  0.81  0.149  0.707  0.956  0.507 
2007  1  0.313  1  0.951  0.752 
2008  0.905  0.281  1  0.887  1 
 
Table A.8: Pure Technical efficiency scores of high-tech sectors in years 
1998-2008 (8-year time lag for the Medicines sector and 3-year time lag for 
others) 
Year  Medicines  AAS  EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
1998 
 
0.072  1  1  0.357 
1999 
 
0.123  0.818  1  0.317 
2000 
 
0.143  1  0.792  0.486 
2001 
 
0.106  0.759  1  0.415 
2002 
 
0.163  0.794  0.874  0.373 
2003  0.726  0.153  0.838  1  0.441 
2004  0.765  0.168  1  1  0.387 
2005  0.829  0.165  0.936  1  0.556 
2006  0.854  0.172  0.808  1  0.525 
2007  1  0.322  1  1  0.769 
2008  0.911  0.337  1  1  1 
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Table A.9: Scale efficiency scores of high-tech sectors in years 1998-2008 
(8-year time lag for the Medicines sector and 3-year time lag for others) 
   Medicines  AAS   EEACE  CAOE   MEAMI 
Year  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS  SE  RTS 
1998 
   
0.997  -  0.546  drs  1  -  0.79  irs 
1999 
   
0.972  irs  0.58  drs  1  -  0.909  irs 
2000 
   
0.983  irs  0.611  drs  0.909  drs  0.847  irs 
2001 
   
0.595  drs  0.532  drs  0.833  drs  0.893  irs 
2002 
   
0.769  drs  0.566  drs  0.867  drs  0.924  irs 
2003  0.941  drs  0.68  drs  0.508  drs  1  -  0.945  irs 
2004  0.992  drs  1  -  0.471  drs  1  -  0.961  irs 
2005  0.999  drs  0.561  drs  0.66  drs  1  -  0.96  irs 
2006  0.948  drs  0.869  drs  0.875  drs  0.956  drs  0.966  irs 
2007  1  -  0.971  drs  1  -  0.951  drs  0.978  irs 
2008  0.993  drs  0.833  drs  1  -  0.887  drs  1  - 
RTS is returns to scale. irs and drs for increasing and decreasing returns to scale, respectively. 
 
Table A.10: Technical efficiency scores of five companies including P&G (1-
year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                
   1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Unilever  0.572  0.582  0.663  0.597  0.616  0.553  0.578  0.53  0.465  0.483 
Procter & 
Gamble  0.563  0.51  0.513  0.59  0.619  0.657  0.702  0.832  0.739  0.674 
Henkel  0.497  0.472  0.773  0.813  1  0.728  0.891  0.869  0.68  0.986 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.963  1  1  0.933  0.802  0.78  0.805  1  0.678  0.818 
Clorox  0.857  0.638  0.717  0.744  0.868  0.871  1  1  0.815  0.787 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009    
Unilever  0.522  0.515  0.476  0.446  0.517  0.592  0.506  0.638  0.575 
  Procter & 
Gamble  0.718  0.799  0.876  0.822  1  0.96  0.951  0.885  0.902 
  Henkel  0.664  0.69  0.624  0.52  0.524  0.565  0.466  0.533  0.514 
  Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.849  0.992  1  0.796  1  0.937  1  1  1 
  Clorox  0.793  0.821  0.851  0.787  0.848  0.869  0.813  0.91  0.956    
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Table A.11: Pure technical efficiency scores of five companies including 
P&G (1-year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                
   1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Unilever  0.869  0.879  1  0.96  1  0.906  0.909  0.852  0.761  0.817 
P& G  0.883  0.83  0.779  0.803  0.803  0.89  0.973  1  0.934  0.876 
Henkel  0.67  0.608  0.84  0.872  1  0.857  1  0.959  0.77  1 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.967  1  1  0.939  0.807  0.791  0.815  1  0.684  0.822 
Clorox  0.86  0.725  1  0.862  1  1  1  1  0.824  0.79 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009    
Unilever  0.896  0.867  0.805  0.75  0.84  0.947  0.81  1  0.931 
  P& G  0.916  0.987  1  0.878  1  1  1  1  1 
  Henkel  0.727  0.799  0.812  0.715  0.738  0.804  0.676  0.775  0.746 
  Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.87  0.994  1  0.803  1  0.955  1  1  1 
  Clorox  0.802  0.87  0.852  0.788  0.848  0.869  0.836  0.91  0.956    
 
Table A.12: Scale efficiency of five companies including P&G (1-year time 
lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
   1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Unilever  0.658  0.662  0.663  0.621  0.616  0.61  0.636  0.622  0.611  0.592 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs  Drs 
P&G  0.637  0.614  0.658  0.735  0.771  0.738  0.721  0.832  0.791  0.769 
  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs  Drs 
Henkel  0.741  0.776  0.921  0.933  1  0.85  0.891  0.907  0.883  0.986 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  -  drs  Drs  drs  drs  Drs 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.997  1  1  0.994  0.994  0.986  0.989  1  0.991  0.995 
 
drs  -  -  irs  irs  irs  Irs  -  drs  Irs 
Clorox  0.996  0.881  0.717  0.864  0.868  0.871  1  1  0.989  0.996 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  -  -  irs  Irs 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
 
Unilever  0.583  0.593  0.592  0.595  0.615  0.625  0.624  0.638  0.618 
 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs 
 
P&G  0.783  0.809  0.876  0.937  1  0.96  0.951  0.885  0.902 
 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  -  drs  Drs  drs  drs 
 
Henkel  0.913  0.863  0.768  0.728  0.709  0.704  0.689  0.688  0.689   
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs 
 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.977  0.998  1  0.992  1  0.98  1  1  1   
 
drs  irs  -  drs  -  drs  -  -  - 
 
Clorox  0.988  0.943  0.999  0.998  1  1  0.973  1  1 
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   irs  irs  drs  drs  -  -  Drs  -  -    
 
 
Table A.13: Technical efficiency scores of five companies including P&G (3-
year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Unilever  0.479  0.606  0.607  0.626  0.507  0.477  0.456  0.449  0.459  0.458 
P & G  0.488  0.453  0.431  0.456  0.517  0.622  0.695  0.832  0.712  0.649 
Henkel  0.329  0.44  0.584  0.728  0.916  0.633  0.765  0.868  0.575  0.744 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.888  0.942  1  1  0.82  0.735  0.98  0.836  0.82  0.718 
Clorox  0.927  0.538  0.506  0.697  0.765  0.879  1  0.99  0.754  0.708 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008    
Unilever  0.463  0.459  0.396  0.381  0.413  0.409  0.508  0.496  0.543 
  P & G  0.642  0.675  0.712  0.901  0.967  0.958  0.711  0.709  0.601 
  Henkel  0.652  0.494  0.604  0.507  0.526  0.446  0.503  0.444  0.413 
  Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.941  1  0.93  0.933  1  1  1  0.947  1 
  Clorox  0.736  0.699  0.668  0.616  0.617  0.67  0.798  0.817  0.583    
 
Table A. 14: Pure technical efficiency scores of five companies including 
P&G (3-year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Unilever  0.81  0.976  0.98  1  0.887  0.846  0.813  0.756  0.787  0.827 
P&G  0.952  0.857  0.862  0.834  0.871  0.866  0.95  1  0.905  0.874 
Henkel  0.545  0.661  0.738  0.871  1  0.927  0.95  0.983  0.777  0.888 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.888  0.943  1  1  0.82  0.755  1  0.857  0.847  0.764 
Clorox  1  0.552  0.507  1  0.937  1  1  0.991  0.819  0.715 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008    
Unilever  0.922  0.898  0.765  0.727  0.778  0.744  0.937  0.921  0.981 
  P&G  0.889  0.957  0.968  1  1  1  0.996  0.947  1 
  Henkel  0.817  0.775  0.873  0.777  0.827  0.743  0.822  0.752  0.706 
  Reckitt 
Benckiser  0.962  1  0.936  0.946  1  1  1  0.968  1 
  Clorox  0.74  0.699  0.687  0.702  0.706  0.75  0.807  0.826  0.654    
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Table A.15: Scale efficiency scores of five companies including P&G (3-year 
lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input                   
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Unilever  0.591  0.62  0.62  0.626  0.572  0.564  0.561  0.594  0.583  0.554 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
P&G  0.512  0.529  0.5  0.546  0.594  0.718  0.731  0.832  0.787  0.743 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
Henkel  0.604  0.666  0.791  0.836  0.916  0.683  0.805  0.882  0.74  0.838 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
Reckitt B.  1  0.999  1  1  1  0.974  0.98  0.975  0.968  0.94 
 
-  drs  -  -  -  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
Clorox  0.927  0.974  0.998  0.697  0.817  0.879  1  0.999  0.92  0.99 
 
irs  drs  drs  irs  irs  irs  -  drs  drs  drs 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008    
Unilever  0.502  0.51  0.517  0.524  0.531  0.55  0.543  0.538  0.554 
 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
P&G  0.722  0.705  0.736  0.901  0.967  0.958  0.714  0.748  0.601 
 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Henkel  0.798  0.637  0.691  0.653  0.636  0.601  0.612  0.591  0.585 
 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs 
 
Reckitt B.  0.979  1  0.993  0.986  1  1  1  0.978  1 
 
 
drs  -  irs  drs  -  -  -  drs  - 
 
Clorox  0.994  1  0.972  0.877  0.874  0.894  0.989  0.989  0.892 
 
   irs  -  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs    
 
Table A.16: Technical efficiency scores of pharmaceutical companies (7-
year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input             
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Pfizer   0.6  0.551  0.55  0.555  0.369  0.442  0.387  0.462  0.437 
J&J   0.507  0.656  0.448  0.44  0.545  0.595  0.51  0.481  0.467 
Merck   0.66  0.523  0.384  0.397  0.393  0.393  0.349  0.376  0.359 
TAKEDA  0.73  0.705  0.658  0.612  0.543  0.544  0.437  0.424  0.422 
Abbott   1  0.805  0.54  0.425  0.455  0.458  0.405  0.442  0.73 
Bristol  0.925  0.897  1  0.933  0.771  0.414  0.397  0.391  0.39 
AstraZeneca  0.478  0.452  0.396  0.444  0.429  0.435  0.412  0.461  0.438 
Novo   0.552  0.563  0.591  0.508  0.644  0.691  0.66  0.811  0.884 
Daichi  0.733  0.71  0.661  0.576  0.851  0.539  0.547  0.568  0.669 
Lilly  0.454  0.53  0.329  0.327  0.318  0.441  0.44  0.486  0.45 
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Table A.17: Pure technical efficiency scores of pharmaceutical companies 
(7-year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input             
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Pfizer   0.682  0.611  0.578  0.583  0.451  0.489  0.439  0.553  0.561 
J&J   0.517  0.664  0.454  0.512  0.653  0.596  0.519  0.482  0.468 
Merck   0.682  0.543  0.39  0.404  0.399  0.397  0.351  0.376  0.359 
TAKEDA  0.819  0.904  0.873  0.881  0.891  0.98  0.951  0.975  1 
Abbott   1  0.875  0.614  0.537  0.621  0.694  0.681  0.744  1 
Bristol  0.947  0.898  1  0.934  0.822  0.781  0.735  0.792  1 
AstraZeneca  0.507  0.467  0.404  0.458  0.443  0.44  0.435  0.478  0.517 
Novo   0.653  0.836  0.927  0.709  0.742  0.866  0.821  0.863  1 
Daichi  1  1  1  1  1  0.649  0.635  0.647  0.724 
Lilly  1  1  0.736  0.579  0.609  1  0.876  0.901  0.718 
 
Table A.18: Scale technical efficiency scores of pharmaceutical companies 
(7-year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input             
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Abbott   0.879  0.902  0.952  0.951  0.817  0.902  0.881  0.836  0.778 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs 
Lilly   0.981  0.988  0.987  0.86  0.834  0.999  0.984  0.999  0.998 
 
irs  irs  drs  drs  drs  irs  drs  Irs  irs 
TAKEDA  0.967  0.963  0.986  0.984  0.986  0.992  0.996  0.998  0.999 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  - 
Bristol  0.891  0.779  0.754  0.695  0.609  0.556  0.459  0.435  0.422 
 
drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs 
AstraZeneca  1  0.921  0.879  0.791  0.732  0.66  0.594  0.594  0.73 
 
-  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs 
Merck  0.976  0.999  1  0.999  0.938  0.53  0.541  0.493  0.39 
 
irs  irs  -  irs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs 
Daichi  0.942  0.967  0.98  0.971  0.969  0.987  0.946  0.964  0.848 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  drs  Drs  drs 
Pfizer  0.846  0.674  0.638  0.717  0.869  0.797  0.804  0.94  0.884 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  irs 
J&J  0.733  0.71  0.661  0.576  0.851  0.831  0.862  0.877  0.924 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  irs 
Novo   0.454  0.53  0.447  0.564  0.523  0.441  0.503  0.54  0.627 
   irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  irs 
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Table A.19: Technical efficiency scores of pharmaceutical companies (9-
year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input             
   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Pfizer   0.607  0.624  0.634  0.696  0.656  0.366  0.465  0.485  0.415 
J&J   0.818  0.602  0.626  0.705  0.582  0.532  0.6  0.533  0.45 
Merck   0.764  0.471  0.407  0.41  0.489  0.452  0.444  0.386  0.362 
TAKEDA  1  0.739  0.662  0.6  0.607  0.551  0.486  0.525  0.551 
Abbott   1  0.716  0.622  0.652  0.676  0.605  0.605  0.745  0.668 
Bristol  1  1  0.874  0.75  0.77  0.643  0.396  0.512  0.434 
AstraZeneca  0.631  0.464  0.447  0.434  0.47  0.517  0.529  0.492  0.56 
Novo   0.679  0.522  0.452  0.664  0.727  0.687  0.747  0.808  0.855 
Daichi  0.988  0.882  0.596  0.858  0.871  0.898  0.606  0.73  0.733 
Lilly  0.685  0.403  0.48  0.401  0.342  0.344  0.476  0.461  0.612 
 
 
Table A.20: Pure technical efficiency scores of pharmaceutical companies 
(9-year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input             
   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Pfizer   0.638  0.665  0.644  0.697  0.659  0.463  0.553  0.567  0.52 
J&J   0.827  0.605  0.626  0.741  0.637  0.584  0.6  0.535  0.45 
Merck   0.765  0.472  0.411  0.41  0.489  0.456  0.445  0.386  0.38 
TAKEDA  1  0.945  0.938  0.93  1  0.985  0.993  0.991  1 
Abbott   1  0.717  0.652  0.712  0.761  0.729  0.772  1  0.928 
Bristol  1  1  0.925  0.837  0.807  0.742  0.792  1  0.934 
AstraZeneca  0.648  0.47  0.448  0.447  0.476  0.518  0.553  0.576  0.63 
Novo   0.701  0.576  0.61  0.76  0.765  0.721  0.783  0.85  0.895 
Daichi  1  0.939  0.71  1  1  1  0.658  0.785  0.792 
Lilly  1  0.765  0.737  0.668  0.524  0.597  1  0.863  0.913 
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Table A.21: Scale technical efficiency scores of pharmaceutical companies 
(9-year time lag) 
Firm  Year of R&D activity input             
   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Abbott   0.95  0.939  0.983  0.999  0.996  0.792  0.842  0.855  0.799 
 
irs  irs  irs  -  irs  Drs  drs  drs  drs 
Lilly   0.989  0.996  0.999  0.951  0.914  0.91  1  0.997  1 
 
irs  irs  irs  drs  drs  Drs  -  drs  - 
TAKEDA  0.998  0.999  0.991  0.999  0.999  0.993  0.996  0.999  0.953 
 
irs  irs  irs  -  -  Irs  irs  -  drs 
Bristol  1  0.782  0.706  0.645  0.607  0.559  0.49  0.529  0.551 
 
-  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs  drs 
AstraZeneca  1  0.998  0.953  0.916  0.889  0.83  0.784  0.745  0.719 
 
-  drs  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs  drs 
Merck  1  1  0.945  0.896  0.955  0.867  0.5  0.512  0.464 
 
-  -  drs  drs  drs  Drs  drs  drs  drs 
Daichi  0.973  0.986  0.998  0.972  0.987  0.997  0.957  0.854  0.889 
 
irs  irs  drs  drs  drs  Irs  drs  drs  drs 
Pfizer  0.968  0.905  0.742  0.873  0.95  0.952  0.954  0.951  0.955 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  irs  irs  irs 
J&J  0.988  0.939  0.84  0.858  0.871  0.898  0.922  0.93  0.926 
 
irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  irs  irs  irs 
Novo   0.685  0.527  0.651  0.6  0.652  0.577  0.476  0.534  0.67 
   irs  irs  irs  irs  irs  Irs  irs  irs  irs 
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